Everything you need to know about ranked-choice voting in one spot. Click to learn more!

"Reforming the Administrative State" by Elaine Kamarck and Tony Mills (2017)

From Ballotpedia
Jump to: navigation, search
New Administrative State Banner.png
Administrative State
Administrative State Icon Gold.png
Five Pillars of the Administrative State
•Agency control
• Executive control
• Judicial control
•Legislative control
• Public Control
Click here for more coverage of the administrative state on Ballotpedia.
Click here to access Ballotpedia's administrative state legislation tracker.

"Reforming the Administrative State" (2017) is the fifth episode of The Future of the Administrative State, a six-episode podcast series produced by RealClearPolicy. The episode features host Tony Mills in an interview with Elaine Kamarck, a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution and a lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Karmack discusses the Clinton administration's efforts to modernize administrative agencies and the continuing challenges presented by developments in technology and private sector competition that make it difficult for administrative agencies to recruit a cutting-edge workforce. Kamarck also discusses contemporary challenges to congressional supervision of administrative agencies and proposes strategies for members of Congress to regain administrative oversight.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Authors: Elaine Kamarck, interviewed by Tony Mills
  • Source: The Future of the Administrative State, a podcast series hosted by Tony Mills and published by RealClearPolicy, July 27, 2017
  • Abstract: The podcast description provides the following summary of Kamarck's argument: "A founding director of the Clinton administration's National Performance Review, [Kamarck] makes a case for reforming rather than abandoning the administrative state by improving Congressional oversight, making agencies more efficient, and clarifying what we think the federal government should and should not be doing in the first place. Their discussion touches on the erosion of congressional power, civil service reform, and the impact of technology on the federal bureaucracy."[1]

    • Authors

    Elaine Kamarck

    Elaine Kamarck is an American political scholar. As of March 2018, she was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Governance Studies program, the director of Brookings' Center for Effective Public Management, and a lecturer in public policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. She served in the Clinton administration from 1993 to 1997, where she developed and led the National Performance Review, an effort to review and improve federal government processes. Kamarck "conducts research on 21st century government, the role of the Internet in political campaigns, homeland defense, intelligence reorganization, and governmental reform and innovation," according to her profile at The Brookings Institution. Below is a summary of Kamarck's education and career:[2]

    • Academic degrees:[2]
      • A.B., Bryn Mawr College (1972)
      • M.A., University of California, Berkeley (1974)
      • Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley (1986)
    • Senior fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings Institution
    • Director, Center for Effective Public Management, Brookings Institution
    • Lecturer in public policy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
    • 2000: Senior policy advisor, Gore 2000 presidential campaign
    • 1993-1997: Senior policy advisor to the Vice President of the United States Al Gore
    • 1989-1993: Senior fellow, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.

    Tony Mills

    Tony (M. Anthony) Mills is an American writer and editor. As of March 2018, he worked as the editor for RealClearPolicy. He hosted the 2017 podcast series The Future of the Administrative State. Mills previously worked as an editor for Big Questions Online and as an associate editor for The New Atlantis. Below is a summary of Mills' education and career:[3]

    • Academic degrees:
      • B.A./M.A., Northwestern University
      • M.A., University of Notre Dame
      • Ph.D., University of Notre Dame
    • 2016 - Present: Editor, RealClearPolicy
    • 2015-2017: Editor, Big Questions Online
    • 2015-2017: Associate editor, The New Atlantis

    Functions of administrative agencies

    Mills and Kamarck open the podcast with a discussion of the function of administrative agencies within a democracy, the limitations of administrative agencies, and alternatives to bureaucracy. Kamarck argues that administrative agencies, or bureaucratic institutions, are essential components of modern democratic governments that are born out of the rule of law—Congress makes the laws that administrative agencies implement.[1]

    “ Bureacracy is the means by which a government executes policy, pure and simple. Now, in a mature democracy—which we have and exists in some countries in the world—what happens is the bureaucracy exists as a result of the rule of law, and parliaments or congresses make laws over the years and the bureaucracy makes sure that what's on the books gets executed. Sometimes, the laws are very big and, therefore, the bureaucracies are very big. It takes over 100,000 people working full-time to make sure that people get their Social Security checks on time every month. And so, you know, we may think poorly of bureaucrats, but the fact of the matter is that if you suddenly fired everybody, there would be an awful lot of things that Americans value that wouldn't happen.[1][4] ”

    Though Kamarck argues that administrative agencies are necessary features of modern democracy, she acknowledges that bureaucratic institutions also face limitations. Kamarck briefly summarizes the historical development of administrative agencies around the turn of the 20th century and contends that the "impersonal, one-size-fits-all" bureaucratic institutions of the period represented an improvement over prior eras when individuals only received government benefits if they had the right political connections. However, Karmarck states that the growth of technology toward the end of the 20th century allowed private sector institutions to be more responsive to individual customer needs, which caused citizens to grow increasingly frustrated with the impartial, standardized functions of government agencies. She claims that government agencies during this period trailed behind the private sector in terms of their capacity to provide services tailored to individuals.

    “ As we neared the end of the 20th century, the standardization that made bureaucracy so important and so useful became irritating to many people because what was happening was that technology was allowing us to cater more to individual needs, and so people got really frustrated with the bureaucratic state. The bureaucracy began to take on a bad name in a way that it never had in, say, mid-century, mid-20th century, and we also developed the tools to be able to be more customer-friendly. By the end of the 20th century, you were able to do a lot of services on the telephone or over the internet, although that was just beginning by the end of the 20th century. By the end of the 20th century, you still had to go to an office to conduct government services for the most part, and stand in line, etc.[1][4] ”

    Karmarck continues the discussion by presenting what she believes to be alternatives to bureaucracy—the creation of markets. She cites the example of exchanging recyclable bottles for money as the successful creation of an efficient market, but also acknowledges that markets are difficult to create. She suspects that more progress will be made in developing markets as alternatives to bureaucracy in the future.[1]

    Modernization of government administration

    Kamarck cites President Bill Clinton's (D) National Performance Review, the administration's effort to review and improve federal government processes, as a successful shift toward the modernization of the administrative state. She argues that the Clinton administration represented a landmark shift for the bureaucracy because the National Performance Review brought administrative agencies online and into the information age. At the same time, Kamarck defends the slow pace of modernization on the grounds that higher levels of security are needed to carry out government transactions.[1]

    Mills questions whether or not Kamarck believes that the recent emphasis on decreasing the size of government agencies has resulted in an increased reliance on private sector contractors. Kamarck acknowledges that private sector contracting has become a problem because the government has not made a clear distinction between central government functions and other duties. She claims that certain core functions should be performed by government agencies while other operations can be contracted out to the private sector. Until the government makes a clear distinction between these functions, Karmarck argues that the increased reliance on private sector contractors will continue.[1]

    “ The reason I think [contract labor has] become a problem is that it has been done in a way that doesn't make crucial distinctions between functions that are central to government and functions which are not. So, for instance, if the Agriculture Department wants to install a new telephone system, there's no reason that, you know, that shouldn't be contracted out to AT&T or Verizon or people who specialize in telephones ... so there's a lot of contracting out that just simply makes sense. It is less clear, however, that the Defense Department should contract out the interrogation of terrorist suspects, which they have done, because that seems to be fairly central to the government's mission.[1][4] ”

    Kamarck also discusses the relationship between federal hiring and firing practices and contract workers. She claims that until the government makes it easier to hire and fire workers, it will still be simpler to contract out work to the private sector. She also contends that the government continues to operate under the mindset that its employees are still the clerks of the 20th century rather than the highly-skilled professionals of the present day. Government agencies, Kamarck argues, still have a "clerk mindset" with salary limitations and an archaic pay schedule that make it difficult to compete with the private sector for talented employees. Kamarck states that these limitations further incentivize the use of contract workers.[1]

    Agency oversight

    Kamarck claims that Congress has ceased to oversee administrative agencies. She states that Congress ought to perform oversight through "police patrol" activities—interacting with agencies and learning what they need to better perform their roles—and emergency oversight. Karmarck argues that Congress has reduced the budget of its oversight agencies, such as the Congressional Research Service and the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which has resulted in a lack of capacity and expertise to perform any oversight other than emergency action. She also argues that the judiciary and Congress are lagging behind agencies in terms of expertise, in part because modern congressional leaders have "dumbed themselves down" by prioritizing campaigning and political grandstanding over holding informative hearings. Kamarck contends that there is hope for a revitalization of administrative oversight if members of Congress can refocus on developing policy solutions.[1]

    “ Congress has dumbed themselves down. There's just no doubt about it. If you are old enough to remember Congresses of the '70s and the '80s, there's a big difference and they've got to, frankly, get smarter and spend more time on understanding the federal government as opposed to attacking it when it screws up. If they understand it better, they can maybe prevent some screw-ups.[1][4] ”

    See also

    Full audio

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 Real Clear Politics, "Episode 5: Reforming the Administrative State," July 27, 2017
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 The Brookings Institution, "Elaine Kamarck," accessed March 17, 2018
    3. ↑ LinkedIn, "Tony Mills," accessed March 17, 2018
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    v • e
    The Administrative State
    MainThe Administrative State Project Badge.png
    Pillars
    Reporting
    Laws
    Administrative Procedure Act • Antiquities Act • Civil Service Reform Act • Clayton Antitrust Act • Communications Act of 1934 • Congressional Review Act • Electronic Freedom of Information Act • Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 • Federal Housekeeping Statute • Federal Reserve Act • Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 • Freedom of Information Act • Government in the Sunshine Act • Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 • Information Quality Act • Interstate Commerce Act • National Labor Relations Act • Paperwork Reduction Act • Pendleton Act • Privacy Act of 1974 • Regulatory Flexibility Act • REINS Act • REINS Act (Wisconsin) • Securities Act of 1933 • Securities Exchange Act of 1934 • Sherman Antitrust Act • Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act • Truth in Regulating Act • Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    Cases
    Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner • A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States • Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp • Auer v. Robbins • Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council • Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe • Federal Trade Commission (FTC) v. Standard Oil Company of California • Field v. Clark • Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation • Humphrey's Executor v. United States • Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha • J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States • Lucia v. SEC • Marshall v. Barlow's • Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency • Mistretta v. United States • National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius • National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning Company • National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. • Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan • Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation • Skidmore v. Swift & Co. • United States v. Lopez • United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. • Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board • Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council • Wayman v. Southard • Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service • Whitman v. American Trucking Associations • Wickard v. Filburn • Wiener v. United States
    Terms
    Adjudication (administrative state) • Administrative judge • Administrative law • Administrative law judge • Administrative state • Arbitrary-or-capricious test • Auer deference • Barrier to entry • Bootleggers and Baptists • Chevron deference (doctrine) • Civil servant • Civil service • Code of Federal Regulations • Codify (administrative state) • Comment period • Compliance costs • Congressional Record • Coordination (administrative state) • Deference (administrative state) • Direct and indirect costs (administrative state) • Enabling statute • Ex parte communication (administrative state) • Executive agency • Federal law • Federal Register • Federalism • Final rule • Formal rulemaking • Formalism (law) • Functionalism (law) • Guidance (administrative state) • Hybrid rulemaking • Incorporation by reference • Independent federal agency • Informal rulemaking • Joint resolution of disapproval (administrative state) • Major rule • Negotiated rulemaking • Nondelegation doctrine • OIRA prompt letter • Organic statute • Pragmatism (law) • Precautionary principle • Promulgate • Proposed rule • Publication rulemaking • Regulatory budget • Regulatory capture • Regulatory dark matter • Regulatory impact analysis • Regulatory policy officer • Regulatory reform officer • Regulatory review • Rent seeking • Retrospective regulatory review • Risk assessment (administrative state) • Rulemaking • Separation of powers • Significant regulatory action • Skidmore deference • Statutory authority • Substantive law and procedural law • Sue and settle • Sunset provision • Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions • United States Code • United States Statutes at Large
    Bibliography
    Agencies
    Retrieved from "https://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php?title=%22Reforming_the_Administrative_State%22_by_Elaine_Kamarck_and_Tony_Mills_(2017)&oldid=10301640"