Auer v. Robbins
| What is deference in the context of the administrative state? Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here. |
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| Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. | |
| Reference: 519 U.S. 452 | |
| Term: 1996 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: December 10, 1996 Decided: February 19, 1997 | |
| Outcome | |
| Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens • Sandra Day O'Connor • Antonin Scalia • Anthony Kennedy • David Souter • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer | |
- See also: Kisor v. Wilkie
Auer et al. v. Robbins et al. is a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court case that created a principle known as Auer deference. Under Auer deference federal courts defer to agency interpretations of ambiguities in their own regulations.[1] In the Auer case, a group of police sergeants and a police lieutenant sued members of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners alleging that the board failed to pay the policemen proper overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The board argued that the policemen were not entitled to overtime pay because the policemen fell under an exemption of the law pertaining to anyone employed in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity.[2]
Why it matters: This case established the principle known as Auer deference, which requires federal courts to give deference to how executive agencies interpret ambiguities in their own regulations. Auer deference requires "that an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute ... Agency interpretations need not be well-established or long-standing to be entitled to deference. They must, however, 'reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.'"[3]
Case background
| Administrative State |
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| • Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
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Several publicly paid police sergeants and a police lieutenant sued members of the St. Louis, Missouri, Board of Police Commissioners alleging that the board failed to pay the policemen overtime pay due to them under Section §7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), codified as 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). The board argued that the policemen were not entitled to overtime pay because the policemen fell under an exemption provided by §213(a)(1). That exemption provided that the provisions of §207(a)(1) do not apply to "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity."[2]
The U.S. Secretary of Labor provided further regulations for the FLSA, one of which made earning a specific minimum salary a requirement for exempt status under §213(a)(1). The regulations provided that "[a]n employee will be considered to be paid 'on a salary basis' ... if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed."[1]
The policemen argued that the salary basis test provided by the secretary's regulations was not met because the policemen's compensation was subject to reduction under terms of the St. Louis police manual based on the "quality or quantity" of work performed. The policemen also argued that their duties did not qualify them for overtime pay exemption because the duties were not of a "bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity."[1]
A federal district court held that the policemen were, in fact, paid on a salary basis, satisfying the salary basis provision provided by the secretary's regulation. The court also held that, for most of the policemen that filed suit, their duties also brought them within the exemption for overtime pay. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the salary basis test provision and reversed on the duties test provision, finding that all the policemen involved in the lawsuit had duties that brought the officers within the overtime pay exemption.[1]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on December 10, 1996.[1]
Decision
The judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed.[1]
Opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The court held that the secretary of labor's interpretation of the salary basis test met the court's standard for deference because the test was "a creature of the Secretary's own regulations," which made his interpretation "controlling unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation'." Justice Scalia argued that the approach offered by the Labor Department was instructive:[1]
| “ |
No clear inference can be drawn as to the likelihood of a sanction's being applied to employees such as petitioners. Nor, under the Secretary's approach, is such a likelihood established by the one time deduction in a sergeant's pay, under unusual circumstances. ... The Secretary's position is in no sense a 'post hoc rationalizatio[n]' advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack ... There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question. [4] |
” |
The court further rejected arguments that the Labor Department's regulation was overly broad and therefore not narrowly tailored as required. The court reasoned that the department was free to write regulations as broadly as it deemed fit, subject only to statutory limits.[1]
As a result of the reasoning presented in the opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Impact
Auer as an extension of judicial deference
This case is largely seen as an extension of the court's 1984 opinion in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. In that case, a principle known as Chevron deference was created, requiring federal courts to give deference to executive agencies in how their regulations interpret a statute. Here, the court expanded this idea via a principle known as Auer deference, which requires federal courts to give deference to how executive agencies interpret ambiguities in their own regulations. Auer deference requires "that an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute ... Agency interpretations need not be well-established or long-standing to be entitled to deference. They must, however, 'reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.'"[3]
Uncertain future of Auer deference
Some scholars have called the status of Auer into question. The Washington Post reported that "before his death, however, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia had second thoughts, concluding that judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations was unwarranted, and he was not alone." Notice & Comment, a blog from the Yale Journal on Regulation and the American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, held a September 2016 symposium on the future of Auer and an earlier regulatory case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock.[5][6]
Kisor v. Wilkie
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicial deference precedents established in Auer and Seminole Rock in a case called Kisor v. Wilkie. The case also placed clear limitations on which regulatory interpretations qualify for deference.[7]
See also
- Auer deference
- Deference (administrative state)
- Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
- Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Auer et al. v. Robbins et al., decided February 19, 1997
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Cornell University's Legal Information Institute, "29 U.S. Code § 213 - Exemptions," accessed November 4, 2016
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, G.G., by his next friend and mother, Deirdre Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, April 19, 2016
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ The Washington Post, "Whither Seminole Rock? An online symposium.," September 13, 2016
- ↑ Notice & Comment, "Reflections on Seminole Rock and the Future of Judicial Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations," September 2016
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Kisor v. Wilkie," June 26, 2019
