In total, the Supreme Court heard argument in 69 cases this term, all of which you can track on our term overview page. Of those 69, the court has issued opinions in 45 cases. The court usually issues the remainder of its opinions by the end of June. Here are this week’s opinions:
In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that Ohio's Supplemental Process did not violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Following the court's ruling, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted instructed Ohio county boards of election not to purge voters before the November 2018 election.
In this case, Ohio had created a process, called the Supplemental Process, to identify and deregister voters from its voter rolls who were no longer eligible to vote due to a change of residence. Under this process, the board of elections in each Ohio county compiled a list of registered voters that had not had any defined voter activity for a period of two years. Two years of inactivity triggered the county board of elections to send a confirmation of address notice to the voter. Voters were removed from the voter rolls if they failed to vote within the subsequent four-year period and if they failed to either re-register to vote or respond to the notice from the county board of elections. A federal district court upheld the process, but a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the process violated Section 8(b)(2) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).
In a 5 - 4 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that Ohio's Supplemental Process does not violate the NVRA. Alito wrote that Ohio's process complied with the NVRA's provisions for removing voters who failed to mail back a return card and did not vote "to the letter. It is undisputed that Ohio does not remove a registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and then fails to vote for an additional four years." He rejected the respondents' argument that Ohio's process violated the NVRA's Failure-to-Vote provision. He wrote that the Failure-to-Vote provision "simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection (d), Ohio removes registrants only if they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a notice."
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented from the court's judgment, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Breyer wrote, "The question is whether the Supplemental Process violates §8, which prohibits a State from removing registrants from the federal voter roll 'by reason of the person’s failure to vote.' §20507(b)(2). In my view, Ohio’s program does just that." Breyer argued that Ohio's reliance on the change of address form did not save the process from violating the NVRA because mailing the change of address form was triggered solely by the person's failure to vote.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented from the court majority's opinion, joining Justice Breyer's dissent and also writing separately. She wrote, "I join the principal dissent in full because I agree that the statutory text plainly supports respondents’ interpretation. I write separately to emphasize how that reading is bolstered by the essential purposes stated explicitly in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) to increase the registration and enhance."
In Sveen v. Melin, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that retroactive application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute does not violate the Contracts Clause. Mark Sveen listed his wife, Kaye Melin, as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy and his children as secondary beneficiaries. After Sveen listed his wife on the policy, Minnesota passed a law providing that its revocation-upon-divorce statute would automatically revoke the life insurance beneficiary status of former spouses upon the couple's divorce. Sveen and Melin later divorced. When Sveen passed away, Melin was still listed as the primary beneficiary of the policy. A federal district court concluded that the revocation-upon-divorce statute revoked Melin's beneficiary status, even though Sveen designated her as a beneficiary before the statute went into effect. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit ruled that retroactive application of the statute violated Sveen's rights under the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.
Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion, joined in full by all the justices except Justice Neil Gorsuch. Kagan wrote first, "The legal system has long used default rules to resolve estate litigation in a way that conforms to decedents’ presumed intent." Those default rules applied after intervening life events unless the person in question expressly opted out. Automatic revocation-upon-divorce statutes, she continued, were created with the default assumption "that the average Joe does not want his ex inheriting what he leaves behind." Kagan wrote that the law did not substantially impair contract rights in part because the policyholder "can reverse the effect of the Minnesota statute with the stroke of a pen . . . by the simple act of sending a change-of-beneficiary form to his insurer." Kagan concluded, "In cases going back to the 1800s, this Court has held that laws imposing such minimal paperwork burdens do not violate the Contracts Clause."
Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented from the court's opinion and judgment. Gorsuch would have affirmed the lower court's decision. Gorsuch wrote, "Because legislation often disrupts existing social arrangements, it usually applies only prospectively. This longstanding and sacred principle ensures that people have fair warning of the law’s demands." The Contracts Clause, he continued, "hardens the presumption of prospectivity into a mandate" for laws concerning contract rights. Therefore, he argued, Minnesota's law should not be retroactively applied to alter contracts entered into before the law was enacted.
In China Agritech Inc. v. Resh, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that American Pipe does not permit a class action filed outside of the limitations period. Under a case called American Pipe, individual plaintiffs may file claims for the first time after class certification has been denied, even if the statute of limitations has expired, because the pending class action tolls the statute of limitations. In this case, plaintiffs sought to file a new class action after class certification had been denied in a different suit. The district court dismissed their claims, concluding that the new class action was untimely. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed, holding that the tolling rule from American Pipe applied to new class actions to the same extent as it applied to individual plaintiffs' claims.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for the eight-justice majority. Ginsburg ruled, "American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or file individual claims if the class fails. But American Pipe does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations." Ginsburg wrote that American Pipe and other earlier Supreme Court decisions "addressed only putative class members who wish to sue individually after a class certification denial." The reason for allowing later individual claims, she continued, was that "economy of litigation favors delaying [individual] claims until after a class-certification denial." Conversely, she wrote, late class actions are judicially inefficient, potentially requiring a court to deal with individual claims before addressing a class action suit that could resolve the claims of an entire class.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the court's judgment but wrote separately. Sotomayor would have limited the court's ruling to cases (like this case) that were filed under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). In class actions not governed by PSLRA, Sotomayor wrote, the class certification process is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But, she continued, where PSLRA imposes procedural requirements designed to notify every potential class member of the suit before certification, Rule 23 only required notice to potential class members after certification. "Given these important differences between Rule 23’s general class procedures and the specific procedures imposed by the PSLRA," she argued, "the majority’s conclusion . . . makes sense only in the PSLRA context."
In Washington v. United States, the Supreme Court split 4 - 4, leaving the Ninth Circuit's decision in place. In this long-running litigation, American Indian tribes in Washington state argued that Washington was in violation of the Steven Treaties, which guaranteed certain fishing rights to the tribes. The tribes sought an injunction ordering Washington to remove or correct state-owned culvert barriers that the tribes argued were harming the supply of fish. Washington argued that the treaties did not obligate it to protect the fish supply and further argued that the United States should be required to fix federal government-owned culverts before Washington was required to fix state-owned culverts. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled in favor of the tribes, and Washington appealed.
The Supreme Court issued a one-sentence per curiam opinion announcing that the Ninth Circuit's judgment was "affirmed by an evenly divided court." Justice Anthony Kennedy was recused from this case. Although the vote tally is not revealed in tied cases, the language of the opinion means that the eight remaining justices were split in a 4 - 4 vote. In the event of a 4 - 4 tie, the lower court's judgment is affirmed.
In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., a unanimous Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit, holding that courts are not required to defer to a foreign government's interpretation of its own law. Two U.S. companies filed a lawsuit in U.S. district court against several Chinese companies, claiming that those companies had violated U.S. antitrust law by collectively fixing prices and supplies of Vitamin C exports from China. A division of the Chinese government filed a brief in the district court, stating that the companies were required to set prices under Chinese law. The district court allowed the case to proceed to trial. After a jury found in favor of the U.S. companies, the Chinese companies appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit ruled that the district court was required to defer to the Chinese government's interpretation of Chinese law. Concluding that Chinese and American law were in conflict, the Second Circuit dismissed the U.S. companies' lawsuit.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Ginsburg ruled, "A federal court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government’s statements. Ginsburg wrote that a court's interpretation of a foreign law was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1. Under that rule, Ginsburg quoted, a court "may consider any relevant material or source . . . whether or not submitted by a party" and "engage in its own research and consider any relevant material thus found." Therefore, she continued, courts should accord respect to a foreign government's statements, but they are not bound to follow those statements. Instead, courts should consider a broad range of information and determine based on the particular circumstances of the case how much weight to give a foreign government's statements. Having described the framework for lower courts to apply, the court did not take a position on the interpretation of foreign law in this case, choosing instead to remand the case to lower courts for reconsideration in light of its opinion.
In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, ruling that Minnesota statute prohibiting clothing with political speech at polling places violated the First Amendment. In this case, the Minnesota Voters Alliance and several other groups and individuals, including the Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots and the Election Integrity Watch (collectively referred to by the court as Minnesota Voters Alliance or MVA), filed suit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and other elections officials in Minnesota. The plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota Statute § 211B.11 violated their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alleged that the statute chilled their free speech rights because it prohibited them from wearing apparel with Tea Party logos to their polling places.
On a vote of 7 - 2, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, ruling that the Minnesota statute violated the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch. Roberts ruled, "Minnesota’s ban on wearing any 'political badge, political button, or other political insignia' plainly restricts a form of expression within the protection of the First Amendment." However, he continued, because the ban applied only to polling places, the statute "implicates our 'forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property.” He wrote that polling places are nonpublic forums in which the government has some freedom to restrict free speech rights. Therefore, as an initial matter, "in light of the special purpose of the polling place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel there because of the message it conveys, so that voters may focus on the important decisions immediately at hand." But the prohibition, he concluded, must be clearer than the statute in this case in order to pass First Amendment muster: "If a State wishes to set its polling places apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more discernible approach than the one Minnesota has offered here."
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented from the majority's judgment, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Sotomayor argued that, because the case concerned a state law, the Supreme Court should have allowed Minnesota state courts to rule on the constitutionality of the statute first. She wrote, "Especially where there are undisputedly many constitutional applications of a state law that further weighty state interests, the Court should be wary of invalidating a law without giving the State’s highest court an opportunity to pass upon it." She concluded, "Because the Court declines to take the obvious step of certification in this case, I respectfully dissent."
Wondering where the cases came from this term? Check out this chart showing the number of appeals from each lower court:
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