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Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

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Supreme Court of the United States
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid
Term: 2020
Important Dates
Argument: March 22, 2021
Decided: June 23, 2021
Outcome
Reversed and remanded
Vote
6-3
Majority
Chief Justice John Roberts • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito • Neil Gorsuch • Amy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Brett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on March 22, 2021, during the court's October 2020-2021 term.

In a 6-3 opinion, the court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the court's majority opinion. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: California law allows union organizers access to employees at worksites under limited circumstances. This is known as the access regulation under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act ("ALRA"), which is presided over by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board. In 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers ("UFW") union accessed the worksites of two corporations and later filed complaints against the companies for unfair labor practices and for blocking the organizers' access to the workers. In 2016, the companies filed a complaint in federal district court against the Board, seeking to bar enforcement of the access regulation on their worksites and challenging the constitutionality of the regulation. The district court denied the request and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the judgment. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The issue: The case concerned the regulation of labor union organizers' access to employees at worksites.
  • The questions presented: "The question presented is whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment."[2]
  • The outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.[3]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    In 1975, the California legislature enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act ("ALRA"), which included the creation of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board ("the Board"). The Board instituted an access regulation for union organizers, allowing them access to agricultural employees at worksites under limited circumstances. The access regulation was put in place to recognize the U.S. Supreme Court's findings on organizational rights, as outlined in the California Code section on Solicitation by Non-Employee Organizers.[3]

    Oregon-based corporation Cedar Point Nursery ("Cedar Point") raises strawberry plants and has a nursery located in Dorris, California. Cedar Point alleges that organizers from the United Farm Workers union ("the UFW") entered its property on October 29, 2015, without providing prior notice of intent, which is required by the Board's access regulation. While UFW organizers were present, some workers joined the organizers in protest and most of the workers who left work during the protest returned by October 31. UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of its intent to access after the organizers had accessed the property. Cedar Point filed a charge against UFW with the Board, alleging that the union had violated the access regulation, that UFW would attempt to take access in the future, and that the company would ban organizers from its property if not for the regulation. UFW filed a charge against Cedar Point, alleging that the company had committed an unfair labor practice. Meanwhile, UFW had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board against Fresno, California-based shipper Fowler Packing Company ("Fowler"), alleging that Fowler blocked its organizers from accessing workers, a violation of the access regulation. The UFW withdrew the charge in January 2016. Fowler alleged that it would oppose union access to worksites if not for the access regulation and would not allow organizers on its property. Collectively in the litigation, Cedar Point and Fowler were referred to as the Growers.[3]

    In February 2016, the Growers filed a complaint against the Board, alleging that the access regulation violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, citing unlawful seizure of property and a permanent physical invasion of property without just compensation. The Growers requested declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the Board from enforcing the access regulation against them. The Board moved to dismiss the Growers' complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the Growers' requests and granted the Board's motion to dismiss.[3]

    On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the court held that the access regulation was not unconstitutional and affirmed the district court's ruling.[3]

    Solicitation by Non-Employee Organizers

    California Code Section 20900 - Solicitation by Non-Employee Organizers reads:

    “ (b) [T]he United States Supreme Court has found that organizational rights are not viable in a vacuum. Their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. When alternative channels of effective communication are not available to a union, organizational rights must include a limited right to approach employees on the property of the employer. Under such circumstances, both statutory and constitutional principles require that a reasonable and just accommodation be made between the right of unions to access and the legitimate property and business interests of the employer .... Generally, unions seeking to organize agricultural employees do not have available alternative channels of effective communication. Alternative channels of effective communication which have been found adequate in industrial settings do not exist or are insufficient in the context of agricultural labor.


    (c) Generally, unions seeking to organize agricultural employees do not have available alternative channels of effective communication. Alternative channels of effective communication which have been found adequate in industrial settings do not exist or are insufficient in the context of agricultural labor.[4]

    		”

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    “ "The question presented is whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment."[4] ”

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[6]


    Outcome

    In a 6-3 opinion, the court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the court's majority opinion. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:[1]

    “ A California regulation grants labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property in order to solicit support for unionization. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §20900(e)(1)(C) (2020). Agricultural employers must allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. The question presented is whether the access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.


    ... Unlike a mere trespass, the regulation grants a formal entitlement to physically invade the growers’ land. Unlike a law enforcement search, no traditional background principle of property law requires the growers to admit union organizers onto their premises. And unlike standard health and safety inspections, the access regulation is not germane to any benefit provided to agricultural employers or any risk posed to the public. See Horne, 576 U.S., at 366 (“basic and familiar uses of property” are not a special benefit that “the Government may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection”). The access regulation amounts to simple appropriation of private property.

    The access regulation grants labor organizations a right to invade the growers’ property. It therefore constitutes a per se physical taking.

    The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[4]

    		”
    —Chief Justice John Roberts

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion.

    In their concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:[1]

    “ I join the Court’s opinion, which carefully adheres to constitutional text, history, and precedent. I write separately to explain that, in my view, the Court’s precedent in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), also strongly supports today’s decision.


    ... Babcock strongly supports the growers’ position in today’s case because the California union access regulation intrudes on the growers’ property rights far more than Babcock allows. When this same California union access regulation was challenged on constitutional grounds before the California Supreme Court in 1976, that court upheld the regulation by a 4-to-3 vote. Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd. v. Superior Ct. of Tulare Cty., 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546 P. 2d 687. Justice William Clark wrote the dissent. Justice Clark stressed that “property rights are fundamental.” Id., at 429, n. 4, 546 P. 2d, at 712, n. 4. And he concluded that the California union access regulation “violates the rule” of Babcock and thus “violates the constitutional provisions protecting private property.” 16 Cal. 3d, at 431, 546 P. 2d, at 713. In my view, Justice Clark had it exactly right.

    With those comments, I join the Court’s opinion in full.[4]

    		”
    —Justice Brett Kavanaugh

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.

    In his dissent, Justice Breyer wrote:[1]

    “ ... Does the regulation physically appropriate the employer's property? If so, there is no need to look further; the Government must pay the employers “just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 5; see Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012) (“‘[W]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner’”). Or does the regulation simply regulate the employers’ property rights? If so, then there is every need to look further; the government need pay the employers “just compensation” only if the regulation “goes too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J., for the Court); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (determining whether a regulation is a taking by examining the regulation’s “economic impact,” the extent of interference with “investment-backed expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action”); Arkansas Game and Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S., at 38–39 (listing factors relevant to the character of the regulation).


    The Court holds that the provision’s “access to organizers” requirement amounts to a physical appropriation of property. In its view, virtually every government-authorized invasion is an “appropriation.” But this regulation does not “appropriate” anything; it regulates the employers’ right to exclude others. At the same time, our prior cases make clear that the regulation before us allows only a temporary invasion of a landowner’s property and that this kind of temporary invasion amounts to a taking only if it goes “too far.” See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982). In my view, the majority’s conclusion threatens to make many ordinary forms of regulation unusually complex or impractical. And though the majority attempts to create exceptions to narrow its rule, see ante, at 17–20, the law’s need for feasibility suggests that the majority’s framework is wrong. With respect, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the regulation is a per se taking.

    ... I recognize that the Court’s prior cases in this area are not easy to apply. Moreover, words such as “temporary,” “permanent,” or “too far” do not define themselves. But I do not believe that the Court has made matters clearer or better. Rather than adopt a new broad rule and indeterminate exceptions, I would stick with the approach that I believe the Court’s case law sets forth. “Better the devil we know . . . .” A right of access such as the right at issue here, a nonpermanent right, is not automatically a “taking.” It is a regulation that falls within the scope of Penn Central. Because the Court takes a different view, I respectfully dissent.[4]

    		”
    —Justice Stephen Breyer

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2020-2021

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 5, 2020. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[7]

    The court issued 67 opinions during its 2020-2021 term. Two cases were decided in one consolidated opinion. Ten cases were decided without argument. Click here for more information on the court's opinions.

    The court agreed to hear 62 cases during its 2020-2021 term. Of those, 12 were originally scheduled for the 2019-2020 term but were delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Five cases were removed from the argument calendar.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Supreme Court, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, decided June 23, 2021
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Supreme Court of the United States, "20-107 CEDAR POINT NURSERY V. HASSID: Questions presented," accessed February 1, 2021
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Nursery v. Shiroma, decided May 8, 2019
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed March 23, 2021
    6. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Transcript," accessed March 23, 2021
    7. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court," accessed April 20, 2015
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