Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Docket number: 09-115
Court: United States Supreme Court
Court membership
Chief Justice John Roberts Associate Justices Antonin Scalia • Anthony M. Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Steven G. Breyer • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided on May 26, 2011. The case concerned the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), effected on January 1, 2008, and whether federal immigration law preempted the state law. LAWA required employers to use the federal E-Verify system to check the legal status of new employees and revoked business licenses of employers that knowingly hired individuals not authorized to work in the United States.

On May 26, 2011, SCOTUS issued a 5-3 ruling holding that LAWA was not preempted by federal immigration law. Chief Justice John Roberts penned the majority opinion. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case. Click here to learn more about the outcome of the case.

Background

Federal immigration law prohibits employers from knowingly hiring employees who are not authorized to work in the United States and requires them to verify their eligibility for employment. To assist employers with the verification process, the federal government created E-Verify, an internet program that maintains records for determining employment eligibility.

In 2007, the state of Arizona enacted its own immigration-related employment law, the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA). The law required businesses in the state to use the federal E-Verify system to check the legal status of new employees, and established penalties for employers who hired people unauthorized to work in the country—their state business licenses would be revoked.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ("Chamber") sued Arizona ("Whiting"), arguing that LAWA's two provisions were preempted by federal immigration law. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the law, finding that federal law did not preempt licensing conditions contained within state law and that Congress had no intent to prevent states from mandating the use of E-Verify. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the ruling.

The Chamber of Commerce appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which accepted the case to its merits docket on June 28, 2010.

Questions presented

The court limited oral arguments to the following questions: "Whether an Arizona statute that imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized aliens is invalid under a federal statute that expressly preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens. "Whether the Arizona statute, which requires all employers to participate in a federal electronic employment verification system, is preempted by a federal law that specifically makes that system voluntary. "Whether the Arizona statute is impliedly preempted because it undermines the comprehensive scheme that Congress created to regulate the employment of aliens."

Outcome

Opinion

Chief Justice John Roberts

Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy

Justice Clarence Thomas

Justice Samuel Alito

In a 5-3 decision issued on May 26, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision and ruled in favor of the state of Arizona. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice John Roberts, who was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.

In its opinion, the Supreme Court held that business licensing regulations fell within the jurisdiction of the states and that mandatory use of E-Verify did not interfere with enforcement of federal immigration law. Therefore, neither provision was preempted.

Although federal law prohibited states from punishing employers who hired individuals unauthorized to work in the United States, the law contained a clause that allowed states to use licensing or similar laws to penalize such employers. The court interpreted this clause to mean any kind of licensing, including business licenses.

In the Court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:

“	Arizona’s requirement that employers use E-Verify is not impliedly preempted. The IIRIRA provision setting up E-Verify contains no language circumscribing state action. It does, however, constrain federal action: absent a prior violation of federal law, “the Secretary of Homeland Security may not require any person or . . . entity” out-side the Federal Government “to participate in” E-Verify. IIRIRA, §402(a), (e). The fact that the Federal Government may require the use of E-Verify in only limited circumstances says nothing about what the States may do. The Government recently argued just that in another case and approvingly referenced Arizona’s law as an example of a permissible use of E-Verify when doing so. Moreover, Arizona’s use of E-Verify does not conflict with the federal scheme. The state law requires no more than that an employer,after hiring an employee, “verify the employment eligibility of the employee” through E-Verify. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §23–214(A). And the consequences of not using E-Verify are the same under the state and federal law—an employer forfeits an otherwise available rebut-table presumption of compliance with the law. Arizona’s requirement that employers use E-Verify in no way obstructs achieving the aims of the federal program. In fact, the Government has consistently expanded and encouraged the use of E- Verify, and Congress has directed that E-Verify be made available in all 50 States. And the Government has expressly rejected the Chamber’s claim that the Arizona law, and those like it, will overload the federal system. ... Federal immigration law expressly preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ … unauthorized aliens.” 8 U. S. C. §1324a(h)(2). A recently enacted Arizona statute—the Legal Arizona Workers Act—provides that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens may be, and in certain circumstances must be, suspended or revoked. The law also requires that all Arizona employers use a federal electronic verification system to confirm that the workers they employ are legally authorized workers. The question presented is whether federal immigration law preempts those provisions of Arizona law. Because we conclude that the State’s licensing provisions fall squarely within the federal statute’s savings clause and that the Arizona regulation does not otherwise conflict with federal law, we hold that the Arizona law is not preempted. ... IRCA expressly reserves to the States the authority to impose sanctions on employers hiring unauthorized workers, through licensing and similar laws. In exercising that authority, Arizona has taken the route least likely to cause tension with federal law. It uses the Federal Government’s own definition of “unauthorized alien,” it relies solely on the Federal Government’s own determination of who is an unauthorized alien, and it requires Arizona employers to use the Federal Government’s own system for checking employee status. If even this gives rise to impermissible conflicts with federal law, then there really is no way for the State to implement licensing sanctions, contrary to the express terms of the savings clause. Because Arizona’s unauthorized alien employment law fits within the confines of IRCA’s savings clause and does not conflict with federal immigration law, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed.	”
—Chief Justice John Roberts

Dissenting opinions

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Justice Stephen Breyer

Justice Sonia Sotomayor

Justice Breyer

Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In Justice Breyer's dissent, he wrote:

“	... Arizona calls its state statute a “licensing law,” and the statute uses the word “licensing.” But the statute strays beyond the bounds of the federal licensing exception, for it defines “license” to include articles of incorporation and partnership certificates, indeed virtually every state-law authorization for any firm, corporation, or partnership to do business in the State. §23–211(9)(a); cf. §23–211(9)(c) (excepting professional licenses, and water and environmental permits). Congress did not intend its “licensing” language to create so broad an exemption, for doing so would permit States to eviscerate the federal Act’s pre-emption provision, indeed to subvert the Act itself, by undermining Congress’ efforts (1) to protect lawful workers from national-origin-based discrimination and (2) to protect lawful employers against erroneous prosecution or punishment. ... Either directly or through the uncertainty that it creates, the Arizona statute will impose additional burdens upon lawful employers and consequently lead those employers to erect ever stronger safeguards against the hiring of unauthorized aliens—without counterbalancing protection against unlawful discrimination. And by defining “licensing” so broadly, by bringing nearly all businesses within its scope, Arizona’s statute creates these effects statewide. ... Another section of the Arizona statute requires “every employer, after hiring an employee,” to “verify the employment eligibility of the employee” through the Federal Government’s E-Verify program. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §23–214. This state provision makes participation in the federal E-Verify system mandatory for virtually all Arizona employers. The federal law governing the E-Verify program, however, creates a program that is voluntary. By making mandatory that which federal law seeks to make voluntary, the state provision stands as a significant “ ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ ” Crosby, 530 U. S., at 373 (quoting Hines, 312 U. S., at 67). And it is consequently pre-empted. ... In co-opting a federal program and changing the key terms under which Congress created that program, Arizona’s mandatory state law simply ignores both the federal language and the reasoning it reflects, thereby posing an “ ‘obstacle to the accomplishment’ ” of the objectives Congress’ statute evinces. Crosby, supra, at 373 (quoting Hines, supra, at 67). ... For these reasons I would hold that the federal Act, including its E-Verify provisions, pre-empts Arizona’s state law. With respect, I dissent from the majority’s contrary holdings.	”
—Justice Stephen Breyer

Justice Sotomayor

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a separate dissent. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:

“	In enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, Congress created a “comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147 (2002). The Court reads IRCA’s saving clause—which preserves from pre-emption state “licensing and similar laws,” 8 U. S. C. §1324a(h)(2)—to permit States to determine for themselves whether someone has employed an unauthorized alien so long as they do so in conjunction with licensing sanctions. This reading of the saving clause cannot be reconciled with the rest of IRCA’s comprehensive scheme. Having constructed a federal mechanism for determining whether someone has knowingly employed an unauthorized alien, and having withheld from the States the information necessary to make that determination, Congress could not plausibly have intended for the saving clause to operate in the way the majority reads it to do. When viewed in context, the saving clause can only be understood to preserve States’ authority to impose licensing sanctions after a final federal determination that a person has violated IRCA by knowingly employing an unauthorized alien. Because the Legal Arizona Workers Act instead creates a separate state mechanism for Arizona state courts to determine whether a person has employed an unauthorized alien, I would hold that it falls outside the saving clause and is pre-empted. I would also hold that federal law pre-empts the provision of the Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify, the federal electronic verification system. By requiring Arizona employers to use E-Verify, Arizona has effectively made a decision for Congress regarding use of a federal resource, in contravention of the significant policy objectives motivating Congress’ decision to make participation in the E-Verify program voluntary. ... I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Breyer in Part IV of his dissenting opinion that federal law impliedly pre-empts the provision in the Arizona Act requiring all Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify program. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §23–214. I also agree with much of his reasoning. I write separately to offer a few additional observations. As we have recently recognized, that a state law makes mandatory something that federal law makes voluntary does not mean, in and of itself, that the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” ... This case, however, is readily distinguishable from cases like Williamson, in which state law regulates relationships between private parties. Here, the Arizona Act directly regulates the relationship between the Federal Government and private parties by mandating use of a federally created and administered resource. This case thus implicates the “uniquely federal interes[t]” in managing use of a federal resource. ... Significant policy objectives motivated Congress’ decision to make use of E-Verify voluntary. In addition to those discussed by Justice Breyer, see ante, at 17–19 (dissenting opinion), I note that Congress considered the cost of a mandatory program. In 2003, when Congress elected to expand E-Verify to all 50 States but declined to require its use, it cited a congressionally mandated report concluding that the annual cost of the pilot program was $6 million, the annual cost of a nationwide voluntary program would be $11 million, and the annual cost of a nationwide mandatory program would be $11.7 billion. ... A more recent report prepared for the Department of Homeland Security similarly noted the costs associated with mandatory use of E-Verify. ... Permitting States to make use of E-Verify mandatory improperly puts States in the position of making decisions for the Federal Government that directly affect expenditure and depletion of federal resources. The majority highlights the Government’s statement in its amicus brief that “ ‘the E-Verify system can accommodate the increased use that the Arizona statute and existing similar laws would create.’ ” ... It matters not whether the Executive Branch believes that the Government is now capable of handling the burdens of a mandatory system. Congressional intent controls, and Congress has repeatedly decided to keep the E-Verify program voluntary. Because state laws requiring use of E-Verify frustrate the significant policy objectives underlying this decision, thereby imposing explicitly unwanted burdens on the Federal Government, I would hold that federal law impliedly pre-empts the Arizona requirement. For these reasons, I cannot agree with either of the Court’s holdings in this case. I respectfully dissent.	”
—Justice Sonia Sotomayor

See also

• 

  Immigration in the U.S.

• 

  Illegal immigration

• 

  Immigration in Arizona

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• Oyez case file for Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
• Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting (2011)
• Legal Arizona Workers Act

Footnotes

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