Christensen v. Harris County
| What is deference in the context of the administrative state? Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here. |
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| Christensen v. Harris County | |
| Reference: 529 U.S. 576 | |
| Term: 1999 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: February 23, 2000 Decided: May 1, 2000 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Clarence Thomas • Chief Justice William Rehnquist • Sandra Day O'Connor • Anthony Kennedy • David Souter • Antonin Scalia | |
| Dissenting | |
| John Paul Stevens • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer | |
Christensen v. Harris County is a 2000 United States Supreme Court case that narrowed the scope of Chevron deference.[1] The case involved a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) opinion letter, workplace regulations, and labor laws. The court ruled that Harris County was allowed to force its deputy sheriffs to take time off to avoid paying cash for overtime work. It also held that agency actions that do not carry the force of law, such as opinion letters and guidance have no binding effect on judges beyond their ability to persuade.[1][2] The court also held that a DOL opinion letter cited in the case did not qualify for Auer deference because the labor regulations interpreted by the letter were clear and Auer only applies to interpretations of ambiguous regulations.[1]
In brief: When Harris County saw that it might have to pay for accrued compensatory time, the county made a policy that required employees to schedule time off work.[1] County deputy sheriffs sued, saying that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) does not permit the county to implement a time-off policy without a prior agreement.[1] The District Court ruled in favor of the deputy sheriffs and held that the time-off policy violated the FLSA.[1] The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling, saying that the FLSA did not address the issue of adopting a time-off policy and therefore did not prohibit the county from adopting one.[1] The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit.[1] In the course of the opinion, the Court held that opinion letters issued by administrative agencies do not carry the force of law and are not entitled to Chevron deference.[1]
Why it matters: The ruling in Christensen v. Harris County narrowed the scope of application for Chevron deference to agency regulations and adjudicatory actions, which carry the force of law. The Court ruled that other agency actions, such as guidance, policy statements or enforcement guidelines are only entitled to respect to the extent that they are persuasive, as Skidmore established.[1]
Timeline
The following timeline details key events in this case:[1][3]
- May 1, 2000: U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 5th Circuit's ruling
- February 23, 2000: Oral argument
- October 19, 1998: The Fifth Circuit Court reversed the district court's ruling.
- November 26, 1996: District court ruled in favor of the deputy sheriffs, saying that the county violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Background
| Administrative State |
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| Read more about the administrative state on Ballotpedia. |
Deputy sheriffs sue Harris County
Harris County, Texas, made a policy that required employees to schedule time off work because the county was worried that it would run out of money to pay its staff for working overtime.[1] The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) allows states and other government agencies to pay their employees for overtime work using compensatory time (comp time) instead of cash, but only up to certain limits.[1] Employees of Harris County earned compensatory time up to the FLSA caps and the new time-off policies were designed to avoid running out of resources paying cash for overtime hours.[1] County deputy sheriffs sued, arguing that the FLSA does not allow the county to implement a mandated time-off policy without a prior agreement.[1]
Opinion letter from the U.S. Department of Labor
Before Harris County made its time-off policy, it asked the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) whether it could schedule employees to use accumulating comp time.[1] The DOL responded in an opinion letter that the county could only mandate time off if the employees agreed in advance.[1] Opinion letters are a form of agency guidance documents, which explain, interpret, or advise people about rules and procedures but are not legally binding like a rule issued through the rulemaking process or a decision made after adjudication.
Initial court review
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The District Court ruled in favor of the deputy sheriffs and held that the time-off policy violated the FLSA.[1] The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling, saying that the FLSA did not address the issue of adopting a time-off policy and therefore did not prohibit the county from adopting one.[1]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on February 23, 2000. The case was decided on May 1, 2000.[1]
- Read the transcript of the oral argument below:
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-3 to affirm the lower court's ruling. The majority opinion was written by Justice Clarence Thomas and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, David Souter, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and in part by Antonin Scalia. Justices Antonin Scalia and David Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. Stephen Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.[1]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
- See also: Chevron deference, Skidmore deference and Auer deference
Justice Thomas wrote that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) allows employers to force employees to use accumulated compensatory time (comp time).[1] He argued that the FLSA and later regulations only keep employers from blocking reasonable requests to use comp time.[1]
The deputy sheriffs cited an opinion letter issued by the U.S. Department of Labor to support their position that Harris County violated labor rules.[1] The letter said a prior agreement was required before the county could compel the deputies to use comp time.[1] The Court ruled that Chevron deference did not apply to the letter.[1] Thomas discusses which forms of deference do apply to the case in the following passage:[1]
| “ | [We] confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron-style deference. [...] Instead, interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to respect" under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade' [...] As explained above, we find unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute at issue in this case.
Seeking to overcome the regulation's obvious meaning, the United States asserts that the agency's opinion letter interpreting the regulation should be given deference under our decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997). In Auer, we held that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference. But Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. The regulation in this case, however, is not ambiguous-it is plainly permissive. To defer to the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation. Because the regulation is not ambiguous on the issue of compelled compensatory time, Auer deference is unwarranted.[4][1][5] |
” |
Concurring opinions
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment on the assumption that the Court did not read the FLSA in a way that prevents the Secretary of Labor from issuing regulations to limit the forced use of comp time.[1]
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion rejecting the application of Skidmore deference as anachronistic. Since Chevron was decided in 1984, Scalia argued that any authoritative view set forth by an agency, as long as it is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, is entitled to deference from federal courts. He joined the majority in ruling against the petitioners because he did not find the position taken by the Department of Labor to be reasonable.[1]
Dissenting opinions
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the law that allows employers to compensate workers for overtime hours using comp time. Stevens held that the law required an agreement between employers and their employees before comp time could be given in place of cash payments. For him, that meant that the method of using comp time was subject to the same agreement.
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on his disagreement with Justice Scalia about the proper applications of Chevron and Skidmore deference.
Text of the opinion
Read the full opinion [here http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep529/usrep529576/usrep529576.pdf].
Narrowing deference doctrines
The decision in Christensen narrowed the range of agency actions that qualify for Chevron deference to things like regulations and adjudications, which carry the force of law.[1] Chevron requires judges to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous laws when Congress has empowered the agency to administer those laws. "The Court's refusal to extend Chevron to agency opinion letters, interpretive rules, and other less formal interpretations sends a signal to lower courts that they may substitute their own judgment when faced with these types of issues," according to a 2001 law review article.[6] The article went on to say that Christensen told courts to give deference only to legally binding agency actions. A focus on actions with the power to bind maintains public accountability for agencies since binding actions have to go through strict procedures.[6] The ruling in Christensen meant that fewer kinds of agency decisions could restrict the scope of judicial review.
The Court ruled that other agency actions, such as guidance, policy statements or enforcement guidelines are only entitled to respect to the extent that they are persuasive, as Skidmore established.[1]
The court held that Auer deference, which requires judges to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of their own ambiguous regulations, only applies when regulations are unclear. In Christensen, the court said that the regulations governing comp time were clear and that contrary agency interpretations were not entitled to Auer deference.[1]
See also
- Skidmore deference
- Chevron deference
- Auer deference
- Deference
- Kisor v. Wilkie
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Ballotpedia's administrative state coverage
- "Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The Original Convention" by Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts (2002)
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.31 1.32 JUSTIA, "Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)," accessed September 5, 2018
- ↑ Oyez, "Christensen v. Harris County," accessed September 5, 2018
- ↑ JUSTIA, "US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998)," accessed June 14, 2019
- ↑ Some internal citations and quotations have been omitted
- ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary, "Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron for All It's Worth - Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference," Naaman Asir Fiola, March 15, 2001
