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City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas, Inc.

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Supreme Court of the United States
City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas, Inc.
Term: 2021
Important Dates
Argued: November 10, 2021
Decided: April 21, 2022
Outcome
reversed and remanded
Vote
6-3
Majority
Sonia SotomayorChief Justice John RobertsStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoElena KaganBrett Kavanaugh
Concurring
Stephen BreyerSamuel Alito (in part)
Dissenting
Clarence ThomasNeil GorsuchAmy Coney BarrettSamuel Alito (in part)

City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas, Inc. is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 21, 2022, during the court's October 2021-2022 term. The case was argued before the court on November 10, 2021.

The court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in a 6-3 ruling, holding that the City of Austin’s regulation distinguishing between advertising signs that are on a business’s premises versus those that are off the premises is content-neutral and is therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, the courts' highest standard of review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: In 2017, outdoor advertising companies Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company ("Reagan") applied with the City of Austin, Texas to digitize its existing off-premises billboards.[2] The city denied the applications, citing its municipal sign code, which prohibited the digitization of off-premises non-digital signs. Reagan sued the city in state court, arguing that the code violated the First Amendment. In July 2017, the city moved the proceedings to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. In August, the city amended its sign code. The district court held that the sign code was content neutral and ruled in favor of the city. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The issue: The case concerned whether a municipal sign code restriction is constitutional.
  • The questions presented: "Is the city code’s distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed?"[3]
  • The outcome: The court reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, holding that the City of Austin’s regulation distinguishing between advertising signs that are on a business’s premises versus those that are off the premises is content-neutral and is therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, the courts' highest standard of review.[1]

  • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.[2] To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company ("Reagan") are outdoor advertising companies that own and operate billboards displaying both commercial and noncommercial messages, including off-premises signs.[2] Reagan filed applications with the City of Austin, Texas to digitize its existing off-premises billboards. The city denied the applications because its municipal sign code does not allow the digitization of off-premises signs. The city's stated general purpose for adopting its sign code was to protect public safety and protect the city's aesthetic value.[2] In June 2017, Reagan sued the city in state court, arguing that the municipal sign code's distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs violated the First Amendment. In July 2017, the city moved the proceedings to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, and in August, amended the municipal sign code.[2] The district court conducted a bench trial and concluded that the sign code was content neutral, satisfying immediate scrutiny, and ruled in favor of the city. Reagan appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.[2]

    On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the city code's distinction between on- and off-premises signs was content-based and failed under strict scrutiny review and therefore violated the First Amendment.[2]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[3]

    Questions presented:
    Is the city code’s distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed?[4]

    Oral argument

    The court heard arguments in the case on November 10, 2021.

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Outcome

    In a 6-3 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit and remanded the case. The court found that the City of Austin’s regulation distinguishing between advertising signs that are on a business’s premises versus those that are off the premises is content-neutral and is therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, the courts' highest standard of review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote:[1]

    Like thousands of jurisdictions around the country, the City of Austin, Texas (City), regulates signs that advertise things that are not located on the same premises as the sign, as well as signs that direct people to offsite locations. These are known as off-premises signs, and they include, most notably, billboards. The question presented is whether, under this Court’s precedents interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the City’s regulation is subject to strict scrutiny. We hold that it is not.
    ...
    A regulation of speech is facially content based under the First Amendment if it “target[s] speech based on its communicative content”—that is, if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 576 U. S., at 163. The Court of Appeals interpreted Reed to mean that if “[a] reader must ask: who is the speaker and what is the speaker saying” to apply a regulation, then the regulation is automatically content based. 972 F. 3d, at 706. This rule, which holds that a regulation cannot be content neutral if it requires reading the sign at issue, is too extreme an interpretation of this Court’s precedent. Unlike the regulations at issue in Reed, the City’s off-premises distinction requires an examination of speech only in service of drawing neutral, location-based lines. It is agnostic as to content. Thus, absent a content-based purpose or justification, the City’s distinction is content neutral and does not warrant the application of strict scrutiny. [4]

    —Justice Sonia Sotomayor

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Breyer concurring opinion

    Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer wrote:[1]

    Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 (2015), is binding precedent here. Given that precedent, I join the majority’s opinion. I write separately because I continue to believe that the Court’s reasoning in Reed was wrong. The Court there struck down a city’s sign ordinance under the First Amendment. It wrote that the First Amendment requires strict scrutiny whenever a regulation “target[s] speech based on its communicative content.” Id., at 163. It therefore concluded that “[c]ontent-based laws . . . are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Ibid.

    But the First Amendment is not the Tax Code. Its purposes are often better served when judge-made categories (like “content discrimination”) are treated, not as bright-line rules, but instead as rules of thumb. And, where strict scrutiny’s harsh presumption of unconstitutionality is at issue, it is particularly important to avoid jumping to such presumptive conclusions without first considering “whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.” Id., at 179 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment); Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 9–10); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 582 (2011) (BREYER, J., dissenting). Here, I would conclude that the City of Austin’s (City’s) regulation of off-premises signs works no such disproportionate harm. I therefore agree with the majority’s conclusion that strict scrutiny and its attendant presumption of unconstitutionality are unwarranted. The majority reaches this conclusion by applying Reed’s formal framework, as stare decisis requires. I would add that Reed’s strict formalism can sometimes disserve the very First Amendment interests it was designed to protect. [4]

    —Justice Stephen Breyer

    Justice Alito concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part

    Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.

    In his opinion, Justice Alito wrote: [1]

    I agree with the majority that we must reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the provisions of the Austin City Code regulating on- and off-premises signs are facially unconstitutional.
    ...
    Because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the code provisions are facially unconstitutional, I agree that we should reverse that decision. On remand, the lower courts should determine whether those provisions are unconstitutional as applied to each of the billboards at issue.

    Today’s decision, however, goes further and holds flatly that “[t]he sign code provisions challenged here do not discriminate” on the basis of “‘the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,’” ante, at 10, and that categorical statement is incorrect. The provisions defining on- and off-premises signs clearly discriminate on those grounds, and at least as applied in some situations, strict scrutiny should be required. [4]

    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett.

    In his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 (2015), we held that a speech regulation is content based—and thus presumptively invalid—if it “draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” Id., at 163. Here, the city of Austin imposes special restrictions on “off-premise[s] sign[s],” defined as signs that “advertis[e] a business, person, activity, goods, products, or services not located on the site where the sign is installed, or that direc[t] persons to any location not on that site.” Austin, Tex., City Code §25– 10–3(11) (2016). Under Reed, Austin’s off-premises restriction is content based. It discriminates against certain signs based on the message they convey—e.g., whether they promote an on- or off-site event, activity, or service.

    The Court nevertheless holds that the off-premises restriction is content neutral because it proscribes a sufficiently broad category of communicative content and, therefore, does not target a specific “topic or subject matter.” Ante, at 8. This misinterprets Reed’s clear rule for content-based restrictions and replaces it with an incoherent and malleable standard. In so doing, the majority’s reasoning is reminiscent of this Court’s erroneous decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703 (2000), which upheld a blatantly content-based prohibition on “counseling” near abortion clinics on the ground that it discriminated against “an extremely broad category of communications.” Id., at 723. Because I would adhere to Reed rather than echo Hill’s long-discredited approach, I respectfully dissent. [4]

    —Justice Clarence Thomas

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2021-2022

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2021-2022

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 4, 2021. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[7]

    The court agreed to hear 68 cases during its 2021-2022 term.[8] Four cases were dismissed and one case was removed from the argument calendar.[9]

    The court issued decisions in 66 cases during its 2021-2022 term. Three cases were decided without argument. Between 2007 and 2021, SCOTUS released opinions in 1,128 cases, averaging 75 cases per year.


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes