Congressional investigation of CENTCOM’s intelligence reports on the Islamic State (2015-2016)

Federal Issues
Executive powers Barack Obama: Vetoed legislation • Executive clemency and presidential pardons
Foreign affairs Iran nuclear agreement: U.S. withheld cash until hostages were released • Congressional investigation of CENTCOM’s intelligence reports on the Islamic State • Iran nuclear agreement: An overview • Bowe Bergdahl exchange • ISIS insurgency in Iraq and Syria • Terrorist attack on U.S. mission in Benghazi, 2012
Economy The Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal: An overview • The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Natural resources Keystone XL Pipeline political timeline
Healthcare Obamacare overview • Obamacare lawsuits
Immigration President Obama's Immigration Accountability Executive Actions
Abortion Republican effort to defund Planned Parenthood, 2015
Have you subscribed yet? Join the hundreds of thousands of readers trusting Ballotpedia to keep them up to date with the latest political news. Sign up for the Daily Brew. Click here to learn more.

---

Ballotpedia's scope changes periodically, and this article type is no longer actively created or maintained. If you would like to help our coverage grow, consider donating to Ballotpedia.

---

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Central and South Asia—including Operation Inherent Resolve, the military operation with the mission of defeating the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Da’esh.

According to a House Republican task force preliminary report released on August 11, 2016, senior leaders at CENTCOM approved intelligence assessments that presented a more optimistic representation of the fight against the Islamic State from the middle of 2014 to the middle of 2015. The investigation determined that leaders of CENTCOM and the J2—CENTCOM’s Joint Intelligence Center—regularly disseminated intelligence that was inconsistent with the judgments of many senior, career CENTCOM analysts and that "CENTCOM produced intelligence that was also significantly more optimistic than that of other parts of the Intelligence Community (IC) and typically more optimistic than actual events warranted."

A separate, Democratic-led House committee preliminary report, also released August 11, 2016, determined "[f]rom the fall of 2014 to the summer of 2015, the leadership of CENTCOM's Intelligence Directorate employed an overly insular process for analyzing intelligence reporting and producing intelligence assessments on ISIL and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). ... There is no evidence to date, however, that this process was designed to advance a particular policy or political narrative, or that it was driven by actors above or outside of the leadership of CENTCOM's intelligence directorate."

Background

"SASC Hearing: U.S. military operations to counter ISIL," September 18, 2015

The United States House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence launched an investigation into CENTCOM in December 2015 following a May 2015 whistleblower complaint about the manipulation of intelligence reports. The complaint stated that senior leaders "violated regulations, tradecraft standards, and professional ethics by modifying intelligence assessments to present an unduly positive outlook on CENTCOM efforts to train the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] and combat ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]." Fifty CENTCOM employees supported the complaint.

According to The Daily Beast, analysts described "a persistent effort by [intelligence director Major General Steven] Grove and his team to downplay or even change reports that that [sic] questioned how much progress a U.S.-led coalition is making in the Obama administration’s stated goal to degrade, destroy, and defeat ISIS. Draft reports that contained a more pessimistic view, or that questioned the efficacy of hitting certain targets, were sent back to the analysts for more extensive rewriting." Some analysts said that they "self-censored so their reports affirmed already-held beliefs."

Democrats of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), led by Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) and Rep. Jackie Speier (D-Calif.), conducted their own investigation into the allegations. Schiff said in a press release, "Chief among our priorities on HPSCI has always been ensuring that the intelligence and analysis provided to policy makers is free from politicization or distortion, as well as making sure both that whistleblower complaints are fully investigated, and that those who lawfully blow the whistle receive protection."

Investigations

The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities among the combatant commanders. CENTCOM is responsible for operations in twenty countries that fall in the "central" area of the globe: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

There were three investigations into the allegations that CENTCOM leadership manipulated ISIS intelligence reports: the Republican-led House Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence, the Democratic-led House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Department of Defense (DoD) investigation under Inspector General Glenn A. Fine.

House Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence (R)

On December 11, 2015, Reps. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.), Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), and Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) announced the formation of a joint task force to investigate allegations that senior CENTCOM officials manipulated intelligence products. Members of the House Armed Services Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Appropriations Committee conducted the investigation.

Key findings of the preliminary report

The key findings of the House Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence appear below.

• "[S]tructural and management changes made at the CENTCOM Intelligence Directorate starting in mid-2014 resulted in the production and dissemination of intelligence products that were inconsistent with the judgments of many senior, career analysts at CENTCOM."

• "Starting in mid-2014, CENTCOM Intelligence Directorate leadership instituted various organizational and process changes that negatively affected the quality and timeliness of intelligence production. CENTCOM senior leaders claimed these changes were intended to improve analytic tradecraft and timeliness, but the changes ultimately were unsuccessful and had the opposite effect. Many of these changes in the review and coordination process have since been reversed."

• Senior CENTCOM leaders "relied on details reported from coalition forces rather than more objective and better documented intelligence reporting...circumvent[ing] important processes that are intended to protect the integrity of intelligence analysis."

• Intelligence products were "consistently more optimistic regarding the conduct of U.S. military action than that of the senior analysts" and "significantly more optimistic than that of other parts of the Intelligence Community (IC) and typically more optimistic than actual events warranted."

• "Many CENTCOM press releases, public statements, and congressional testimonies were also significantly more positive than actual events."

• The leadership environment within CENTCOM and its Intelligence Directorate "deteriorated significantly following the 2013 departure of Marine General James Mattis and his senior intelligence leaders."

• A survey revealed that dozens of analysts viewed the subsequent leadership environment "as toxic, with 40% of analysts responding that they had experienced an attempt to distort or suppress intelligence in the past year."

• Testimony revealed that the leadership environment began to improve in mid-2015 after the DoD inspector general launched his investigation.

Comments on preliminary findings

Representatives Ken Calvert (R-Calif.), Mike Pompeo (R-Kan.), and Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), who led the investigation, released the following statements when the preliminary report was released on August 11, 2016:

• Calvert said, "The leadership failures at CENTCOM reach to the very top of the organization. I hope that the new CENTCOM commander and the new Director of Intelligence can turn things around quickly. As for the task force, it is critical that we follow up on the deficiencies highlighted in this initial report. What happened at CENTCOM is unacceptable – our warfighters suffer when bad analysis is presented to senior policymakers. We must continue our efforts until we fix it."

• Pompeo said, "After months of investigation, this much is very clear: from the middle of 2014 to the middle of 2015, the United States Central Command’s most senior intelligence leaders manipulated the command’s intelligence products to downplay the threat from ISIS in Iraq. The result: consumers of those intelligence products were provided a consistently ‘rosy’ view of U.S. operational success against ISIS. That may well have resulted in putting American troops at risk as policymakers relied on this intelligence when formulating policy and allocating resources for the fight. I urge the Department of Defense Inspector General to hold accountable the intelligence leaders that failed our service members fighting our wars on the ground."

• Wenstrup said, "I am proud to serve on the Joint Task Force, which is working diligently to conduct a thorough investigation into the CENTCOM intelligence directorate. Amongst other findings, our investigation has determined that unfavorable intelligence reports underwent significant scrutiny and were likely to be omitted unless they could be confirmed with virtually 100 percent certainty. As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve, I understand that intelligence is not always certain. Possibilities and probabilities can be just as critical for decision makers. Additionally, despite nearly nine months of review, we still do not fully understand the reasons and motivations behind this practice and how often the excluded analyses were proven ultimately to be correct. We cannot win the war against ISIS with incomplete intelligence. The report out today highlights the importance of having an independent process."

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (D)

Democrats on the committee conducted their own investigation into the allegations "[d]ue to concerns regarding the unnecessary proliferation of task forces within the Congress ... rather than serve as Members of the task force established by House Republicans."

Key findings of the preliminary report

The key findings of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence appear below.

• "From the fall of 2014 to the summer of 2015, the leadership of CENTCOM's Intelligence Directorate employed an overly insular process for analyzing intelligence reporting and producing intelligence assessments on ISIL and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)."

• "There is no evidence to date, however, that this process was designed to advance a particular policy or political narrative, or that it was driven by actors above or outside of the leadership of CENTCOM's intelligence directorate."

• "CENTCOM analysts were not permitted to coordinate externally with IC experts at their level, at odds with analytical best practices. Assessment methodologies at times deviated from analytical best practices. The production of intelligence on ISIL and ISF capabilities was sometimes slow and insufficiently accommodating of dissent."

• "Morale among the analytical workforce was poor, particularly as analysts found their authority diminished once the focus shifted to ISIL and Iraq and new reporting structures were imposed without sufficient notice and timely explanations to the workforce."

Comments on preliminary findings

Schiff said, "Through our inquiry, HPSCI Democrats have found that between 2014 and 2015, CENTCOM created an overly insular process for producing intelligence assessments on ISIL and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – one that at times deviated from analytical best practices; stalled the release of intelligence products; limited the ability of CENTCOM analysts to coordinate with IC experts; insufficiently accommodated dissenting views; and negatively influenced the morale of CENTCOM analysts. However, we found no evidence of politicization of intelligence in this case. Nor did we – or the Majority – find any evidence that the White House requested to, or in any manner attempted to, have the intelligence analysis conform to any preset or political narrative. ... There are some aspects of the Majority analysis with which we do not agree. In particular, we believe that CENTCOM and others within DoD and DNI have taken steps to address these problems, and we look forward to monitoring their progress."

Department of Defense Inspector General's report

On September 9, 2015, the DoD confirmed that the department's inspector general was investigating the whistleblower complaint.

Timeline of the investigations and the fight against ISIS

Change of command ceremony at McDill Air Force Base. General Joseph L. Votel relieved General Lloyd J. Austin III on March 30, 2016.

• March 22, 2013: Army General Lloyd J. Austin III assumed command of CENTCOM, relieving Marine General James Mattis.

• January 27, 2014: During an interview, President Barack Obama (D) discussed ISIS, saying, "The analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant. I think there is a distinction between the capacity and reach of a bin Laden and a network that is actively planning major terrorist plots against the homeland versus jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles and disputes, often sectarian."

• June 10, 2014: ISIL seized control of the city of Mosul in Iraq.

• August 8, 2014: The United States, under the operational control of CENTCOM, started conducting airstrikes against ISIS outside of Irbil in Iraq. It was the first offensive action by the United States in Iraq since withdrawing ground troops in 2011.

• March 26, 2015: Army General Austin said during a congressional hearing, "The fact is that ISIL can no longer do what he did at the outset, which is to seize and hold new territory. He has assumed a defensive crouch in Iraq. Although he has greater freedom of movement in Syria, he's largely in a defensive there, as well. He's having a tough time governing. … But, make no mistake, ISIL is losing this fight. And I am certain that he will be defeated."

Change of command ceremony at McDill Air Force Base. General Lloyd Austin III relieved General James Mattis on March 22, 2013.

• May 17, 2015: ISIL seized control of the city of Ramadi in Iraq.

• May 21, 2015: When asked if the United States was losing the fight against ISIS after the terrorist group gained control of Ramadi, Obama said, "No, I don’t think we’re losing. There’s no doubt there was a tactical setback, although Ramadi had been vulnerable for a very long time, primarily because these are not Iraqi security forces that we have trained or reinforced … [T]he training of Iraqi security forces, the fortifications, the command-and-control systems are not happening fast enough in Anbar, in the Sunni parts of the country."

• May 28, 2015: An analyst assigned to CENTCOM filed a formal complaint with the Defense Intelligence Agency inspector general, alleging that CENTCOM leadership manipulated ISIS intelligence reports.

• August 25, 2015: The New York Times reported that the "Pentagon’s inspector general is investigating allegations that military officials have skewed intelligence assessments about the United States-led campaign in Iraq against the Islamic State to provide a more optimistic account of progress, according to several officials familiar with the inquiry."

• September 9, 2015: The Daily Beast reported that "[m]ore than 50 intelligence analysts working out of the U.S. military’s Central Command have formally complained that their reports on ISIS and al Qaeda’s branch in Syria were being inappropriately altered by senior officials."

• September 9, 2015: The Pentagon confirmed the inspector general’s investigation for the first time.

• November 23, 2015: The Daily Beast reported that some CENTCOM analysts accused Major General Steven Grove, who was in charge of CENTCOM's intelligence directorate (J2), and his civilian deputy, Gregory Ryckman, of interfering with the inspector general’s investigation by "deleting emails and files from computer systems before the inspector general could examine them."

• December 11, 2015: Representatives Devin Nunes (R-Calif.), Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), and Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.) established a Joint Task Force to investigate allegations that senior CENTCOM officials manipulated intelligence products.

• December 28, 2015: Iraqi forces regained control of the city of Ramadi in Iraq.

• February 25, 2016: During a congressional hearing, Nunes accused officials at the Pentagon of deleting classified intelligence files and emails about the war on ISIS/ISIL. He said, "We have been made aware that both files and emails have been deleted by personnel at CENTCOM, and we expect that the Department of Defense will provide these and all other relevant documents to the committee."

• March 25, 2016: The Department of Defense announced that Major General Mark R. Quantock would serve as CENTCOM director of intelligence, or J2.

• March 30, 2016: Army General Joseph Votel assumed command of CENTCOM, relieving Army General Austin.

• May 24, 2016: The Department of Defense announced that Major General Grove would serve as the director of the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office.

• August 11, 2016: The House Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence (R) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (D) released their preliminary reports on allegations that CENTCOM leaders manipulated intelligence reports.

See also

• U.S. Department of Defense
• 2016 presidential candidates on ISIS and Syrian refugees

External links

• "Initial Findings of the U.S. House of Representatives Joint Task Force on U.S. Central Command Intelligence Analysis," August 10, 2016
• "HPSCI Democrats Release Findings of Investigation into CENTCOM Intelligence Analysis," August 11, 2016
• Operation Inherent Resolve
• U.S. Central Command