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De Jonge v. Oregon
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| De Jonge v. Oregon | |
| Reference: 299 US 353 | |
| Term: 1937 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: December 9, 1936 Decided: January 4, 1937 | |
| Outcome | |
| Oregon Supreme Court reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Charles Evans Hughes • Louis Brandeis • Pierce Butler • Benjamin Cardozo • James McReynolds • Owen Roberts • George Sutherland • Willis Van Devanter | |
De Jonge v. Oregon is a case decided on January 4, 1937, by the U.S. Supreme Court that held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects freedom of assembly from state statutes. The court found that Dirk De Jonge had the right to speak at a peaceful public meeting held by the Communist Party even though the party generally advocated industrial or political change through revolution.[1]
Why it matters: The court's opinion in De Jonge v. Oregon made First Amendment protections of free assembly binding on state governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To read more about the legacy of De Jonge v. Oregon click here.
Background
An Oregon statute made it a crime to teach or advocate violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts as a means of effecting political change or revolution.
An individual was guilty of advocating criminal anarchy under the statute if he or she:[2]
| “ | assist in conducting any assemblage of persons ... which teaches or advocates ... the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution.[3] | ” |
If found guilty, the defendant was guilty of a felony and subject to punishment of imprisonment and/or a fine.
The statute was similar to state laws the Supreme Court upheld in cases like Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California.
Oral argument
Oral argument was conducted on December 9, 1936. The case was decided on January 4, 1937.[1]
Decision
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, which reversed De Jonge's conviction and overturned the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court.[1] Justice Harlan Fiske Stone did not participate in consideration of the case.[2]
Opinion
Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the unanimous Supreme Court, which reversed De Jonge's conviction.
First, Hughes said that the Supreme Court had to accept the indictment as the Oregon Supreme Court had defined it and decide the case on the basis that the state's criminal syndicalism law had been properly applied. Due to the principle of federalism, Hughes argued, the Oregon Supreme Court had final authority to interpret state law. Thus, the Supreme Court could not examine the evidence at trial to determine if De Jonge had done anything more culpable than conduct a public meeting for the Communist Party because he wasn't charged with anything further. Justice Hughes wrote, "Conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process."[1]
Next, Justice Hughes discussed the difference between this case and cases like Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California, which upheld criminal syndicalism laws. Hughes argued that in those cases the defendant was convicted of advocating the overthrow of the government or joining a conspiracy, but said that "none of our prior decisions go to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application."[1]
Hughes proceeded to explain the importance of the right to freedom of assembly:
| “ | [Freedom of assembly] cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions. ... The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government...consistently with the Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime.[1][3] | ” |
However, Justice Hughes argued that peaceable assembly was different from advocating violence or overthrow of the government and assembling to bring about crime. Hughes wrote, "If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws."[1] He argued that De Jonge had a constitutional right "to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek redress of alleged grievances. That was of the essence of his guaranteed personal liberty."[1] De Jonge's conviction was thus reversed as a violation of the Due Process Clause.
Aftermath
In 1969, the Supreme Court declared a criminal syndicalism law unconstitutional on its face in Bradenburg v. Ohio, overruling Whitney v. California and casting doubt on Gitlow v. New York. Bradenburg reaffirmed the holding of De Jonge that peaceful political assembly is a right protected by the First Amendment incorporated into the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 Justia, "De Jonge v. Oregon, , 299 U.S. 353 (1937)," accessed August 23, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), De Jonge v. Oregon decided June 8, 1925
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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