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Federalist No. 24 by Alexander Hamilton (1787)

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Federalist Number (No.) 24 (1787) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Author: Alexander Hamilton
  • Source: Originally published in the Independent Journal on December 19, 1787. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.
  • Abstract: Hamilton argues for a strong national army.
  • Background of the author

    Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:[2]

    • 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
    • 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
      • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
    • 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
    • 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
    • 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

    Full text of The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

    The full text of Federalist No. 24 reads as follows:[1]

    To the People of the State of New York:


    To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

    It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.

    A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature.

    If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.

    Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.

    If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them1 contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.

    Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.

    If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.

    But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

    Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.

    Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.

    In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.

    If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.

    PUBLIUS.[3]

    Background of the Federalist Papers

    The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[4]

    The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

    The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

    The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[5][6][4]

    Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.[5][6][4]

    Full list of Federalist Papers

    The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

    The Federalist Papers
    Number Subject Author
    No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
    No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
    No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
    No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
    No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
    No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
    No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
    No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
    No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
    No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
    No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
    No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
    No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
    No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
    No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
    No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
    No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
    No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
    No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
    No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
    No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
    No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
    No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
    No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
    No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
    No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
    No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
    No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
    No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
    No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
    No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
    No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
    No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
    No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
    No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
    No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
    No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
    No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
    No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
    No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
    No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
    No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
    No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
    No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
    No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
    No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
    No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
    No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
    No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
    No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
    No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
    No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
    No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
    No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
    No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
    No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes