Federalist No. 32 by Alexander Hamilton (1788)

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Federalist Number (No.) 32 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

HIGHLIGHTS

Author: Alexander Hamilton

Source: Originally published in the Daily Advertiser on January 3, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.

Abstract: Hamilton argues for the national government to have the power of taxation.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
  • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of Concerning the General Power of Taxation

The full text of Federalist No. 32 reads as follows:

“ To the People of the State of New York: ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution. An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers Congress "TO LAY AND COLLECT TAXES, DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND EXCISES; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, LAY ANY IMPOSTS OR DUTIES ON IMPORTS OR EXPORTS, except for the purpose of executing its inspection laws. Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States. This must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE. A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular, there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article, UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the kind. As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty. The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every hypothesis to the contrary. PUBLIUS. ”

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

The Federalist Papers
Number	Subject	Author
No 1	General Introduction	Hamilton
No 2	Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence	Jay
No 3	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 4	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 5	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 6	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States	Hamilton
No 7	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't)	Hamilton
No 8	The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States	Hamilton
No 9	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection	Hamilton
No 10	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't)	Madison
No 11	The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy	Hamilton
No 12	The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue	Hamilton
No 13	Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government	Hamilton
No 14	Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered	Madison
No 15	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union	Hamilton
No 16	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 17	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 18	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 19	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 20	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 21	Other Defects of the Present Confederation	Hamilton
No 22	Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't)	Hamilton
No 23	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union	Hamilton
No 24	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered	Hamilton
No 25	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 26	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered	Hamilton
No 27	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 28	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 29	Concerning the Militia	Hamilton
No 30	Concerning the General Power of Taxation	Hamilton
No 31	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 32	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 33	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 34	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 35	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 36	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 37	Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government	Madison
No 38	The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed	Madison
No 39	The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles	Madison
No 40	The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained	Madison
No 41	General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution	Madison
No 42	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered	Madison
No 43	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't)	Madison
No 44	Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States	Madison
No 45	The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered	Madison
No 46	The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared	Madison
No 47	The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts	Madison
No 48	These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other	Madison
No 49	Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention	Hamilton and Madison
No 50	Periodical Appeals to the People Considered	Hamilton and Madison
No 51	The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments	Hamilton and Madison
No 52	The House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 53	The House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 54	The Apportionment of Members Among the States	Hamilton and Madison
No 55	The Total Number of the House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 56	The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 57	The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation	Hamilton and Madison
No 58	Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered	Madison
No 59	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members	Hamilton
No 60	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 61	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 62	The Senate	Hamilton and Madison
No 63	The Senate (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 64	The Powers of the Senate	Jay
No 65	The Powers of the Senate (con't)	Hamilton
No 66	Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered	Hamilton
No 67	The Executive Department	Hamilton
No 68	The Mode of Electing the President	Hamilton
No 69	The Real Character of the Executive	Hamilton
No 70	The Executive Department Further Considered	Hamilton
No 71	The Duration in Office of the Executive	Hamilton
No 72	The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 73	The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power	Hamilton
No 74	The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 75	The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 76	The Appointing Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 77	The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 78	The Judiciary Department	Hamilton
No 79	The Judiciary (con't)	Hamilton
No 80	The Powers of the Judiciary	Hamilton
No 81	The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority	Hamilton
No 82	The Judiciary Continued	Hamilton
No 83	The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury	Hamilton
No 84	Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered	Hamilton
No 85	Concluding Remarks	Hamilton

See also

• Federalism
• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

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