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Federalist No. 49 by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton (1788)

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Federalist Number (No.) 49 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton or James Madison arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
  • Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on February 5, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.
  • Abstract: Hamilton or Madison argue the Constitution should not be changed even if two thirds of the branches of government agree on an opinion. They claim doing so would cause the Constitution to constantly be changing, which is counter productive to its original intent.
  • Background of the authors

    This paper was written by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison.

    Alexander Hamilton

    Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:[2]

    • 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
    • 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
      • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
    • 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
    • 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
    • 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

    James Madison

    James Madison (1751-1836) was an American politician who served as the fourth president of the United States. He is considered a Founding Father of the United States and is also known as the Father of the Constitution due to his contributions to the development of the United States Constitution. Below is a summary of Madison's career:[3]

    Full text of Advantage of the Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention

    The full text of Federalist No. 49 reads as follows:[1]

    To the People of the State of New York:


    THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia, quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked. His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT, a convention shall be called for the purpose. As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the government, but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others.

    The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance? There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits. In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to be rather against the modification of the principle, than against the principle itself. In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.

    If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side. The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied.

    We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended. But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government.

    We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy, and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numberous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.

    With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue. But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them. It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. The usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the people.

    In such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of, the measures to which the decision would relate. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government. We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision.

    PUBLIUS.[4]

    Background of the Federalist Papers

    The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[5]

    The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

    The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

    The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[6][7][5]

    Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.[6][7][5]

    Full list of Federalist Papers

    The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

    The Federalist Papers
    Number Subject Author
    No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
    No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
    No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
    No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
    No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
    No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
    No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
    No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
    No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
    No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
    No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
    No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
    No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
    No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
    No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
    No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
    No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
    No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
    No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
    No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
    No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
    No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
    No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
    No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
    No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
    No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
    No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
    No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
    No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
    No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
    No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
    No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
    No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
    No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
    No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
    No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
    No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
    No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
    No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
    No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
    No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
    No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
    No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
    No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
    No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
    No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
    No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
    No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
    No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
    No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
    No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
    No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
    No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
    No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
    No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
    No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes