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Federalist No. 4 by John Jay (1787)

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Federalist Number (No.) 4 (1787) is an essay by British-American politician John Jay arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Author: John Jay
  • Source: Originally published in the Independent Journal on November 14, 1787. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.
  • Abstract: John Jay argues for a central government.
  • Background of the author

    John Jay (c. 1745–1829) was a British-American politician, diplomat, and Supreme Court chief justice. He was a supporter of a stronger central government under the U.S. Constitution and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Jay's career:[2][3]

    • 1774-1775: Delegate to the Continental Congress from New York
    • 1777: Drafted New York's first constitution
    • 1778: President of the Continental Congress
    • 1779-1782: Diplomat to Spain during the American Revolution
    • 1782-1783: Negotiated the Treaty of Paris along with Benjamin Franklin and John Adams, formally ending the war
    • 1787-1788: Author of five of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
    • 1789-1795: First chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
    • 1795-1801: Governor of New York

    Full text of Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

    The full text of Federalist No. 4 reads as follows:[1]

    To the People of the State of New York:


    MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

    But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.

    It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.

    With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.

    With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.

    In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

    The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

    Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

    From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

    The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

    As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

    One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.

    What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?

    We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.

    Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

    But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

    But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

    PUBLIUS.[4]

    Background of the Federalist Papers

    The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[5]

    The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

    The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

    The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[6][7][5]

    Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.[6][7][5]

    Full list of Federalist Papers

    The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

    The Federalist Papers
    Number Subject Author
    No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
    No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
    No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
    No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
    No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
    No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
    No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
    No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
    No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
    No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
    No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
    No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
    No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
    No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
    No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
    No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
    No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
    No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
    No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
    No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
    No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
    No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
    No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
    No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
    No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
    No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
    No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
    No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
    No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
    No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
    No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
    No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
    No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
    No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
    No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
    No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
    No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
    No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
    No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
    No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
    No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
    No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
    No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
    No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
    No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
    No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
    No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
    No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
    No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
    No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
    No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
    No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
    No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
    No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
    No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
    No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes