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Federalist No. 50 by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton (1788)

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Federalist Number (No.) 50 (1788) is an essay by British-American politicians Alexander Hamilton or James Madison arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "Periodical Appeals to the People Considered." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
  • Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on February 5, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.
  • Abstract: Hamilton or Madison argues against period appeals of the Constitution by the people.

    • Background of the authors

    This paper was written by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison.

    Alexander Hamilton

    Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:[2]

    • 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
    • 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
      • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
    • 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
    • 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
    • 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

    James Madison

    James Madison (1751-1836) was an American politician who served as the fourth president of the United States. He is considered a Founding Father of the United States and is also known as the Father of the Constitution due to his contributions to the development of the United States Constitution. Below is a summary of Madison's career:[3]

    Full text of Periodical Appeals to the People Considered

    The full text of Federalist No. 50 reads as follows:[1]

    “ To the People of the State of New York:


    IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated.

    The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire, "whether the constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments had encroached upon each other. This important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very particular attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who composed the council, that some, at least, of its most active members had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State.
    Secondly. It appears that the same active and leading members of the council had been active and influential members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other members of the executive council, within the seven preceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others distinguished members, of the legislative assembly within the same period.

    Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, PASSION, not REASON, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.

    Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.

    Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party.

    Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other given period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty. Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the people, to revise the preceding administration of the government, all persons who should have been concerned with the government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures, and have been elected under their auspices.

    PUBLIUS.[4]

    		”

    Background of the Federalist Papers

    The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[5]

    The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

    The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

    The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[6][7][5]

    Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.[6][7][5]

    Full list of Federalist Papers

    The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

    The Federalist Papers
    Number Subject Author
    No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
    No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
    No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
    No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
    No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
    No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
    No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
    No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
    No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
    No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
    No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
    No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
    No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
    No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
    No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
    No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
    No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
    No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
    No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
    No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
    No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
    No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
    No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
    No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
    No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
    No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
    No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
    No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
    No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
    No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
    No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
    No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
    No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
    No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
    No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
    No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
    No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
    No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
    No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
    No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
    No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
    No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
    No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
    No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
    No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
    No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
    No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
    No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
    No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
    No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
    No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
    No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
    No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
    No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
    No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
    No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School, "The Federalist Papers: No. 50," accessed June 15, 2022
    2. ↑ Biography.com, "Alexander Hamilton," accessed March 6, 2018
    3. ↑ Biography.com, "James Madison," accessed June 16, 2018
    4. ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 The Federalist Papers, "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive, "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Middle Tennessee State University, "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021
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