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Federalist No. 52 by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton (1788)

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Federalist Number (No.) 52 (1788) is an essay by British-American politicians Alexander Hamilton or James Madison arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The House of Representatives." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison
  • Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on February 8, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.
  • Abstract: Hamilton or Madison outlines the structure of the House of Representatives within the federal government.

    • Background of the authors

    This paper was written by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison.

    Alexander Hamilton

    Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:[2]

    • 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
    • 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
      • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
    • 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
    • 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
    • 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

    James Madison

    James Madison (1751-1836) was an American politician who served as the fourth president of the United States. He is considered a Founding Father of the United States and is also known as the Father of the Constitution due to his contributions to the development of the United States Constitution. Below is a summary of Madison's career:[3]

    Full text of The House of Representatives

    The full text of Federalist No. 52 reads as follows:[1]

    “ To the People of the State of New York:


    FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option.

    It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution. The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.

    The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected.

    Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found. The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II. , that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III. , when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term "frequently, which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II. , is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian succession.
    From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves. Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence.

    In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

    PUBLIUS.[4]

    		”

    Background of the Federalist Papers

    The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.[5]

    The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

    The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

    The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.[6][7][5]

    Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.[6][7][5]

    Full list of Federalist Papers

    The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

    The Federalist Papers
    Number Subject Author
    No 1 General Introduction Hamilton
    No 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence Jay
    No 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) Jay
    No 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Hamilton
    No 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) Hamilton
    No 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Hamilton
    No 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Hamilton
    No 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) Madison
    No 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Hamilton
    No 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Hamilton
    No 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Hamilton
    No 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered Madison
    No 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Hamilton
    No 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton
    No 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 20 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation Hamilton
    No 22 Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) Hamilton
    No 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Hamilton
    No 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Hamilton
    No 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Hamilton
    No 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) Hamilton
    No 29 Concerning the Militia Hamilton
    No 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation Hamilton
    No 31 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 32 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 33 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 34 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 35 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 36 Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) Hamilton
    No 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government Madison
    No 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed Madison
    No 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Madison
    No 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained Madison
    No 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution Madison
    No 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered Madison
    No 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) Madison
    No 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States Madison
    No 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered Madison
    No 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared Madison
    No 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts Madison
    No 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other Madison
    No 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Hamilton and Madison
    No 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Hamilton and Madison
    No 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Hamilton and Madison
    No 52 The House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 53 The House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States Hamilton and Madison
    No 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives Hamilton and Madison
    No 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Hamilton and Madison
    No 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered Madison
    No 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Hamilton
    No 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) Hamilton
    No 62 The Senate Hamilton and Madison
    No 63 The Senate (con't) Hamilton and Madison
    No 64 The Powers of the Senate Jay
    No 65 The Powers of the Senate (con't) Hamilton
    No 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Hamilton
    No 67 The Executive Department Hamilton
    No 68 The Mode of Electing the President Hamilton
    No 69 The Real Character of the Executive Hamilton
    No 70 The Executive Department Further Considered Hamilton
    No 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive Hamilton
    No 72 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Hamilton
    No 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive Hamilton
    No 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Hamilton
    No 78 The Judiciary Department Hamilton
    No 79 The Judiciary (con't) Hamilton
    No 80 The Powers of the Judiciary Hamilton
    No 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Hamilton
    No 82 The Judiciary Continued Hamilton
    No 83 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Hamilton
    No 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Hamilton
    No 85 Concluding Remarks Hamilton

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Yale Law School, "The Federalist Papers: No. 52," accessed June 15, 2022
    2. ↑ Biography.com, "Alexander Hamilton," accessed March 6, 2018
    3. ↑ Biography.com, "James Madison," accessed June 16, 2018
    4. ↑ Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 The Federalist Papers, "THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS," accesses May 27, 2022
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive, "Federalism," accessed July 27, 2021
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Middle Tennessee State University, "Anti-Federalists," accessed July 27, 2021
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