Federalist No. 61 by Alexander Hamilton (1788)

• Federalism
• Terms and definitions
• Laws
• Court cases
• Major arguments
• State responses to federal mandates
• State survey of the federal grant review process
  • State responses to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
  • State responses by question to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
• Federalism by the numbers
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal mandates
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal grants-in-aid
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal information collection requests
  • Overview of federal spending during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic
• Index of articles

Federalist Number (No.) 61 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

HIGHLIGHTS

Author: Alexander Hamilton

Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on February 26, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.

Abstract: Hamilton argues the national government should be the only entity that can regulate Congressional elections.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
  • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members

The full text of Federalist No. 61 reads as follows:

“ To the People of the State of New York: THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice. If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The constitution of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States. If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests. Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations. Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year. It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government at the same epochs. PUBLIUS. ”

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

The Federalist Papers
Number	Subject	Author
No 1	General Introduction	Hamilton
No 2	Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence	Jay
No 3	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 4	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 5	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 6	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States	Hamilton
No 7	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't)	Hamilton
No 8	The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States	Hamilton
No 9	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection	Hamilton
No 10	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't)	Madison
No 11	The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy	Hamilton
No 12	The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue	Hamilton
No 13	Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government	Hamilton
No 14	Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered	Madison
No 15	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union	Hamilton
No 16	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 17	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 18	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 19	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 20	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 21	Other Defects of the Present Confederation	Hamilton
No 22	Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't)	Hamilton
No 23	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union	Hamilton
No 24	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered	Hamilton
No 25	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 26	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered	Hamilton
No 27	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 28	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 29	Concerning the Militia	Hamilton
No 30	Concerning the General Power of Taxation	Hamilton
No 31	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 32	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 33	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 34	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 35	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 36	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 37	Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government	Madison
No 38	The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed	Madison
No 39	The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles	Madison
No 40	The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained	Madison
No 41	General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution	Madison
No 42	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered	Madison
No 43	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't)	Madison
No 44	Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States	Madison
No 45	The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered	Madison
No 46	The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared	Madison
No 47	The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts	Madison
No 48	These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other	Madison
No 49	Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention	Hamilton and Madison
No 50	Periodical Appeals to the People Considered	Hamilton and Madison
No 51	The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments	Hamilton and Madison
No 52	The House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 53	The House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 54	The Apportionment of Members Among the States	Hamilton and Madison
No 55	The Total Number of the House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 56	The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 57	The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation	Hamilton and Madison
No 58	Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered	Madison
No 59	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members	Hamilton
No 60	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 61	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 62	The Senate	Hamilton and Madison
No 63	The Senate (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 64	The Powers of the Senate	Jay
No 65	The Powers of the Senate (con't)	Hamilton
No 66	Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered	Hamilton
No 67	The Executive Department	Hamilton
No 68	The Mode of Electing the President	Hamilton
No 69	The Real Character of the Executive	Hamilton
No 70	The Executive Department Further Considered	Hamilton
No 71	The Duration in Office of the Executive	Hamilton
No 72	The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 73	The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power	Hamilton
No 74	The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 75	The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 76	The Appointing Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 77	The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 78	The Judiciary Department	Hamilton
No 79	The Judiciary (con't)	Hamilton
No 80	The Powers of the Judiciary	Hamilton
No 81	The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority	Hamilton
No 82	The Judiciary Continued	Hamilton
No 83	The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury	Hamilton
No 84	Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered	Hamilton
No 85	Concluding Remarks	Hamilton

See also

• Federalism
• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

• Search Google News for this topic

Footnotes

Ballotpedia

About

Overview • What people are saying • Support Ballotpedia • Contact • Contribute • Job opportunities

---

Executive: Leslie Graves, Founder and CEO • Gwen Beattie, Chief Operating Officer

Communications: Alison Graves, Director of Communications • Carley Allensworth • Abigail Campbell • Frank Festa • Sarah Groat • Nathaniel Harwood • Dillon Redmond • Erica Shumaker
External Relations: Geoff Pallay, Director of External Relations • Ken Carbullido, Vice President of Election Product and Technology Strategy • Ashley Fleming • Thomas Mardik • Hannah Nelson
Operations: Meghann Olshefski, Director of Operations • Amanda Herbert • Mandy Morris • Caroline Presnell • Kelly Rindfleisch
Tech: Matt Latourelle, Director of Technology Operations • Ryan Burch • Kirsten Corrao • Beth Dellea • Travis Eden • Tate Kamish • Margaret Kearney • Eric Lotto • Joseph Sanchez • Mary Susmitha

Contributors: Scott Rasmussen

---

Editorial Content

Josh Altic, Director of Content • Daniel Anderson, Associate Director of Elections & Data • Cory Eucalitto, Associate Director of Features • Ryan Byrne, Managing Editor of Ballot Measures • Mandy McConnell, Managing Editor of News • Doug Kronaizl, Managing Editor of Local Expansion • Abbey Smith, Managing Editor of Elections • Janie Valentine, Managing Editor of Law • Joel Williams. Managing Editor of Events • Andrew Bahl • Jaclyn Beran • Marielle Bricker • Joseph Brusgard • Emma Burlingame • Kelly Coyle • Jon Dunn • Thomas Ellis • Nicole Fisher • Joseph Greaney • Thomas Grobben • Brianna Hosea • Molly Kehoe • Tyler King • Glorie Martinez • Norm Leahy, Senior Editor • Nathan Maxwell • Jimmy McAllister • Brandon McCauley • Ellie Mikus • Ellen Morrissey • Mackenzie Murphy • Kaley Platek • Samantha Post • Adam Powell • Annelise Reinwald • Ethan Rice • Spencer Richardson • Victoria Rose • Briana Ryan • Myj Saintyl • Maddy Salucka • Emma Soukup • Alexis Thacker • Mina Vogel • Samuel Wonacott • Trenton Woodcox