Federalist No. 68 by Alexander Hamilton (1788)

• Federalism
• Terms and definitions
• Laws
• Court cases
• Major arguments
• State responses to federal mandates
• State survey of the federal grant review process
  • State responses to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
  • State responses by question to the federal grant review process survey, 2021
• Federalism by the numbers
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal mandates
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal grants-in-aid
  • Federalism by the numbers: Federal information collection requests
  • Overview of federal spending during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic
• Index of articles

Federalist Number (No.) 68 (1788) is an essay by British-American politician Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The full title of the essay is "The Mode of Electing the President." It was written as part of a series of essays collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

HIGHLIGHTS

Author: Alexander Hamilton

Source: Originally published in the New York Packet on March 14, 1788. Republished in 1788 as part of the collection The Federalist, now referred to as The Federalist Papers.

Abstract: Hamilton describes the process of electing the President of the United States.

Background of the author

Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755-1804) was a British-American politician, lawyer, and military officer. He was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and is considered a Founding Father of the United States. Below is a summary of Hamilton's career:

• 1775-1777: Officer in the New York Provincial Artillery Company
• 1777-1782: Officer in the Continental Army
  • Including service as an adviser to General George Washington
• 1787: Delegate to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pa.
• 1787-1788: Author of 51 of the 85 essays in The Federalist Papers
• 1789-1795: First secretary of the treasury of the United States

Full text of The Mode of Electing the President

The full text of Federalist No. 68 reads as follows:

“ To the People of the State of New York: THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture. It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place. Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty. Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice. All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office. The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: "For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best, yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration. The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter. The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President. PUBLIUS. ”

Background of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are the 85 articles and essays James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published arguing for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the full replacement of the Articles of Confederation. All three writers published their papers under the collective pseudonym Publius between 1787-1788.

The Articles of Confederation were an agreement among the original thirteen states in the United States to unite under a central government consisting of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress proposed the Articles in 1777, and they became effective in March 1781.

The Articles primarily authorized the national government to govern diplomatic foreign relations and regulate and fund the Continental Army. Under the Articles, the Continental Congress lacked the power to levy taxes and could only request funds from the states. The inability of the national government to raise money caused the government to default on pension payments to former Revolutionary War soldiers and other financial obligations, resulting in unrest. Shay's Rebellion was a prominent example of unrest related to the weakness of the central government and the Continental Congress' inability to fulfill its obligations.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened to solve the problems related to the weak national government. Federalists, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, advocated for a completely new government under the United States Constitution. They rejected the Articles of Confederation as a weak governing document that needed fully replaced. The federalists thought the strengthened national government could help protect individual rights from factional conflicts at the state and local levels. They argued the Constitution would strengthen the federal government enough to allow for effective governance but not enough to infringe on the rights of individuals.

Anti-federalists like Patrick Henry, Melancton Smith, and George Clinton argued that the national government proposed under the Constitution would be too powerful and would infringe on individual liberties. They thought the Articles of Confederation needed to be amended, not replaced.

Full list of Federalist Papers

The following is a list of individual essays that were collected and published in 1788 as The Federalist and later known as The Federalist Papers. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They argued for ratification of the United States Constitution as a replacement for the Articles of Confederation.

The Federalist Papers
Number	Subject	Author
No 1	General Introduction	Hamilton
No 2	Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence	Jay
No 3	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 4	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 5	Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't)	Jay
No 6	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States	Hamilton
No 7	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't)	Hamilton
No 8	The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States	Hamilton
No 9	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection	Hamilton
No 10	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't)	Madison
No 11	The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy	Hamilton
No 12	The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue	Hamilton
No 13	Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government	Hamilton
No 14	Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered	Madison
No 15	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union	Hamilton
No 16	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 17	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton
No 18	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 19	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 20	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 21	Other Defects of the Present Confederation	Hamilton
No 22	Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't)	Hamilton
No 23	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union	Hamilton
No 24	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered	Hamilton
No 25	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 26	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered	Hamilton
No 27	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 28	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't)	Hamilton
No 29	Concerning the Militia	Hamilton
No 30	Concerning the General Power of Taxation	Hamilton
No 31	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 32	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 33	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 34	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 35	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 36	Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't)	Hamilton
No 37	Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government	Madison
No 38	The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed	Madison
No 39	The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles	Madison
No 40	The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained	Madison
No 41	General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution	Madison
No 42	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered	Madison
No 43	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't)	Madison
No 44	Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States	Madison
No 45	The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered	Madison
No 46	The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared	Madison
No 47	The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts	Madison
No 48	These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other	Madison
No 49	Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention	Hamilton and Madison
No 50	Periodical Appeals to the People Considered	Hamilton and Madison
No 51	The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments	Hamilton and Madison
No 52	The House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 53	The House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 54	The Apportionment of Members Among the States	Hamilton and Madison
No 55	The Total Number of the House of Representatives	Hamilton and Madison
No 56	The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 57	The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation	Hamilton and Madison
No 58	Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered	Madison
No 59	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members	Hamilton
No 60	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 61	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)	Hamilton
No 62	The Senate	Hamilton and Madison
No 63	The Senate (con't)	Hamilton and Madison
No 64	The Powers of the Senate	Jay
No 65	The Powers of the Senate (con't)	Hamilton
No 66	Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered	Hamilton
No 67	The Executive Department	Hamilton
No 68	The Mode of Electing the President	Hamilton
No 69	The Real Character of the Executive	Hamilton
No 70	The Executive Department Further Considered	Hamilton
No 71	The Duration in Office of the Executive	Hamilton
No 72	The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 73	The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power	Hamilton
No 74	The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 75	The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 76	The Appointing Power of the Executive	Hamilton
No 77	The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered	Hamilton
No 78	The Judiciary Department	Hamilton
No 79	The Judiciary (con't)	Hamilton
No 80	The Powers of the Judiciary	Hamilton
No 81	The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority	Hamilton
No 82	The Judiciary Continued	Hamilton
No 83	The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury	Hamilton
No 84	Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered	Hamilton
No 85	Concluding Remarks	Hamilton

See also

• Federalism
• Federalist Papers
• Anti-Federalist papers

External links

• Search Google News for this topic

Footnotes

Ballotpedia

About

Overview • What people are saying • Support Ballotpedia • Contact • Contribute • Job opportunities

---

Executive: Leslie Graves, Founder and CEO • Gwen Beattie, Chief Operating Officer

Communications: Alison Graves, Director of Communications • Carley Allensworth • Abigail Campbell • Frank Festa • Sarah Groat • Nathaniel Harwood • Dillon Redmond • Erica Shumaker
External Relations: Geoff Pallay, Director of External Relations • Ken Carbullido, Vice President of Election Product and Technology Strategy • Ashley Fleming • Thomas Mardik • Hannah Nelson
Operations: Meghann Olshefski, Director of Operations • Amanda Herbert • Mandy Morris • Caroline Presnell • Kelly Rindfleisch
Tech: Matt Latourelle, Director of Technology Operations • Ryan Burch • Kirsten Corrao • Beth Dellea • Travis Eden • Tate Kamish • Margaret Kearney • Eric Lotto • Joseph Sanchez • Mary Susmitha

Contributors: Scott Rasmussen

---

Editorial Content

Josh Altic, Director of Content • Daniel Anderson, Associate Director of Elections & Data • Cory Eucalitto, Associate Director of Features • Ryan Byrne, Managing Editor of Ballot Measures • Mandy McConnell, Managing Editor of News • Doug Kronaizl, Managing Editor of Local Expansion • Abbey Smith, Managing Editor of Elections • Janie Valentine, Managing Editor of Law • Joel Williams. Managing Editor of Events • Andrew Bahl • Jaclyn Beran • Marielle Bricker • Joseph Brusgard • Emma Burlingame • Kelly Coyle • Jon Dunn • Thomas Ellis • Nicole Fisher • Joseph Greaney • Thomas Grobben • Brianna Hosea • Molly Kehoe • Tyler King • Glorie Martinez • Norm Leahy, Senior Editor • Nathan Maxwell • Jimmy McAllister • Brandon McCauley • Ellie Mikus • Ellen Morrissey • Mackenzie Murphy • Kaley Platek • Samantha Post • Adam Powell • Annelise Reinwald • Ethan Rice • Spencer Richardson • Victoria Rose • Briana Ryan • Myj Saintyl • Maddy Salucka • Emma Soukup • Alexis Thacker • Mina Vogel • Samuel Wonacott • Trenton Woodcox