Help us improve in just 2 minutes—share your thoughts in our reader survey.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
 | |
| First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | |
| Reference: 435 U.S. 765 | |
| Term: 1978 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: November 9, 1977 Decided: April 26, 1978 | |
| Outcome | |
| Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Lewis Powell • Potter Stewart • Harry Blackmun • John Paul Stevens | |
| Concurring | |
| Warren Burger | |
| Dissenting | |
| William Brennan • Byron White • Thurgood Marshall • William Rehnquist | |
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti is a case decided on April 26, 1978, by the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution authorizes all individuals and corporations to discuss matters of public concern without the threat of punishment. The case concerned whether corporations had the constitutional right to attempt to influence the outcome of an election. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that the First Amendment authorizes all speakers to discuss matters of public concern without any threat of punishment or restraint. To read more about the impact of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti click here.
Background
A group of national banks and corporations, including the National Bank of Boston, aimed to use their money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative. The Massachusetts Attorney General responded by enforcing a statute to prohibit corporations from making expenditures to influence the outcome of an election that did not have a direct monetary impact on them. The group of corporations filed a lawsuit, arguing that the state statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the statute was constitutional.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on November 9, 1977. The case was decided on April 26, 1978.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to reverse the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Justice Lewis Powell delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Byron White wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. Justice William Rehnquist also wrote a dissenting opinion.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the court, argued that the right to attempt to influence the outcome of an election is protected by the First Amendment. Powell contended that the protection of free speech was not diminished by the fact that the case involved a corporation as opposed to an individual.[2]
| “ | If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation, rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.[4] | ” |
| —Lewis Powell, majority opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti[2] | ||
Concurring opinion
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote a concurring opinion. He argued that the Massachusetts statute posed a threat to the protection of freedom of speech, particularly for large media corporations.[2]
| “ | A disquieting aspect of Massachusetts' position is that it may carry the risk of impinging on the First Amendment rights of those who employ the corporate form as most do -- to carry on the business of mass communications, particularly the large media conglomerates. This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from corporations such as the appellants in this case.[4] | ” |
| —Warren Burger, concurring opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti[2] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice Byron White, in a dissenting opinion, argued that corporations' money should not be spent on political initiatives that individual shareholders may not support since corporations are funded by the money of investors.[2]
| “ | Of course, it may be assumed that corporate investors are united by a desire to make money, for the value of their investment to increase. Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, activities such as advertising and other communications integrally related to the operation of the corporation's business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires of individual shareholders. This unanimity of purpose breaks down, however, when corporations make expenditures or undertake activities designed to influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because their managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a particular corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate business. Thus, when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate, this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.[4] | ” |
| —Byron White, dissenting opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti[2] | ||
Justice William Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, argued that corporations are considered artificial persons and therefore are not guaranteed the same constitutional rights as natural persons.[2]
| “ | It is true, as the Court points out, ante at 435 U. S. 781-783, that recent decisions of this Court have emphasized the interest of the public in receiving the information offered by the speaker seeking protection. The free flow of information is in no way diminished by the Commonwealth's decision to permit the operation of business corporations with limited rights of political expression. All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity.[4] | ” |
| —William Rehnquist, dissenting opinion in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
|---|
|
| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti established that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution authorizes all speakers, both individuals and corporations, to discuss matters of public concern without any threat of punishment or restraint.[2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti," accessed August 8, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Justia, "First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)," accessed August 8, 2022
- ↑ LexisNexis, "First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti - 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978)," accessed August 8, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
| ||||||||||||||||||||
