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Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools

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Supreme Court of the United States
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
Reference: 15-497
Issue: Education
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argument: October 31, 2016
Decided: February 22, 2017
Outcome
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded
Vote
8-0 to vacate and remand
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Samuel Alito • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan
Concurring
Alito (in part and in the judgment), joined by Thomas
Dissenting
None


Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 31, 2016. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. On February 22, 2017, the court unanimously vacated and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: E.F., a minor, sought to bring her service dog to school. The school made other arrangements within federal law and refused to allow the dog to come to school. E.F. seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.
  • The issue: Must all state-administered avenues for remedy under color of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) be exhausted even if the relief sought is not available under the IDEA?
  • The outcome: The court unanimously vacated and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.


    • In brief: E.F. was prescribed a service dog to help her with everyday tasks. She sought to bring her service dog to school, but the school refused. The school provided her with a human aide as part of her individual education plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). E.F. sued to bring her dog under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and applicable Michigan law. A federal district court dismissed E.F.'s claims because the relief E.F. sought would implicate her IEP, which falls within the IDEA. Under the IDEA, all administrative procedures for relief must be exhausted before a suit can be brought under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. E.F. claimed that the exhaustion provisions did not apply because the relief she sought was not provided under the IDEA. A federal district court rejected that argument. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court was held on October 31, 2016. The court issued its opinion on February 22, 2017, with Justice Elena Kagan writing for the court. Justice Samuel Alito wrote an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.

    You can review the Sixth Circuit's opinion here.[1]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case

    Background

    In order to aid her in her everyday tasks, E.F. was prescribed a service dog named Wonder in 2008. In October 2009, E.F. sought to bring her dog to school for the 2009-2010 school year. The school refused, noting that E.F.'s individual education plan (IEP) was already in place for the school year and "included a human aide to provide one-on-one support" for E.F. A meeting was held in January 2010 related to E.F.'s IEP and the decision to prohibit the dog was upheld. In April 2010, the school agreed to allow E.F. to bring the dog to school until the end of the school year. At the end of the school year, the school informed E.F.'s parents that she would not be allowed to bring the dog to school during the 2010-2011 school year. E.F.'s parents began to homeschool E.F. They filed a complaint with the civil rights division of the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The DOE's civil rights office found the school's actions violated the ADA. The school, without accepting the DOE's conclusions, permitted E.F. to bring the dog beginning the fall of the 2012-2013 school year, but E.F. had been enrolled in a different school in a different school district that permitted E.F. to bring her dog to school.[1]

    In December 2012, E.F.'s parents filed a lawsuit seeking damages for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years under Title II of the ADA, §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. Judge Lawrence Zatkoff of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Frys' claim under Michigan law. On January 10, 2014, the district court dismissed the Frys' claims under federal law. The district court held that E.F. was required to exhaust all IDEA administrative procedures before bringing suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.[1]

    The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on appeal. While acknowledging that the court has held exhaustion is not required for injuries that both relate to an IDEA-defined provision of free appropriate public education (FAPE) and that cannot be resolved through the administrative process, the Sixth Circuit held that exhaustion was required in this case "because the suit turns on the same questions that would have determined the outcome of IDEA procedures, had they been used to resolve the dispute ... In fact, the school did use IDEA procedures to attempt to resolve the dispute, and the injuries alleged by the Frys here could have been raised then."[1]

    In finding that the exhaustion requirement under the IDEA was binding here because the alleged injuries were "in essence a violation of IDEA standards", the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge Zatkoff's ruling.[1]

    Petitioner's challenge

    The Frys alleged that the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA should not apply to litigation brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when the remedies sought under those laws are not available under the IDEA.

    Certiorari granted

    On October 15, 2015, petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry, on behalf of a minor E.F., initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the Fry family's certiorari request on June 28, 2016. Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on October 31, 2016.

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    Whether the Handicapped Children's Protection Act commands exhaustion in a suit, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, that seeks damages-a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act."[2]


    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[3]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[4]

    Outcome

    Decision

    In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.[5]

    Opinion

    In her opinion for the court, Justice Elena Kagan sought to bring clarity to the parameters of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's (IDEA) exhaustion requirement, which is codified as 20 U.S.C. 1415(l). That requirement mandates that relief under other federal laws such as the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act is not preempted by the IDEA's exhaustion requirement even if the relief sought hinges on a claim that a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is denied; however, the exhaustion requirement requires that, in certain circumstances, if a claimant seeks relief that is available under the IDEA then those procedures must be exhausted prior to seeking relief under another federal law.

    In examining the scope of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement, Justice Kagan identified the only available relief the IDEA makes available is the denial of a FAPE. In so concluding, the court, in order to establish the scope of the exhaustion requirement, necessarily had to "identify the circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit)." In Justice Kagan's assessment,[5]

    “

    §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape §1415(l) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other than the IDEA ... Rather, that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly the issues she raises. But if, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures: A hearing officer, as just explained, would have to send her away empty-handed. And that is true even when the suit arises directly from a school’s treatment of a child with a disability—and so could be said to relate in some way to her education. A school’s conduct toward such a child—say, some refusal to make an accommodation—might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE, which are addressed in statutes other than the IDEA. A complaint seeking redress for those other harms, independent of any FAPE denial, is not subject to §1415(l)’s exhaustion rule because, once again, the only 'relief' the IDEA makes 'available' is relief for the denial of a FAPE. [6]

    		”

    In concluding that the only remedy under the IDEA is for the denial of a FAPE, Justice Kagan sought to give courts guidance as to how courts can ascertain when a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE versus seeking relief for some other type of violation. In the court's view, "what matters is the crux—or in legal-speak, the gravamen-of the plaintiff's complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading." Justice Kagan provided some insight into how courts could best ascertain the substance of an IDEA FAPE complaint,[5]

    “

    One clue to whether the gravamen of a complaint against a school concerns the denial of a FAPE, or instead addresses disability-based discrimination, can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions. First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit could go forward. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting or a child in some other) has a viable claim. ... A further sign that the gravamen of a suit is the denial of a FAPE can emerge from the history of the proceedings ... prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies will often provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff ’s claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. [6]

    		”

    Because the Sixth Circuit did not undertake an assessment of whether or not the gravamen of the petitioners' complaint addressed the denial of a FAPE, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case back to the circuit court with instructions to "establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA’s dispute resolution process before bringing this suit. And if the Frys started down that road, the court should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion."[5]

    Concurring opinions

    Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito joined the entirety of the court's opinion except for the portion of the court's opinion in which guidance was offered to lower courts as to how to ascertain the gravamen of a plaintiff's claim that a FAPE was denied under the IDEA. In Justice Alito's words, "although the Court provides these clues for the purpose of assisting the lower courts, I am afraid that they may have the opposite effect. They are likely to confuse and lead courts astray."[5]

    Dissenting opinions

    There were no dissenting opinions filed.

    The opinion

    Filings

    The court granted the Fry family's certiorari request on June 28, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' filings

    • The Fry family, the petitioners, filed a merits brief on August 22, 2016.
    • Napoleon Community Schools, the respondent, filed a merits brief on September 30, 2016.
    • The Frys filed a reply brief on the merits on October 20, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioner, the Fry family.

    • Brief of the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates et al.
    • Brief of Lowell J. Weicker, Jr.
    • Brief of the National Disability Rights Network et al.
    • Brief of Professor Thomas Hehir et al.
    • Brief of Psychiatric Dog Partners, Inc., et al.
    • Brief of the United States of America


    The following groups filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the respondent, Napoleon Community Schools.

    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • The Fry family, the petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari on October 15, 2015.
    • Napoleon Community Schools, the respondent, filed a brief in opposition to certiorari on December 18, 2015, after the court granted an order extending time to file.

    Amicus curiae

    • Brief of the United States of America in support of granting certiorari


    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Stacy Fry and Brent Fry, as next friends of minor E.F. v. Napoleon Community Schools et al. decided June 12, 2015
    2. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, June 28, 2016
    3. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, argued October 31, 2016
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, argued October 31, 2016
    5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Supreme Court of the United States Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, decided February 22, 2017
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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