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Locke v. Davey

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Supreme Court of the United States
Locke v. Davey
Term: 2003
Important Dates
Argument: December 2, 2003
Decided: February 25, 2004
Outcome
Reversed
Vote
7-2
Majority
Chief Justice William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens • Sandra Day O'Connor •Anthony Kennedy • David Souter • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer
Dissenting
Antonin Scalia • Clarence Thomas


Locke v. Davey is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States during the court's October 2003-2004 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. It concerned the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and state-sponsored scholarship funding for college students.

The court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding that the State of Washington's exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its otherwise inclusive scholarship aid program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.[1] Click here for more information.


HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Washington State resident and student Joshua Davey was awarded a scholarship through the state for postsecondary education expenses. According to the state constitution, the students could not use the money to pursue a devotional theology degree. Davey enrolled at a private Christian school that qualified under the scholarship program to pursue a double major. One of the majors was a devotional theology degree, which was excluded from funding under the program. Davey challenged the constitutionality of the program in district court, citing the religion clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, requested a preliminary injunction against the state for denying funds and requested damages. The court denied the requests. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Washington's judgment, holding that the program was unconstitutional and discriminated on the basis of religion. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.
  • The issue: Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment require the state to fund religious instruction if it provides college scholarships for secular instruction?[2]
  • The outcome: The court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in a 7-2 ruling, holding that Washington's exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its otherwise inclusive scholarship aid program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.[1]


    • You can review the lower court's opinion here.[3]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    Background

    In 1999, the Washington State Legislature created the Washington State Promise Scholarship to give college scholarship money, funded through the state's general fund, to students in the state for postsecondary education expenses. To receive the scholarship money, a student applicant was required to meet certain academic, income, and enrollment criteria. According to the state constitution, the students could not use the money to pursue a devotional theology degree. Joshua Davey received a scholarship through the program and chose to attend Northwest College. The college is a private, Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, and was eligible under the Promise Scholarship. When Davey enrolled, he opted to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and business management and administration. The pastoral ministries degree was devotional and was excluded under the state's scholarship program. At the start of the 1999–2000 school year, Davey was informed by the college's financial aid director that he could not use his scholarship money to pursue the pastoral ministries degree. In order to receive the funding, Davey would have to certify in writing that he was not pursuing the pastoral ministries degree. Davey refused and did not receive any scholarship funds.[1][4]

    Then, Davey brought a civil action against several state officials (referred to as the "State" in the proceedings) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to stop the State from refusing to award the scholarship money on the basis that Davey was pursuing a devotional theological degree and for damages.[5] Davey argued that the denial of the scholarship based on his decision to pursue a devotional theological degree violated the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Western District of Washington denied Davey's request for a preliminary injunction. The parties cross-filed motions for summary judgment. The court rejected Davey's constitutional challenges and granted the State's request for summary judgment.[1]

    On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the policy of the Washington Promise Scholarship's administrator, Washington's Higher Education Coordinating Board (HECB), lacked neutrality on its face as it made the scholarship available to all students who met the program's general criteria, except for those who chose a religious major, facially discriminated on the basis of religion, did not survive strict scrutiny, and that the HECB unconstitutionally denied Davey his scholarship funding.[3]

    The State appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The court granted review on May 19, 2003. Oral argument was scheduled for December 2, 2003.


    Constitutional clauses

    Free Exercise Clause

    The Free Exercise Clause refers to the section of the 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits Congress from creating a law that would bar the free exercise of religion.

    Equal Protection

    The Equal Protection Clause refers to the section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that “nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

    Establishment Clause

    The Establishment Clause refers to the section of the 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits Congress from establishing any law "respecting an establishment of religion."

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:[2]

    Questions presented:
    • Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment require the state to fund religious instruction if it provides college scholarships for secular instruction?

    Outcome

    In a 7-2 opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, holding that Washington's exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its otherwise inclusive scholarship aid program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.[1]

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote:[1]

    “ The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973). (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)). Yet we have long said that "there is room for play in the joints" between them. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). In other words, there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.


    This case involves that "play in the joints" described above. Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1983). As such, there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology, see Witters, supra, at 489, and the State does not contend otherwise. The question before us, however, is whether Washington, pursuant to its own constitution, which has been authoritatively interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students for the ministry, see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 369–370, 771 P. 2d 1119, 1122 (1989); cf. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 629, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (1984) ("It is not the role of the State to pay for the religious education of future ministers"), rev'd, 474 U.S. 481, supra, can deny them such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause.

    Davey urges us to answer that question in the negative. He contends that under the rule we enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion. We reject his claim of presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning. In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of animal slaughter. We found that the law sought to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion. 508 U.S., at 535. In the present case, the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the community. See McDaniel v Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). And it does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit. See ibid. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas of Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.

    ... [T]raining for religious professions and training for secular professions are not fungible. Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed, majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit. ... And the subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment–that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or professions. That a State would deal differently with religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings is a product of these views, not evidence of hostility toward religion.

    ... Far from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits. The program permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited. ... And under the Promise Scholarship Program's current guidelines, students are still eligible to take devotional theology courses.

    ... In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, §11 of the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus towards religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.

    Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey's claim must fail. The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of Washington.

    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.[11]

    		”


    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Scalia

    Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas.[1]

    In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote:[1]

    “ In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the majority opinion held that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral . . . must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny," id., at 546, and that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face,” id., at 533. The concurrence of two Justices stated that "[w]hen a law discriminates against religion as such, . . . it automatically will fail strict scrutiny.” Id., at 579 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). And the concurrence of a third Justice endorsed the "noncontroversial principle" that "formal neutrality" is a "necessary conditio[n] for free-exercise constitutionality." Id. at 563 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). These opinions are irreconcilable with today's decision, which sustains a public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion.


    ... When the state makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.

    ... Even if "play in the joints" were a valid legal principle, surely it would apply only when it was a close call whether complying with one of the Religion Clauses would violate the other. But that is not the case here. It is not just that "the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology." Ante, at 5. The establishment question would not even be close, as is evident from the fact that this Court's decision in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), was unanimous. Perhaps some formally neutral public benefits programs are so gerrymandered and devoid of plausible secular purpose that they might raise specters of state aid to religion, but an even-handed Promise Scholarship Program is not among them.

    ... It may be Washington's original purpose in excluding the clergy from public benefits was benign, and the same might be true of its purpose in maintaining the exclusion today. But those singled out for disfavor can be forgiven for suspecting more invidious forces at work. Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious minority. Most citizens of this country identify themselves as professing some religious belief, but the State’s policy poses no obstacle to practitioners of only a tepid, civic version of faith. Those the statutory exclusion actually affects—those whose belief in their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and their lives to its ministry–are a far narrower set. One need not delve too far into modern popular culture to perceive a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction. In an era when the Court is so quick to come to the aid of other disfavored groups, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996), its indifference in this case, which involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually speaks, is exceptional.

    Today's holding is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go. What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits on the ground that taxpayers' freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense? This may seem fanciful, but recall that France has proposed banning religious attire from schools, invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today. See Sciolino, "Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faith Out of School," N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2003, p. A17. When the public's freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal treatment, benevolent motives shade into indifference and ultimately into repression. Having accepted the justification in this case, the Court is less well equipped to fend it off in the future. I respectfully dissent.[11]

    		”

    Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.[1]

    In his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:[1]

    “ Because the parties agree that a "degree in theology" means a degree that is "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith," Brief for Petitioners, 6; Brief for Respondent 8, I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case. With this understanding, I join Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The contested statute denies Promise Scholarships to students who pursue "a degree in theology." See Wash. Admin. Code §250–80–020(12)(g) (2003) (defining an "eligible student," in part, as one who "[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.10.814 (West 1997) ("No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology"). But the statute itself does not define "theology." And the usual definition of the term “theology” is not limited to devotional studies. "Theology" is defined as "[t]he study of the nature of God and religious truth" and the "rational inquiry into religious questions." American Heritage Dictionary 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (1991) ("the study of religious faith, practice, and experience” and "the study of God and his relation to the world"). These definitions include the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.


    Assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe that Justice Scalia's application of our precedents is correct. Because neither party contests the validity of these precedents, I join Justice Scalia's dissent.[11]

    		”


    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio

    You can review the audio of oral argument here:[18]

    Transcript

    You can review the oral argument transcript here:

    See also

    External links


    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Supreme Court of the United States, Locke v. Davey, decided February 25, 2004
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Supreme Court of the United States, "02-1315 Locke v. Davey, Questions Presented," accessed July 15, 2020
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, Davey v. Locke, decided July 18, 2002
    4. ↑ Oyez, Locke v. Davey, decided February 25, 2004
    5. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "42 U.S. Code § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights," accessed July 15, 2020
    6. ↑ Oyez.org, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, decided April 6, 1981
    7. ↑ Stanford Law School, "Michael W. McConnell," accessed April 13, 2020
    8. ↑ Michael McConnell, Religion and the Constitution (2002), pg. 105.
    9. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "Incorporation Doctrine," accessed April 13, 2020
    10. ↑ Oyez.org, Cantwell v. Connecticut, decided May 20, 1940
    11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    12. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "Free Exercise Clause," accessed April 13, 2020
    13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "Equal Protection," accessed April 13, 2020
    14. ↑ Oyez.org, Van Orden v. Perry, decided June 27, 2005
    15. ↑ Oyez.org, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., decided June 27, 2005
    16. ↑ Oyez.org, Salazar v. Buono, decided April 28, 2010
    17. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, "Establishment Clause," accessed April 13, 2020
    18. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed July 15, 2020
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