Gray v. Sanders
 | |
| Gray v. Sanders | |
| Docket number: 112 | |
| Term: 1963 | |
| Court: Supreme Court of the United States | |
| Important dates | |
| Argument: January 17, 1963 Decided: March 18, 1963 | |
| Court membership | |
| Chief Justice Earl Warren • Hugo Black • William O. Douglas • Tom Clark • John Marshall Harlan • William Brennan • Potter Stewart • Byron White • Arthur Goldberg | |
Gray v. Sanders was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1963. The case was brought by a Georgia voter who alleged that the state's system for counting primary votes (described in court documents as the county unit voting system) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment XIV, United States Constitution, giving disproportionate influence to voters in rural counties. On March 18, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 8-1 that the county unit voting system violated the Equal Protection Clause.[1][2]
Background
- See also: Primary elections in Georgia
County unit voting system
At the time that Gray v. Sanders was brought before the Supreme Court of the United States, Georgia used a county unit voting system for primary elections for statewide and congressional office. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes within a county was declared the winner of that county's unit votes. The candidate receiving a majority of the available county unit votes was declared the winner of the primary.[1][2]
Case history
In 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter residing in Fulton County, Georgia, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that the county unit voting system gave disproportionate influence to voters residing in less densely populated rural counties, violating the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteentheent Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court found in favor of Sanders, though it did not strike down the county unit voting system in its entirety. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which heard oral argument in the case on January 17, 1963. The following question was presented to the court:[1][2][3]
| “ | Does the county unit voting system violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?[4] | ” |
Decision
On March 18, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 8-1 in favor of Sanders, finding that Georgia's county unit voting system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment XIV, United States Constitution. The majority comprised Chief Justice Earl Warren and Associate Justices William Douglas, Hugo Black, Tom Clark, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, and Arthur Goldberg. Douglas wrote the following in the court's majority opinion:[3]
| “ | The Equal Protection Clause requires that, once a geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election must have an equal vote -- whatever their race; whatever their sex; whatever their occupation; whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of representation, such as an allocation of Senators irrespective of population and the use of the electoral college in the choice of a President. The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, one vote.[4] | ” |
| —William Douglas | ||
Stewart penned a separate concurring opinion, which was joined by Clark. Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, writing the following in his opinion:[3]
| “ | At the core of Georgia's diffusion of voting strength which favors the small as against the large counties is the urban-rural problem, so familiar in the American political scene. In my dissent in Baker v. Carr, I expressed the view that a State might rationally conclude that its general welfare was best served by apportioning more seats in the legislature to agricultural communities than to urban centers, lest the legitimate interests of the former be submerged in the stronger electoral voice of the latter. In my opinion, recognition of the same factor cannot be deemed irrational in the present situation even though all of the considerations supporting its use in a legislative apportionment case are not present here.[4] | ” |
| —John Marshall Harlan | ||
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Gray v. Sanders," accessed December 13, 2017
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Oxford Reference, "Gray v .Sanders," accessed December 13, 2017
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Supreme Court of the United States, "Gray v. Sanders: Opinion," March 18, 1963
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
