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Grosjean v. American Press Co.

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Supreme Court of the United States
Grosjean v. American Press Co.
Reference: 297 U.S. 233
Term: 1936
Important Dates
Argued: January 14, 1936
Decided: February 10, 1936
Outcome
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana affirmed
Majority
George SutherlandCharles E. HughesWillis Van DevanterJames Clark McReynoldsLouis BrandeisPierce ButlerHarlan Fiske StoneOwen Josephus RobertsBenjamin Nathan Cardozo

Grosjean v. American Press Co. is a case decided on February 10, 1936, by the United States Supreme Court holding that freedom of the press applied to newspaper publishers the same as it did to individuals. The case concerned whether a tax on advertisements in publications with large circulation violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.[1][2]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: La. Act No. 23 (1934) established a tax on advertisements in newspaper publications with a circulation greater than 20,000 copies per week. Newspaper publishers filed to prohibit the tax, arguing that it violated the freedom of the press established by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
  • The issue: Does the La. Act No. 23 (1934) tax violate the First Amendment?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and held that newspaper publishers had the constitutional right to freedom of the press.

  • Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that freedom of the press applied to newspaper publishers. To read more about the impact of Grosjean v. American Press Co. click here.

    Background

    The state of Louisiana enacted La. Act No. 23 (1934) which established that all individuals, associations, and corporations that sold or charged for advertisements in publications with a circulation greater than 20,000 copies per week were responsible for paying a license tax of two percent of the business' gross receipts. A group of newspaper publishers in the state filed to prohibit the tax on the grounds that it violated the freedom of the press granted by the First Amendment. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and prohibited the collection of the tax.[1][2]

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on January 14, 1936. The case was decided on February 10, 1936.[1]

    Decision

    The Supreme Court decided unanimously to affirm the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Justice George Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Justice George Sutherland, writing for the court, argued that La. Act No. 23 (1934) violated the First Amendment right to freedom of the press. Sutherland contended that newspaper publishers should be classified as corporations, which meant that they had the same constitutional rights as individuals.[1]

    The framers of the First Amendment were familiar with the English struggle, which then had continued for nearly eighty years and was destined to go on for another sixty-five years, at the end of which time it culminated in a lasting abandonment of the obnoxious taxes. The framers were likewise familiar with the then recent Massachusetts episode, and while that occurrence did much to bring about the adoption of the amendment (see Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1888, p. 181), the predominant influence must have come from the English experience. It is impossible to concede that, by the words 'freedom of the press,' the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow view then reflected by the law of England that such freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censorship, for this abuse had then permanently disappeared from English practice. It is equally impossible to believe that it was not intended to bring within the reach of these words such modes of restraint as were embodied in the two forms of taxation already described. Such belief must be rejected in the face of the then well known purpose of the exactions and the general adverse sentiment of the colonies in respect of them. Undoubtedly, the range of a constitutional provision phrased in terms of the common law sometimes may be fixed by recourse to the applicable rules of that law. But the doctrine which justifies such recourse, like other canons of construction, must yield to more compelling reasons whenever they exist. Cf. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 294 U. S. 668-669. And, obviously, it is subject to the qualification that the common law rule invoked shall be one not rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political conditions. Murray's lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 276-277; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 454-457; Powell v. Alabama, supra, pp. 287 U. S. 60-65.


    In the light of all that has now been said, it is evident that the restricted rules of the English law in respect of the freedom of the press in force when the Constitution was adopted were never accepted by the American colonists, and that, by the First Amendment, it was meant to preclude the national government, and, by the Fourteenth Amendment, to preclude the states, from adopting any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, including that which had theretofore been effected by these two well known and odious methods.[3]

    George Sutherland, majority opinion in Grosjean v. American Press Co.[1]

    Impact

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    Grosjean v. American Press Co. established that freedom of the press applies to newspaper publishers the same as it applies to individuals.[1]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes