Johnson v. United States

Johnson v. United States
Reference: 13-7120
Term: 2014
Important Dates
Argued: November 5, 2014 Decided: June 26, 2015
Outcome
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Stephen Breyer • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Elena Kagan • Antonin Scalia • Sonia Sotomayor
Concurring
Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas
Dissenting
Samuel Alito

Johnson v. United States was decided on June 26, 2015, by the U.S. Supreme Court. In this case, the court held that a portion of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) defining "violent felony" was unconstitutionally vague.

Question presented: "Whether the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague."

Case background

Samuel Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm. As a felon with prior convictions, Johnson's possession of the firearm was a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g). The government requested that Johnson be given an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which provides for enhanced sentences for criminals convicted of at least three "violent felonies." The government argued that Johnson's previous convictions, including one for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun, qualified as violent felonies under ACCA's residual clause, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). That clause provides that anyone who commits a crime punishable by at least one year in prison and that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" is guilty of a violent felony under the statute. Johnson argued that his mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun did not constitute a violent felony and, accordingly, he did not merit an enhanced sentence under the Act. The district court rejected that argument and imposed the enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on appeal.

Oral argument

Oral argument was held on November 5, 2014.

Decision

The judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was reversed and remanded.

Opinion

Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the court for himself and five other justices. Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas filed opinions concurring in the judgment. In his opinion for the court, Justice Scalia held that the residual clause violated the Fifth Amendment's protection of due process of law because the clause was unconstitutionally vague.

The categorical approach

Justice Scalia argued that the due process violation of vagueness stemmed, in part, from the court's reliance on a framework known as the categorical approach for evaluating residual clause cases. As Justice Scalia explained,

“

Under the categorical approach, a court assesses whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony 'in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.' Deciding whether the residual clause covers a crime thus requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in 'the ordinary case,' and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury ... The court's task goes beyond deciding whether creation of risk is an element of the crime. That is so because, unlike the part of the definition of a violent felony that asks whether the crime 'has as an element the use ... of physical force,' the residual clause asks whether the crime 'involves conduct' that presents too much risk of physical injury. What is more, the inclusion of burglary and extortion among the enumerated offenses preceding the residual clause confirms that the court's task also goes beyond evaluating the chances that the physical acts that make up the crime will injure someone. The act of making an extortionate demand or breaking and entering into someone's home does not, in and of itself, normally cause physical injury. Rather, risk of injury arises because the extortionist might engage in violence after making his demand or because the burglar might confront a resident in the home after breaking and entering. We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges. Increasing a defendant's sentence under the clause denies due process of law ... By combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates ... this Court's repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.

”

Stare decisis

Justice Scalia took note of the court's adherence to a principle known as stare decisis, to "let the decision stand." Courts adhere to this principle in giving deference to previously decided cases known as precedent. The court is reluctant to overrule its own precedent in order to promote consistency in the law, a key principle of common law, but, as Justice Scalia explained, "the doctrine of stare decisis allows us to revisit an earlier decision where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable." Justice Scalia noted that the "unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause" served to produce "'a judicial morass that defies systemic solution', 'a black hole of confusion and uncertainty' that frustrates any effort to impart 'some sense of order and direction.'" So, while noting that stare decisis was "a vital rule of judicial self-government," Justice Scalia stated that stare decisis matters "because it 'promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles.'" Here, in the court's view, jurisprudence under the residual clause did not promote these principles sufficient to sustain the language of the clause under review.

Outcome

The court reversed and remanded the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in striking the residual clause of the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA). In so doing, the court explicitly reversed its own rulings in James v. United States and Sykes v. United States.

Concurrences

Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas filed opinions concurring in the judgment.

Justice Kennedy filed a three-sentence concurrence stating that he would not strike the residual clause for vagueness. Consistent with the categorical approach, however, Justice Kennedy agreed with the court that Johnson's conviction for a "violent felony" under ACCA should be dismissed.

Justice Thomas filed a lengthy concurring opinion challenging the court's reliance on both the court's vagueness doctrine specifically, as well as the court's substantive due process jurisprudence generally. In his view, the court need not have gone so far, asserting "we could have easily disposed of this case without nullifying ACCA's residual clause ... the risk of injury to others from mere possession of this firearm is too attenuated to treat this offense as a violent felony. I would reverse the Court of Appeals on that basis."

Dissents

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Like Justice Thomas, Justice Alito also challenged the court's application of its vagueness doctrine. He wrote,

“

The Court is tired of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) and in particular its residual clause. Anxious to rid our docket of bothersome residual clause cases, the Court is willing to do what it takes to get the job done. So brushing aside stare decisis, the Court holds that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague even though we have twice rejected that very argument within the last eight years. The canons of interpretation get no greater respect. Inverting the canon that a statute should be construed if possible to avoid unconstitutionality, the Court rejects a reasonable construction of the residual clause that would avoid any vagueness problems, preferring an alternative that the Court finds to be unconstitutionally vague. And the Court is not stopped by the well-established rule that a statute is void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications. While conceding that some applications of the residual clause are straightforward, the Court holds that the clause is now void in its entirety. The Court’s determination to be done with residual clause cases, if not its fidelity to legal principles, is impressive.

”

Justice Alito instead argued that the determination of whether or not a defendant's prior crimes constituted violent felonies could be decided beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury trial. In this case, he argued that under both the court's categorical approach, as well as on the factual record, Johnson's conviction should be sustained.

Impact

As a result of the court's opinion, the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) was struck for vagueness, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court
• Lynch v. Dimaya
• Beckles v. United States

External links

• Supreme Court of the United States