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Lee v. United States

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Supreme Court of the United States
Lee v. United States
Reference: 15-214
Issue: Sixth Amendment
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: March 28, 2017
Decided: June 23, 2017
Outcome
United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit reversed and remanded
Vote
6-2 to reverse and remand
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan
Dissenting
Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito


Lee v. United States is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on March 28, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. On June 23, 2017, in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Samuel Alito except as to Part I of Justice Thomas' dissent.

In this circumstances of this case, the court held, consistent with the court's precedent in Hill v. Lockhart, that Lee's decision to accept a plea deal on the erroneous advice of counsel that doing so wouldn't affect Lee's immigration status established the requisite prejudice to vacate his conviction and order a new trial under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that this was true even though Lee had no viable defense to his crime.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A legal, nonresident alien pleaded guilty to a charge on the assurance of his attorney that he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty. This advice was in error, and the defendant moved to vacate his sentence claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit denied the claim, holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was prejudicial towards the defendant.
  • The issue: Is the Sixth Circuit's standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's standard for evaluating such claims?
  • The outcome: On June 23, 2017, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.


    • In brief: Pursuant to pleading guilty to possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), Jae Lee was subject to deportation. Lee moved to vacate his sentence. Lee claimed that he only pleaded guilty because his attorney told him he would not be subject to deportation, which was in error. Lee based his claim on the Sixth Amendment's requirement that defendants be afforded the effective assistance of counsel. On appeal before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the court found that Lee failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice in order to sustain such a claim, consistent with that circuit's precedent in Pilla v. United States. The circuit panel, however, noted inconsistency among the federal circuit courts on how claims similar to Lee's are adjudicated. Argument in the case was held on March 28, 2017.

    You can review the Sixth Circuit's opinion here.[1]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case

    Background

    This was a case about a split in the federal circuit courts over whether a subset of criminal defendants who face deportation for pleading guilty to charges, in part, on the basis of counsel's advice can challenge their counsel's performance as unconstitutionally deficient under the Sixth Amendment.

    Jae Lee moved to the United States with his family from South Korea in 1982 and has lived in the United States legally since that time. Unlike his parents, however, Lee never became an American citizen. In 2009, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1). Lee's attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee did this on the assurance from counsel that if he pleaded guilty his offense would not subject him to deportation from the United States. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, however, is considered an aggravated felony under federal law, which made Lee subject to deportation. Lee filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.[1]

    Federal appeals courts review claims of deficient counsel under the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland v. Washington. That case established a two-part test to determine if counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective: (1) was counsel's performance deficient, and (2) did this deficiency prejudice the defendant? Before a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, the government conceded that Lee satisfied the first part of this test. The remaining question for the panel was whether Lee could demonstrate prejudice. To prevail, Lee was required to show a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Under a precedent of the Sixth Circuit, Pilla v. United States, to obtain relief Lee was required to convince the court that decision to reject a plea bargain was rational under the circumstances.[1]

    In an opinion for the panel, Judge Alice Batchelder wrote,[1]

    “

    As a factual matter, we do not doubt Lee’s contention that many defendants in his position, had they received accurate advice from counsel, would have decided to risk a longer prison sentence in order to take their chances at trial, slim though they were. But would such a decision be 'rational'? Several courts, including this circuit, have said 'no': being denied the chance to throw 'a Hail Mary' at trial does not by itself amount to prejudice. ... Others have reached the opposite conclusion. ... We have no ability, of course, as a panel, to change camps. And in that sense, this is a straightforward case. In Pilla we held that no rational defendant charged with a deportable offense and facing 'overwhelming evidence' of guilt would proceed to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter prison sentence. ... Lee finds himself in precisely this position, and he must therefore lose. But given the growing circuit split (which, as best we can tell, has gone unacknowledged), we think it worthwhile to explain why we are convinced that our approach is the right one and to set out the role that we believe deportation consequences should play in evaluating prejudice under Strickland.

    We begin, however, by giving the other side its due. As the Seventh Circuit noted in DeBartolo, strong evidence of guilt does not strip a defendant of his right to a jury trial, nor does it guarantee a guilty verdict. ... The second point is especially true for defendants such as Lee, since it is well documented that many jurors are willing to acquit those charged with a first-time, non-violent drug offense, despite evidence of guilt. ... We nevertheless respectfully disagree with our colleagues on the Seventh Circuit that jury nullification may be considered when evaluating whether a petitioner has shown Strickland prejudice. We reach this conclusion for the straightforward reason that Strickland itself has taken the matter out of our hands: 'A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.' ... Unfortunately for Lee, the luck of the lawless decisionmaker is all he has going for him. ... We therefore join the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits in holding that a claimant’s ties to the United States should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. [2]

    		”

    Petitioner's challenge

    Jae Lee, the petitioner, challenged the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit that the Sixth Circuit's decision in Pilla was consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's standard for demonstrating prejudice when claiming the ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Certiorari granted

    On September 6, 2016, Jae Lee, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Lee's certiorari request on December 14, 2016. Argument in the case was held on March 28, 2017.

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "To establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant who has pleaded guilty based on deficient advice from his attorney must show 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In the context of a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States, the question that has deeply divided the circuits is whether it is always irrational for a defendant to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation."[3]


    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[4]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[5]

    Outcome

    Decision

    On June 23, 2017, in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Samuel Alito except as to Part I of Justice Thomas' dissent.

    In this circumstances of this case, the court held, consistent with the court's precedent in Hill v. Lockhart, that Lee's decision to accept a plea deal on the erroneous advice of counsel that doing so wouldn't affect Lee's immigration status established the requisite prejudice to vacate his conviction and order a new trial under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that this was true even though Lee had no viable defense to his crime.[6]

    Opinion

    After a review of the factual and procedural history of the case, Chief Justice Roberts addressed both Lee's and the government's positions before turning to the court's decision to affirm the lower court. He wrote[6]

    “

    Lee, on the other hand, argues he can establish prejudice under Hill because he never would have accepted a guilty plea had he known that he would be deported as a result. Lee insists he would have gambled on trial, risking more jail time for whatever small chance there might be of an acquittal that would let him remain in the United States. The Government responds that, since Lee had no viable defense at trial, he would almost certainly have lost and found himself still subject to deportation, with a lengthier prison sentence to boot. Lee, the Government contends, cannot show prejudice from accepting a plea where his only hope at trial was that something unexpected and unpredictable might occur that would lead to an acquittal.

    The Government asks that we, like the Court of Appeals below, adopt a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial. ... As a general matter, it makes sense that a defendant who has no realistic defense to a charge supported by sufficient evidence will be unable to carry his burden of showing prejudice from accepting a guilty plea. But in elevating this general proposition to a per se rule, the Government makes two errors. First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that we have emphasized demands a 'case-by-case examination' of the 'totality of the evidence.' ... And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial. ...

    The Government argues, however, that under Padilla v. Kentucky, a defendant 'must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.' ... The Government contends that Lee cannot make that showing because he was going to be deported either way; going to trial would only result in a longer sentence before that inevitable consequence. ...

    We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But for his attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly. If deportation were the 'determinative issue' for an individual in plea discussions, as it was for Lee; if that individual had strong connections to this country and no other, as did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, as in this case, that 'almost' could make all the difference. Balanced against holding on to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or two more of prison time. ... Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.

    Lee’s claim that he would not have accepted a plea had he known it would lead to deportation is backed by substantial and uncontroverted evidence. Accordingly we conclude Lee has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'[2]

    		”

    Concurring opinions

    There were no concurring opinions filed in this case.

    Dissenting opinions

    Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Samuel Alito except as to Part I of the Justice Thomas' dissent. Justice Thomas argued that the court did not interpret the court's precedents correctly in this case and he would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit. He wrote,[6]

    “

    The majority misapplies this Court’s precedents when it concludes that a defendant may establish prejudice by showing only that 'he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial,' without showing that 'the result of that trial would have been different than the result of the plea bargain.' ... In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively on the single line from Hill that 'the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' For the reasons explained above, that sentence prescribes the threshold showing a defendant must make to establish Strickland prejudice where a defendant has accepted a guilty plea. In Hill, the Court concluded that the defendant had not made that showing, so it rejected his claim. The Court did not, however, further hold that a defendant can establish prejudice by making that showing alone. ...

    Applying the ordinary Strickland standard in this case, I do not think a defendant in petitioner’s circumstances could show a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been different had he not pleaded guilty. ... In the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and in the absence of a bona fide defense, a reasonable court or jury applying the law to the facts of this case would find the defendant guilty. There is no reasonable probability of any other verdict. A defendant in petitioner’s shoes, therefore, would have suffered the same deportation consequences regardless of whether he accepted a plea or went to trial. He is thus plainly better off for having accepted his plea: had he gone to trial, he not only would have faced the same deportation consequences, he also likely would have received a higher prison sentence. Finding that petitioner has established prejudice in these circumstances turns Strickland on its head.[2]

    		”

    The opinion



    Filings

    The U.S. Supreme Court granted Lee's certiorari request on December 14, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' briefs

    • Jae Lee, the petitioner, filed a merits brief on February 1, 2017.
    • The United States of America, the respondent, filed a merits brief on March 6, 2017.

    Amicus briefs

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioner, Jae Lee:

    • Brief of Asian Americans Advancing Justice I AAJC et al.
    • Brief of the Constitutional Accountability Center
    • Brief of the Immigrant Defense Project et al.
    • Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

    The following group filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the respondent, the United States of America:

    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • Jae Lee, the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on September 6, 2016.
    • The United States of America, the respondent, filed a brief in opposition to certiorari on November 21, 2016, pursuant to an order extending the time to file the petition.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of granting certiorari:

    • Brief of Asian Americans Advancing Justice I AAJC et al.
    • Brief of the Center for the Administration of Criminal Law
    • Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Jae Lee v. United States of America, filed June 8, 2016
    2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    3. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lee v. United States, December 14, 2016
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lee v. United States, argued March 28, 2017
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lee v. United States, argued March 28, 2017
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Supreme Court of the United States, Jae Lee v. United States, June 23, 2017
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