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Mapp v. Ohio
 | |
| Mapp v. Ohio | |
| Reference: 367 US 643 | |
| Term: 1961 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 29, 1961 Decided: June 19, 1961 | |
| Outcome | |
| Supreme Court of Ohio reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Tom Clark • William Douglas • Earl Warren • William Brennan • Potter Stewart • Hugo Black | |
| Dissenting | |
| Charles Whittaker • Felix Frankfurter • John Harlan | |
Mapp v. Ohio is a case decided on June 19, 1961, by the United States Supreme Court holding that evidence obtained in an unwarranted search and seizure was inadmissible in state courts because it violated the right to privacy. The case concerned Ohio police officers who entered the home of Dollree Mapp without a search warrant and collected materials aiming to convict her of possessing pornography. In a 6-3 decision, the justices found the police officers violated Mapp's right to privacy outlined in the Fourth Amendment made incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.[1][2]
Why it matters: The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in this case incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states. The court found that the exclusionary rule established in Weeks v. United States, which requires courts to exclude evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures per the Fourth Amendment, was applicable to state courts through the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. To read more about the impact of Mapp v. Ohio click here.
Background
On May 23, 1957, Ohio police officers knocked on Dollree Mapp's door requesting to search her home after receiving a tip alleging Mapp possessed obscene material. Dollree Mapp refused to let the police in without a search warrant.
The officers returned to the residence a few hours later and forcibly entered when there was no response to a knock at the door. Dollree was walking down the stairs when the officers entered and demanded to see a search warrant. The police showed her a piece of paper they claimed to be a search warrant; however, the prosecution never produced a warrant during the trial. Police collected materials during this search and used them to prosecute Dollree Mapp for violating the Ohio Constitution, which previously made it illegal for individuals to possess pornographic materials.
The Supreme Court of Ohio found that although the search was conducted unlawfully, the evidence could still be used in court. Mapp appealed the decision, arguing the state violated her right to free thought and expression.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral arguments were held on March 29, 1961. The case was decided on June 19, 1961.[1]
Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court decided 6-3 to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Justice Tom Clark delivered the opinion of the court, with Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas writing concurring opinions. Justice John Harlan, along with Justices Felix Frankfurter and Charles Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Potter Stewart ultimately concurred in the judgment but wrote an opinion that agreed in part with Justice Harlan's dissent.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision, asserting the appellant's right to privacy was violated by the illegal search, and therefore the evidence could not be used to prosecute Dollree Mapp. Justice Tom Clark, writing for the court, argued that the Ohio officers violated the appellant's right to privacy outlined in the Fourth Amendment and the federal government must enforce the U.S. Constitution against the states:[2]
| “ | The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.[3] | ” |
| —Tom Clark, majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio[2] | ||
Concurring opinions
Justice Hugo Black wrote a concurring opinion, asserting that the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment when in conjunction with one another require the exclusionary rule to be applied:
| “ | I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures. Reflection on the problem, however, in the light of cases coming before the Court since Wolf, has led me to conclude that, when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies, but actually requires, the exclusionary rule.[3] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio[2] | ||
Justice William Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that states must be penalized for violating the Fourth Amendment:
| “ | Without judicial action making the exclusionary rule applicable to the States, Wolf v. Colorado, in practical effect, reduced the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to "a dead letter," as Mr. Justice Rutledge said in his dissent. See 338 U.S. at 47. Wolf v. Colorado, supra, was decided in 1949. The immediate result was a storm of constitutional controversy which only today finds its end. I believe that this is an appropriate case in which to put an end to the asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law.[3] | ” |
| —William Douglas, concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justice John Harlan, along with Justices Felix Frankfurter and Charles Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion that argued overruling Wolf v. Colorado would have significant ramifications by no longer allowing illegally obtained evidence to be included in state trials.[2]
| “ | Indeed, certainly as regards its "nonexclusionary" aspect, Wolf did no more than articulate the then existing assumption among the States that the federal cases enforcing the exclusionary rule "do not bind [the States], for they construe provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, not applicable to the States." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 20, 150 N.E. 585, 587. Though, of course, not reflecting the full measure of this continuing reliance, I find that, during the last three Terms, for instance, the issue of the inadmissibility of illegally state-obtained evidence appears on an average of about fifteen times per Term just in the in forma pauperis cases summarily disposed of by us. This would indicate both that the issue which is now being decided may well have untoward practical ramifications respecting state cases long since disposed of in reliance on Wolf, and that were we determined to reexamine that doctrine, we would not lack future opportunity.[3] | ” |
| —John Harlan, dissenting opinion in Mapp v. Ohio[2] | ||
Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in part with Justice Harlan's dissent that the precedent established in Wolf v. Colorado should remain. Justice Stewart ultimately agreed to reverse the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, citing Ohio's law barring possession of obscene materials to violate the right to free thought and expression implied in the Fourteenth Amendment:
| “ | Agreeing fully with Part I of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's dissenting opinion, I express no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue which the Court today decides. I would, however, reverse the judgment in this case, because I am persuaded that the provision of § 2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, upon which the petitioner's conviction was based, is, in the words of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, not "consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment."[3] | ” |
| —Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Mapp v. Ohio incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states. The case strengthened the precedent established in Weeks v. United States by finding that the exclusionary rule applies to the states per the Due Process Clause outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment.[1][2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "Mapp v. Ohio," accessed July 29, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 Justia, "Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)," accessed August 1, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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