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Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.

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Supreme Court of the United States
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
Term: 2022
Important Dates
Argued: November 8, 2022
Decided: June 27, 2023
Outcome
vacated and remanded
Vote
5-4
Majority
Neil GorsuchClarence ThomasSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorKetanji Brown Jackson
Concurring
Ketanji Brown JacksonSamuel Alito
Dissenting
Amy Coney BarrettChief Justice John RobertsElena KaganBrett Kavanaugh

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. is a case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 27, 2023, during the court's October 2022-2023 term. The case was argued before the court on November 8, 2022.

The court vacated and remanded the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a 5-4 ruling, holding that Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 controls the case and remains the law. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Chief Justice John Roberts, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh.[1] Click here for more information about the ruling.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Robert Mallory, a Virginia resident, filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania against Norfolk Southern Railway Company, a Virginia-based company. Mallory claimed that while working for the company, he had been exposed to toxic chemicals. The Pennsylvania trial court dismissed the case, holding it did not have the authority to hear the case because none of the incidents occurred in Pennsylvania. Mallory appealed, arguing that Norfolk Southern consented to court action in Pennsylvania when it registered to do business there. Norfolk Southern disagreed. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision.[2] Click here to learn more about the case's background.
  • The issue: The case concerned the 14th Amendment and a state's ability to condition a corporation doing business in that state on the corporation consenting to personal jurisdiction.
  • The question presented: "Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state."[3]
  • The outcome: In a 5-4 ruling, the court vacated and remanded the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

  • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. To review the lower court's opinion, click here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • June 27, 2023: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • November 8, 2022: The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument.
    • April 25, 2022: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • February 18, 2022: Robert Mallory, the petitioner, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • December 22, 2021: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's ruling.

    Background

    When this lawsuit was filed, Norfolk Southern Railway Company was a railway company whose principal place of business was in Virginia. The company had registered to do business in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation, and also did business in Ohio.[2]

    Robert Mallory, the petitioner, was a Virginia resident who worked for Norfolk Southern Railway Company in Virginia and Ohio for almost 20 years. He filed a lawsuit again the company in Pennsylvania, claiming the company "exposed him to asbestos and other toxic chemicals that caused him to develop colon cancer."[2] According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling, Mallory "did not allege that he suffered any harmful occupational exposures in Pennsylvania."[4]

    Norfolk Southern moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. In its ruling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote that the company "contended that the case did not arise in Pennsylvania, it was not otherwise 'at home' in Pennsylvania, and it did not consent to jurisdiction by registering to do business in Pennsylvania." Thus, to have a Pennsylvania court rule on the case would be a violation of due process.[4] Mallory responded that Norfolk Southern consented to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania by registering to do business there.[4] The Court of Common Pleas concluded it did not have the authority to try the case and granted Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss.[2]

    On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision. Mallory filed a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court for review.[2]

    Question presented

    The petitioner presented the following question to the court:[3]

    Question presented:
    Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state.[5]

    Oral argument

    Audio

    Audio of oral argument:[6]




    Transcript

    Transcript of oral argument:[7]

    Outcome

    In a 5-4 opinion, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding that Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 controls the case and remains the law. Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court.[1]

    Opinion

    In the court's majority opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote:[1]

    Not every case poses a new question. This case poses a very old question indeed—one this Court resolved more than a century ago in Pennsylvania Fire. Because that decision remains the law, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is vacated, and the case is remanded. [5]

    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Jackson's concurring opinion

    Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion.

    In her concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote:[1]

    I agree with the Court that this case is straightforward under our precedents. I write separately to say that, for me, what makes it so is not just our ruling in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917). I also consider our ruling in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694 (1982), to be particularly instructive... Insurance Corp. of Ireland makes clear that the personal-jurisdiction requirement is an individual, waivable right, and I agree with the Court that Norfolk Southern waived that right by choosing to register as a foreign corporation under the circumstances presented in this case. Therefore, I perceive no due process problem with the registration statute at issue here. [5]

    —Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson

    Alito's concurring opinion

    Justice Samuel Alito also filed a concurring opinion.

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito wrote:[1]

    I am not convinced, however, that the Constitution permits a State to impose such a submission-to-jurisdiction requirement. A State’s assertion of jurisdiction over lawsuits with no real connection to the State may violate fundamental principles that are protected by one or more constitutional provisions or by the very structure of the federal system that the Constitution created. At this point in the development of our constitutional case law, the most appropriate home for these principles is the so called dormant Commerce Clause. Norfolk Southern appears to have asserted a Commerce Clause claim below, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address it. See 266 A. 3d 542, 559–560, nn. 9, 11 (2021). Presumably, Norfolk Southern can renew the challenge on remand. I therefore agree that we should vacate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. [5]

    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justices Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh.

    In her dissent, Justice Barrett wrote:[1]

    For 75 years, we have held that the Due Process Clause does not allow state courts to assert general jurisdiction over foreign defendants merely because they do business in the State. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 317 (1945). Pennsylvania nevertheless claims general jurisdiction over all corporations that lawfully do business within its borders. As the Commonwealth’s own courts recognized, that flies in the face of our precedent. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 139–140 (2014).

    The Court finds a way around this settled rule. All a State must do is compel a corporation to register to conduct business there (as every State does) and enact a law making registration sufficient for suit on any cause (as every State could do). Then, every company doing business in the State is subject to general jurisdiction based on implied “consent”—not contacts. That includes suits, like this one, with no connection whatsoever to the forum.

    Such an approach does not formally overrule our traditional contacts-based approach to jurisdiction, but it might as well. By relabeling their long-arm statutes, States may now manufacture “consent” to personal jurisdiction. Because I would not permit state governments to circumvent constitutional limits so easily, I respectfully dissent. [5]

    —Justice Amy Coney Barrett

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2022-2023

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2022-2023

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 3, 2022. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Monday in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[8]


    See also

    External links

    Footnotes