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Murr v. Wisconsin

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Supreme Court of the United States
Murr v. Wisconsin
Reference: 15-214
Issue: Takings clause
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: March 20, 2017
Decided: June 23, 2017
Outcome
Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District III affirmed
Vote
5-3 to affirm
Majority
Anthony KennedyRuth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSonia SotomayorElena Kagan
Dissenting
Chief Justice John G. RobertsClarence ThomasSamuel Alito


Murr v. Wisconsin is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District III. On June 23, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court affirmed the judgment of the state court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion.

In this case, the court established a new test for determining how to define and assess the value of a parcel of private property when deciding whether a government regulation limiting or restricting the use of the privately-owned land constitutes a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: A St. Croix County, Wisconsin, ordinance prohibits the development or sale of privately owned, adjacent lots unless any one individual lot has at least one acre of net project area. The Murrs, owners of two adjacent lots in the county each less than one acre, challenged the ordinance as a regulatory taking of their property.
  • The issue: Did the government's actions under the ordinance as applied here constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
  • The outcome: On June 23, 2017, the court affirmed the judgment of the state court.

  • In brief: A St. Croix County ordinance "prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent, substandard lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot has at least one acre of net project area." The Murrs, the petitioners, own two adjacent lots, one of which they want to sell in order to make capital improvements to a dwelling on the other lot. The county board of adjustors denied the Murrs' application to sell one of the lots because the ordinance mandates their merger. A Wisconsin circuit court and court of appeals both affirmed.[1] Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017.

    You can review the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' opinion here.[2]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case


    Background

    In 1960, William Murr and his wife purchased a plot of land on the St. Croix River in St. Croix County, Wisconsin. The plot purchased was referred to in court filings as "Lot F." On Lot F, the Murrs built a 950 square foot log cabin. Three years later, in 1963, the Murrs purchased an adjacent lot. In court filings, this was known as "Lot E." Lot E was purchased "as an investment property, with the intention of developing it separate from Lot F or selling it to a third party." By 1995, title to both lots passed to the Murrs' four children. Under a St. Croix County ordinance dating back to 1995, once the lots were brought under common ownership, the two lots were merged. The ordinance "prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent, substandard lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot has at least one acre of net project area."[1][3]

    In 2004, "after repeated flooding, the Murrs decided to flood proof the cabin on Lot F and sell Lot E as a building lot." The Murrs sought a variance through which they could sell Lot E in order to pay for improvements to the cabin on Lot F. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the county zoning staff opposed the Murrs' application, which was later denied by the county board of adjustment. That denial was affirmed by the St. Croix County Circuit Court and the District III Court of Appeals.[1][3]

    The Murrs' filed a complaint against the state of Wisconsin and St. Croix County alleging that the ordinance resulted in an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution. Both the state and the county sought summary judgment, arguing that the Murrs' claim was time barred, that the Murrs had not exhausted all of the available administrative remedies, that they had no right protected under law to sell a portion of their property, and that the Murrs had not been deprived of all or substantially all of the beneficial use of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment that the claim was time barred. The court also reached the merits of the Murrs' claim, holding that there was no taking of the property because the property, "taken as a whole, could be used for residential purposes, among other things." The court denied a motion to reconsider. The Murrs appealed to the court of appeals. That court held that the Murrs' claim failed on the merits, under Wisconsin law, because of,[1]

    a well-established rule that contiguous property under common ownership is considered as a whole regardless of the number of parcels contained therein ... With the analysis properly focused on the Murrs' property as a whole, it is evident they have failed to establish a compensable taking, as a matter of law ... The undisputed facts establish that the Murrs' property, viewed as a whole, retains beneficial and practical use as a residential lot. [4]

    The Murrs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States alleging an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[3]

    Petitioners' challenge

    The Murrs brought a challenge under the U.S. Supreme Court's 1978 ruling in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York. That case established a rule known as the "parcel as a whole" rule related to takings of private property. In Penn Central, the owners of the Grand Central Terminal sued New York City over an ordinance that prohibited the owners from demolishing the terminal so that the owners could build a high-rise complex. Before the Supreme Court, the owners argued that the city had taken "air rights" above the terminal away from the owners. Writing for a six-person majority rejecting that argument, Justice William Brennan wrote ,"'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . . [on] the parcel as a whole."[5]

    In their petition for certiorari, the Murrs' claimed that,[3]

    the standard presumption derived from Penn Central is that the magnitude of government interference in a takings claim should be measured against the fee title of the single parcel alleged to be taken ... Although the Murrs own two parcels that happen to be adjacent, those parcels were purchased at different times, for different purposes, and have never been considered as a single economic unit or jointly developed. Absent the effect of the challenged ordinance, the Murrs’ rights in Lot E are separate and distinct from Lot F. Their alleged taking should focus on the fee interest of the single parcel, just as this Court held in Penn Central. [4]

    Certiorari granted

    On August 14, 2015, Joseph Murr et al., the petitioners, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District III. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Murr's certiorari request on January 15, 2016. Argument in the case was held on March 20, 2017.

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "In a regulatory taking case, does the "parcel as a whole" concept as described in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), establish a rule that two legally distinct, but commonly owned contiguous parcels, must be combined for takings analysis purposes?"[6]


    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[7]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[8]

    Outcome

    Decision

    On June 23, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court affirmed the judgment of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District III. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion.

    In this case, the court established a new test for determining how to define and assess the value of a parcel of private property when deciding whether a government regulation limiting or restricting the use of the privately-owned land constitutes a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.[9]

    Opinion

    After a review of the factual and procedural history of the case, Justice Kennedy noted that, while the court's precedents provide some guidance as to regulatory takings cases, "the Court has not set forth specific guidance on how to identify the relevant parcel for the regulatory taking inquiry." Put another way, the Supreme Court had not provided guidance to lower courts on how to "...compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property." As Kennedy stated, "one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.'"

    He noted two key concepts, however, that drive the court's jurisprudence in determining the value of parcels at issue: "First, the Court has declined to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to the portion of property targeted by the challenged regulation ... second ... the Court has expressed caution ... that property rights under the Takings Clause should be coextensive with those under state law."

    Under the Supreme Court's precedent in Penn Central v. New York, the value of a property was considered in relation to the property as a whole, but this did not consider any disproportionate impact of a harm that a property owner may suffer in one particular part of a property. In an attempt to enhance the court's jurisprudence in this area, Justice Kennedy offered a new standard for review. He wrote,[9]

    no single consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the denominator. Instead, courts must consider a number of factors. ... The endeavor should determine whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts. The inquiry is objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from background customs and the whole of our legal tradition. ... First, courts should give substantial weight to the treatment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law. ... Second, courts must look to the physical characteristics of the landowner’s property. These include the physical relationship of any distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, and the surrounding human and ecological environment. In particular, it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation. ... Third, courts should assess the value of the property under the challenged regulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings. Though a use restriction may decrease the market value of the property, the effect may be tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining property, such as by increasing privacy, expanding recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.[4]

    In adopting and applying this test, the court determined that the Wisconsin courts below correctly considered the two lots owned by the Murrs as one parcel for purposes of conducting a regulatory takings analysis. Further, Justice Kennedy wrote, "considering petitioners’ property as a whole, the state court was correct to conclude that petitioners cannot establish a compensable taking."[9]

    Based on the conclusions above, the judgment of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District III was affirmed.

    Concurring opinions

    There were no concurring opinions filed in this case.

    Dissenting opinions

    Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. In his opinion, the chief justice rejected the idea of the test proposed in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the court. Roberts wrote,[9]

    Where the majority goes astray, however, is in concluding that the definition of the 'private property' at issue in a case such as this turns on an elaborate test looking not only to state and local law, but also to (1) 'the physical characteristics of the land,' (2) 'the prospective value of the regulated land,' (3) the 'reasonable expectations' of the owner, and (4) 'background customs and the whole of our legal tradition.' ... Our decisions have, time and again, declared that the Takings Clause protects private property rights as state law creates and defines them. By securing such established property rights, the Takings Clause protects individuals from being forced to bear the full weight of actions that should be borne by the public at large. The majority’s new, malleable definition of 'private property'—adopted solely 'for purposes of th[e] takings inquiry,' ... undermines that protection.

    I would stick with our traditional approach: State law defines the boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and those boundaries should determine the 'private property' at issue in regulatory takings cases. Whether a regulation effects a taking of that property is a separate question, one in which common ownership of adjacent property may be taken into account.[4]

    Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he urged a review of the court's case law on regulatory takings, writing that "it would be desirable for us to take a fresh look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can be grounded in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."[9]

    The opinion


    Filings

    The court granted Murr's certiorari request on January 15, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' filings

    • Joseph Murr et al., the petitioners, filed a merits brief on April 11, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioners, Joseph Murr et al.

    • Brief of the California Cattlemen's Association et al.
    • Brief of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
    • Brief of the Mountain States Legal Foundation
    • Brief of the National Association of Home Builders et al.
    • Brief of the New England Legal Foundation
    • Brief of the Reason Foundation
    • Brief of the Southeastern Legal Foundation and the Beacon Center
    • Brief of the Wisconsin Realtors Association


    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the respondents, Wisconsin and St. Croix County, Wisconsin.

    • Brief of the American Planning Association and the Wisconsin Chapter of the American Planning Association
    • Brief of Carlisle Ford Runge et al.
    • Brief of the National Association of Counties et al.
    • Brief of the National Trust for Historic Preservation
    • Brief of various property law professors
    • Brief of the United States of America
    • Brief of Walter Mondale et al.
    • Brief of the Wisconsin Counties Association et al.

    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • Joseph Murr et al., the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on August 14, 2015.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following group filed an amicus curiae brief in support of granting certiorari.

    • Brief of the California Cattlemen's Association et al.

    See also

    Footnotes