NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson is a case argued during the October 1957 term of the Supreme Court of the United States. Argument in the case was held on January 15-16, 1958. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama. On June 30, 1958, the court unanimously reversed and remanded the judgment of the state supreme court, which had declined to take up the NAACP's appeal of a lower court ruling that ordered the group to turn over information to state authorities required by state law, including the names and addresses of the group's members.
HIGHLIGHTS
The case: Alabama law required out-of-state organizations to register prior to conducting business within the state. The NAACP, incorporated in New York in 1911, failed to meet the registration requirement, and the order to disclose the names and addresses of all its members living in Alabama.
The outcome: On June 30, 1958, the court unanimously reversed and remanded the judgment of the state supreme court, which had declined to take up the NAACP's appeal of a lower court ruling that ordered the group to turn over information to state authorities required by state law, including the names and addresses of the group's members.
In 1956, Alabama Attorney General John Patterson sued the NAACP because of the group's failure to comply with a state law that required out-of-state organizations to register with the state prior to conducting business. Though the NAACP was incorporated in 1911 under New York law as a nonprofit membership corporation, Alabama provided sufficient evidence to show that the NAACP was conducting business in Alabama, which the NAACP did not challenge. Based on the NAACP's noncompliance, an Alabama state judge ordered the group to turn over all documentation required by the state. The NAACP, however, refused to release the names and addresses of all its members in Alabama, offering instead the names and addresses of its directors and officers. The state court enjoined the NAACP from further conducting business in Alabama, even if the organization were later willing to provide the required documentation. Two separate petitions for hearing before the Supreme Court of Alabama were denied. Argument before the U.S. Supreme Court was held on January 15-16, 1958. The court issued its opinion in the case on June 30, 1958, with Justice John M. Harlan writing for a unanimous court.
Case
Background
Great Seal of The State of Alabama
Alabama Attorney General’s suit (1956)
In 1956, Alabama Attorney General John Patterson sued the NAACP because of the group's failure to comply with a state law that required out-of-state organizations to register with the state prior to conducting business. The NAACP was incorporated in 1911 under New York law as a nonprofit membership corporation. Alabama "maintained that the NAACP had opened a regional office, organized chapters and recruited members throughout Alabama; solicited contributions in Alabama; and provided both financial support and legal aid to black students attempting to gain admission to the white-only University of Alabama." While the NAACP only provided legal support to African-Americans seeking to enter the University of Alabama, the organization was, in the view of Alabama, noncompliant with the state's registration laws.[1][2]
The suit brought by Alabama, which referenced what it assumed to be the NAACP's involvement in promoting various civil rights episodes like the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 and Autherine Lucy’s admission to the University of Alabama, argued that the group was "causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief." Patterson “believed that the resulting negative publicity that accompanied these events in the national media had damaged the state’s reputation.”[3]
NAACP initial response
Represented by Robert Carter, a lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the NAACP argued in response that the group had never sought to come into compliance with the state's rules because it believed it was "exempt given the non-commercial nature of its activities."[3] The NAACP argued that the registration requirements mandated under Alabama law violated the free speech and free association protections provided under the First Amendment and which are incorporated to state governments under the Due Process Clause of the Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
Contempt judgement against NAACP
Prior to a hearing, however, Alabama ordered the NAACP to turn over numerous organizational documents, including the names and addresses of its members in Alabama. The NAACP, in response to the lawsuit, agreed it was in noncompliance and would seek to gain the proper qualifications to conduct business in the state. But because the group declined to make public its record of members, a state court judge found the group in contempt and fined it $10,000. The contempt fine was structured to be reduced if the group complied with the full order, including turning over its member records, but would be raised to $100,000 after five days if still in noncompliance.
Arguing that Alabama could not force the disclosure of the group's member records, the NAACP moved to dismiss the contempt judgement. The Alabama courts, however, argued that a petitioner could not seek to dissolve a contempt order until it purged itself of that contempt. Though the NAACP was willing to produce some of the requested records, it would not provide the names and addresses of its members, offering instead the names of its directors and officers. The state of Alabama then requested the authority to deny the NAACP the ability to comply with the registration laws, even if the group were willing and able to do so, which a state court ruling agreed to. When the NAACP offered the state its missing chartering documents, required by law, the state declined to accept them.[1][4]
Initial United States Supreme Court involvement
When the United States Supreme Court reviewed the case, it reversed the contempt judgement. The Alabama Supreme Court, however, then reinstated it. The NAACP argued for the case to be tried on its merits, but that was denied by Alabama courts, and again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court again remanded the case back to Alabama, ordering the federal district court to try the case on the merits if the Alabama courts again declined to do so.[3]
Alabama agrees to hear case on the merits
The Alabama state circuit court did hear the case on its merits, ruling that the NAACP had violated the law and ordering it to cease doing business in the state. The Alabama appeals court upheld that ruling.
United States Supreme Court agrees to hear case the merits
After five years and four appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and decided on its merits, rather than remanded back to Alabama courts.
In the U.S. Supreme Court opinion, Justice John Harlan wrote the following:[5]
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We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And we conclude that Alabama has fallen short of showing a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have. Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the $100,000 fine which resulted from petitioner's refusal to comply with the production order in this respect must fall.[6]
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The court also argued that “compelling the disclosure of the NAACP’s membership might also encourage some individuals to leave the organization and discourage others from joining.”[3]
NAACP resumes operations in Alabama (1964)
Ultimately, in 1964, after many years of appeals and inability to operate within the state, the NAACP again resumed operations Alabama.[3]
Arguments
Question presented
Question presented:
"[w]hether, Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the Association."[7]
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Audio
- Audio of oral argument:[8]
For January 15 audio, click here.
For January 16 audio, click here.
Transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[9]
Highlights from oral argument
Petitioner's argument
Robert L. Carter argued the case for petitioner, the NAACP.
1. Authority of the trial court
Justice Charles Whittaker questioned Carter about whether the Alabama trial court had the authority to compel the NAACP to disclose its membership rolls:
| Whittaker |
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Do you claim that it was not within the power of the trial court in sustaining this motion to produce, to require you to give the names and the addresses of your members, not within his power? Was that relevant in other words to the lawsuit pending before the Court as to whether or not you were doing business there and within the power of the trial court so to order?[6]
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| Carter |
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We -- we think it was not. We think not only was it not relevant. We think that the trial court had no authority to order this disclosure because of the fact that our contention is that the right of our members to associate together in the organization, to associate together is -- is protected from enforced disclosure to any State authority. This is our contention. Now, on the question of relevance, if we think it is not a basic question, but on the question of relevance in -- in the light of our answer in which we had admitted that we had the kinds of operation that we have been carrying on, what we have been, the character of our -- of our operation, not only in the Alabama but throughout the United States, the question of who are members were have nothing and no relevance whatever to the -- the question which was purportedly before the court as to whether or not we were doing business. And besides that, when we offered to register and offered to waive our right to object to Alabama saying whether we were or we're not doing business, if there had been any relevance, we submit that it was lost at that point. There was no issue before the Court from which the -- the identification of our members had any relevance whatever. Does that answer your question?[6]
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| Whittaker |
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Respondent's argument
Edmon L. Rinehart, an assistant attorney general for the state of Alabama, argued the case for the respondent, Alabama Attorney General John Patterson.
1. Can the state permanently enjoin an organization from compliance with a statute?
Chief Justice Warren concluded the first day of oral argument inquiring as to whether Alabama could prevent the NAACP from compliance with the statutory registration requirements. This argument carried into the second day of arguments:
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Mr. Rinehart, if -- if a corporation is delinquent in complying with law, is there any authority of anyone in the State to prohibit them from complying with the law when they are -- was called to their attention?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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There is no such statutory authority.[6]
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| Warren |
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Well, is there any authority?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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We -- yes.
We think -- we think the authority can be found in State ex rel Griffith against Knights and the Ku Klux Klan, a Kansas case.[6]
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| Warren |
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Well, a Kansas case?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Warren |
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Well, what I am getting at is this. Has it ever been declared to be the law of Alabama that anybody in the State can -- can prevent them from complying merely because they were delinquent? [6]
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| Rinehart |
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There is no case law and no statutory law, either.[6]
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| Warren |
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No case or statutory law. Well now, then I suppose we have to go to -- to what laws we -- we have and I notice here that -- that the -- on page 35 of the brief for our petitioner that you just called our attention to that there are certain penalties prescribed for not complying and for doing business without complying. If that is true and the State has set those penalties and there is no other statutory law or no -- no judicial law, aren't those the only penalties that you should be looking at exactly? [6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Warren |
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I -- I think you might as well answer that in the morning.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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Mr. Chief Justice, just before closing you asked me a question concerning the Alabama statutes dealing with these domestication statutes and the enforcement thereof.[6]
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| Warren |
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| Rinehart |
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There are two criminal statutes. They are set out in the petitioner's brief at page 36 in a footnote. They -- one of those denies a foreign corporation which makes a contract in Alabama the power to assert their rights under that contract. [6]
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| Warren |
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| Rinehart |
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They had also set certain penalties which are misdemeanors and those are enforced by the solicitors of our respective circuits and counties and on appeals where the Attorney General's Office would handle loss. Those are the only statutes in Alabama which deal with what we would call the enforcement, that is the method of penalizing a corporation or its agents for coming in and doing business without a license. We do not place our action or base our action in any way on those. In fact, part of the basis of our action is that those do not provide an adequate remedy at law.[6]
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| Warren |
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What I was thinking about Mr. Rinehart was whether it has a penalty for having -- having been delinquent in that query. There was any authority in anyone to say to that corporation that you cannot now qualify. I consider there will be many number of penalties that might attach to it but is there such a penalty as a denial of the right to register because of the delinquency in registering beforehand. [6]
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| Rinehart |
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Not a penalty but we believe a power in the court of equity in its equity jurisdiction to police, perhaps police is not the correct word, to supervise corporations once it has jurisdiction of the subject matter in this case to maintain the status quo. We petitioned not only for temporary injunction but a permanent injunction and ultimately an order of ouster basing it on the power of the state to exclude a corporation completely. If we had not in the first place let it in, we don't -- we actually concede, if we let a corporation in, we allowed to qualify, we can't then turn around and say, “We're sorry, we just don't like you anymore.” Or we can't ask them to waive their constitutional rights in advance and coming in as a condition preceding to entry. But where they are interlopers as we consider this corporation to be doing business in Alabama without even the slightest action toward complying with our laws that they are interlopers and that they have absolutely no right to be here and that the equity power is the only effective way to protect and vindicate the constitutional provision which is involved here -- the constitution that is of Alabama, Section 232. And that the equity courts have that power. And if they have the power to oust, they have the lesser concluded power to restrain their qualified as a -- in fact, that's one of the reasons we think that the records to get to the merits of this case -- no I mean the merits before the Circuit Court is so important in this case to determine whether or not they should be ousted in a proceeding of equity in the nature of (Inaudible) such as Kansas did in State ex rel Griffith against Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. That is the gravamen of the state’s petition, a sworn bill, I might add, a sworn bill in equity which was filed on June 1, 1956.[6]
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2. Statutory v. constitutional issues
Justice Felix Frankfurter had a lengthy exchange with Mr. Rinehart about whether Alabama was inconsistent in its application of the law and process in this case, particularly towards addressing statutory vs. constitutional issues:
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May I ask you this. You correct me if I misunderstand it -- if my understanding is inaccurate. You brought out the proceeding against the NAACP. They said they didn't come within your law either because they are a membership corporation of New York or because what they did in Alabama does not include what legally speaking is doing business in Alabama. But they said as you can have them to say, I think to seldom say on the advice of counsel, well whether we are right or wrong and lead him first to comply. So they say we're ready to file this certificate if this is what you want. But they did contend the coercive power of Alabama to make this file. That's correct isn't it? Didn't they deny that they come within your law requiring to do anything including what they did do in Alabama?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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I -- I agree what they offered to do in Alabama.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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Well, what they -- but you said, they have been doing over these years during which they didn't file -- that they should have filed a certificate and domesticate themselves, isn't that true? You said they've been doing business for good many years in Alabama and certainly way back since 1918 or probably earlier in connection with their purposes.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Frankfurter |
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So that you say, you've been doing business without the requisite provision of Alabama. They said, “We don't come within your law. We didn't have to satisfy the requirements of getting a certificate but in the interest of whatever it is, convenience, we are ready to file this certificate.” And you said, “No, we don't have to accept it.” Is that right?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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Now, and on the basis of the facts that's quickly summarized, the State got a restraining order against them calling for the cessation of all business although they raised, what I supposed, is not a frivolous or a ridiculous objection to the claim asserted by the State. Is that right?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Frankfurter |
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I know you don't -- you don't think there's much to the point, but sometimes it drives how often -- a majority of my brothers think there's something to a point which I think there's nothing or by subversive.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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I -- I accept everything except the very last statement with a reservation as being absolutely a correct statement.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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All right. What we say is this, first statement I will make is that the offer which they made was after the ex -- and I admit ex parte restraining order and the offer wasn't made until after we we're going to get down to the nub of the case, the facts of the case and that is something I think that should be borne in mind into spelling this which I think petitioner is trying to create, this aura of unfairness in Alabama.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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All right. What I've stated was merely preliminary to the (Voice Overlap) -- [6]
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| Rinehart |
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Oh I'm -- I'm sorry.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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I didn't think on that statement that Alabama did something that was wrong. This is merely -- I want to see if the preliminary facts seemed to me irrelevant to the question I'm going to put to you or correct.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Frankfurter |
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Very well. Then you get a restraining order against him not to do business. They must shut up sharp, is that right?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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Yes. They have not at that point, however, made any offer of compliance, whatsoever.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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No, but you did -- you told them they must shut up sharp.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Frankfurter |
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Before the validity of that order, not only the validity of the order but the scope of the decree could be contested. The state begins another proceeding and says, produce certain documents. That's true, isn't it?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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| Frankfurter |
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They say you are asking us to produce documents which we are entitled. Now whatever rights -- by the rights we have under the United States Constitution to withhold. That certainty is not a frivolous question -- [6]
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| Rinehart |
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No, that is not a frivolous question.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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That being so, what I want to put to you is that pending the determination of what is not a frivolous question, what is a substantial question that respectable lawyers can raise and do raise and have raised, Alabama takes the position that although this organization has been in Alabama all these years without any attention or objection from the authority with Alabama. I am not talking about estoppel. I'm addressing myself to the nature of the remedy. Although that has been so and although they raised that question ancillary to the proceedings of oust. Alabama says, “You go out of business until this long trail of litigation because you have, standing on constitutional right said, “You don't have to obey this.” Alabama then throws them in contempt but all this time they are executed. They get a death sentence pro tem although in the end, it may turn out that they we're constitutionally right. You're not (Voice Overlap) of this litigation?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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I -- I am going to make one correction and I think -- [6]
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| Frankfurter |
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| Rinehart |
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-- the most important correction. Alabama did not throw them into contempt. They need never have been in contempt. They could have tested the order to produce without ever the slightest risk of contempt.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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Well they tested it in way in which they thought they contested according to your cases. [6]
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| Rinehart |
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Our cases don't hold that in a proper way.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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But that is the question before us whether they raise it by a -- whether a certiorari by which they sought to raise it, raised all these issues. And even your Supreme Court said we don't have to consider this but we do consider them. It's the love of the counsel that they had a right to pursue (Inaudible) -- [6]
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| Rinehart |
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I would like to address myself to that specific question in -- in considerable detail and explain the fairness of the Alabama procedure and that is this, the Alabama procedure on a subpoena duces tecum if in case of a third party or an order to produce documents is that that is an interlocutory order not appealable. The proper remedy is petition for writ of mandamus.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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Because the person does not have to set himself up as the sole judge of relevancy, the sole judge of constitutionality and bring himself to the position of flat out as this petitioner did in open court and saying, “We don't need any more time. We choose to stand on these rights.” [6]
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| Frankfurter |
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… So far as I'm concerned, if it can be established that the orderly, traditional, settled procedure of Alabama requires the rating of these questions solely by mandamus and I think the other side is out of court so far as I'm concerned because Alabama has the right to say, “It should be raised by mandamus and not by certiorari, if you're right.[6]
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| Rinehart |
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If I'm right. Well, we have cited in our brief at pages 9 and 17, thereof, Ex parte Monroe County Bank, 254 Ala. 515. Now that I will grant you the Monroe County Bank was not a party to the action. They were -- this was a subpoena duces tecum. In that case, they didn't choose or felt that they did not have the duty to produce certain records in a divorce proceeding. Husband against wife and of course these financial matters become very important. If they proceeded by writ of mandamus to test the validity of that subpoena duces tecum in the Alabama court and it went to the Supreme Court and all the questions we're passed on it. Now that isn't enough. That doesn't make a great long line of cases. In addition, Ex parte Hart cited in the Supreme Courts' opinion had a similar question of an order to produce. The court didn't discuss that thing at length. It was just the well accepted method in Alabama.[6]
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| Frankfurter |
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If I -- if my reading with all the consciousness that one should have about reading the decisions of a state or the law which he isn't familiar except by reading. If my reading of your cases were a consistent document that mandamus is the crucial remedy, I would have to go with you. But if my reading of your cases is this that sometimes Alabama does and sometimes Alabama doesn't allow all the substantive questions to be raised on certiorari then I'd say to you that it can't invoke that doctrine when the federal right is asserted when it doesn't invoke at another instances.[6]
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3. Could the state refuse if the NAACP offered to register?
Justice Hugo Black, a native Alabaman, asked Mr. Rinehart whether Alabama had any authority to refuse the NAACP should the organization desire to register in compliance with Alabama law:
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Is there any law of Alabama which tells a delinquent corporation cannot register -- cannot register?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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Absolutely not, no statutory law whatsoever.[6]
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| Black |
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In considering the merits, it means that (Inaudible). You would tell me what issue was left upon which an order could rest (Inaudible)[6]
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-- after you had, on your petition, you oust these people because they were delinquent after they had offered to file the Secretary's claims, a certificate, which if they have been permitted to file, he could not have (Inaudible). What issue was left on which orders could be issued in your brief after that?[6]
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I -- think that the -- the authority to oust is -- is in the Courts of Alabama to punish -- perhaps punish is not -- is too strong a word, but to -- I believe it is a correct one for having -- for a long period of time ignored our laws and the question of whether in fact they were doing business and how long in the extent and nature of there -- were absolutely essential to the case. Now, we think that the power to oust for past misconduct included the power to maintain the status quo as between the parties, and that is what this order denying the right to register did. It's the traditional power of the court of equity. [6]
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| Black |
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Had they ever done that?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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No. We've never had an -- we've never had a case like this before.[6]
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| Black |
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Never had a case where a corporation was delinquent?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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We've had cases where -- where corporations -- oh, I won't say that. I don't know of anywhere corporations were delinquent in this manner. There are other constitutional questions -- I don't want to dodge that question, Your Honor. [6]
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Well, I don't want to consume all your time on this but I had been wondering if this -- is this -- if they had been permitted to file this registration certificate with the Secretary of State. He could not have refused it, couldn't he?[6]
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| Rinehart |
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There's -- there is a dispute in our opinion which has never been written, I admit. Our opinion is that he could, first of all, he has the duty to refer it to the franchise tax people for determination of whether or not in fact this is a benevolent corporation within the meaning of the law of exemptions or a charitable and --[6]
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And suppose they offered to file these both, could he have refused it?[6]
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Oh, he doesn't -- he doesn't in fact accept the filing and it is not accepted until the franchise tax people make a determination as to whether or not there are franchise taxes due. That's my understanding of the procedure.[6]
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Was there any basis for this action originally except that they were delinquent in registration? [6]
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The pleadings are not here that's the reason I don't know.[6]
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The basis for the action is that they were delinquent -- the basis of the action is a long-term extensive delinquency which we think is in derogation of the rights of the people of Alabama not to have corporations come in, foreign corporations, and just ignore their statutes.[6]
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Outcome
Decision
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.[10]
Opinion
In his opinion for the court, Justice Harlan first addressed Alabama's assertion that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction in the case. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that NAACP was required to seek review of its constitutional claims by the state supreme court via a writ of mandamus, and not via a writ of certiorari from that court. Accordingly, under a more limited review of the contempt charge, the state supreme court did not find fault with the contempt judgment issued by the lower Alabama court. According to Justice Harlan, that holding was inconsistent with the prior practice of the state supreme court. Citing Alabama case history, he noted, "We are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review available upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment." Justice Harlan, however, noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain the federal claims made by the NAACP.[10]
After affirming that the rank-and-file members had rights to withhold their membership in the NAACP, and that this same right was assertable by the NAACP itself, Justice Harlan addressed the First Amendment claims made by the Association.[10]
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It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved ... Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs ...
We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association. Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner's activities follows not from state action but from private community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold.
[6]
|
”
|
| —Justice Harlan[10]
|
After affirming the rights of free association afforded to members of the NAACP, Justice Harlan evaluated whether Alabama's asserted interests in obtaining the membership lists superseded the First Amendment claims of the Association. After determining that the "exclusive purpose was to determine whether" the NAACP "was conducting intrastate business" in violation of Alabama law, as well as if the activities of the NAACP brought the Association within the registration statute and its attendant regulations, Justice Harlan stated,[7]
| “
|
...we are unable to perceive that the disclosure of the names of petitioner's rank-and-file members has a substantial bearing ... As matters stand in the state court, petitioner (1) has admitted its presence and conduct of activities in Alabama since 1918; (2) has offered to comply in all respects with the state qualification statute, although preserving its contention that the statute does not apply to it; and (3) has apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the membership lists, by furnishing the Attorney General with varied business records, its charter and statement of purposes, the names of all of its directors and officers, and with the total number of its Alabama members and the amount of their dues. These last items would not on this record appear subject to constitutional challenge and have been furnished, but whatever interest the State may have in obtaining names of ordinary members has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the production order.
[6]
|
”
|
| —Justice Harlan[10]
|
Justice Harlan concluded by noting that the Alabama Supreme Court was, in fact, the appropriate location to rule on appeal on the legitimacy of the injunction. Having reversed the judgment of the state supreme court, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the state supreme court for additional proceedings.[10]
Concurring opinions
There were no concurring opinions filed.
Dissenting opinions
There were no dissenting opinions filed.
The opinion
Legacy
The court's opinion in this case, in the words of University of Pennsylvania Professor of Law Anita Allen,
| “
|
...has left an indelible mark. It is the centerpiece of the constitutional jurisprudence of information disclosure ... Thanks to NAACP v. Alabama, government may not force even a controversial group to identify its members, absent establishing a compelling state interest in disclosure. The right of private free association belongs to all who respect the rights of others ... The fact that technology has made it easier to collect, store and share data revealing individuals’ group memberships should be of no consequence. The principles of expressive private association, confidentiality and anonymity embodied in the NAACP case should have an abiding place in the jurisprudence of every enlightened democracy.
[6]
|
”
|
| —Anita Allen[1]
|
In the years following the case, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have continued to rely on the ruling, including in the following cases:[1]
- Talley v. California (1960): "the Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance banning distribution of leaflets that did not bear the names and addresses of the people responsible for their distribution."
- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995): "the Court struck down an Ohio law prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign materials."
- Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. (1999): "the court found that a Colorado statute requiring that door-to-door solicitors wear identification badges violated the First Amendment."
Legal scholars have noted that NAACP v. Alabama isn't always successful in upholding related membership privacy concerns. Courts have upheld perceived infringements on speech and assembly when laws are deemed "narrowly tailored and necessary to further a compelling state interest."[1]
In 2016, however, the Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFPF) brought a suit against California Attorney General Kamala Harris, challenging a rule that demanded "organizations registering with her office to solicit contributions from Californians first provide her the names and addresses of donors listed on a federal tax return schedule filed confidentially with the IRS." The AFPF claimed the requirement to disclose donor names and addresses violated the First Amendment as well as the principles of the NAACP v. Alabama ruling.[11]
See also
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 NAACPvAlabama.org, "NAACP v. Alabama, Privacy and Data Protection," accessed April 13, 2015
- ↑ Cornell University Law School, "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button," accessed April 13, 2015
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Encyclopedia of Alabama, "NAACP v. Alabama," January 11, 2011
- ↑ Publishing the Long Civil Rights Movement, "Remembering NAACP v. Alabama," June 30, 2012
- ↑ Justia, "NAACP v. Patterson 357 U.S. 449 (1958)," accessed December 16, 2016
- ↑ 6.00 6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.18 6.19 6.20 6.21 6.22 6.23 6.24 6.25 6.26 6.27 6.28 6.29 6.30 6.31 6.32 6.33 6.34 6.35 6.36 6.37 6.38 6.39 6.40 6.41 6.42 6.43 6.44 6.45 6.46 6.47 6.48 6.49 6.50 6.51 6.52 6.53 6.54 6.55 6.56 6.57 6.58 6.59 6.60 6.61 6.62 6.63 6.64 6.65 6.66 6.67 6.68 6.69 6.70 6.71 6.72 6.73 6.74 6.75 6.76 6.77 6.78 6.79 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Supreme Court of the United States (via Justia), NAACP v. Patterson, decided June 30, 1958
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson," argued January 15-16, 1958
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, argued October 4, 2016
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, decided June 30, 1958
- ↑ Daily Caller, "Would Lois Lerner Make A Good Senator?" February 2, 2016
