Near v. Minnesota
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| Near v. Minnesota | |
| Reference: 283 U.S. 697 | |
| Term: 1931 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: January 30, 1931 Decided: June 1, 1931 | |
| Outcome | |
| Minnesota Supreme Court reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Charles E. Hughes • Oliver Wendell Holmes • Louis Brandeis • Owen Josephus Roberts • Harlan Fiske Stone | |
| Dissenting | |
| Willis Van Devanter • Pierce Butler • James Clark McReynolds • George Sutherland | |
Near v. Minnesota is a case decided on June 1, 1931, by the United States Supreme Court holding that restraints on speech are unconstitutional. The case concerned whether the issuance of an injunction against the newspaper violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that prior court decisions to place restraints on speech are unconstitutional. To read more about the impact of Near v. Minnesota click here.
Background
Jay Near and Howard Guilford published an article in a Minneapolis newspaper accusing local law enforcement officers of being involved with a gangster who was alleged to be in control of gambling and racketeering occurring in the city. State officials sought an injunction against the newspaper for violating the state's public nuisance law and publishing malicious and defamatory content. The text of the law stated that individuals who engage in publishing "'a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,' is guilty of a nuisance, and authorizes suits, in the name of the State, in which such periodicals may be abated and their publishers enjoined from future violations."[2]
A trial court issued a permanent injunction, which was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the state court's decision on an appeal, which argued that the injunction was unconstitutional.[1][3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on January 30, 1931. The case was decided on June 1, 1931.[2]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to reverse the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Pierce Butler wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Willis Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, and George Sutherland.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, writing for the court, argued that the freedom of press that stems from the First Amendment extends to protecting the press from restraints on speech or censorship.[2]
| “ | The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship. The conception of the liberty of the press in this country had broadened with the exigencies of the colonial period and with the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration. That liberty was especially cherished for the immunity it afforded from previous restraint of the publication of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct [4] | ” |
| —Charles E. Hughes, majority opinion in Near v. Minnesota[2] | ||
Hughes highlighted that the Minnesota statute aimed to justify restraints on speech by labeling the newspaper as a business that was a nuisance. He contended that this characterization should not allow the state to infringe on the constitutional immunity against restraint of speech. The newspaper is permitted to the constitutional protection of free speech, regardless of whether or not they are labeled as a business.[2]
| “ | In attempted justification of the statute, it is said that it deals not with publication per se, but with the 'business' of publishing defamation. If, however, the publisher has a constitutional right to publish, without previous restraint, an edition of his newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot be denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same purpose. He does not lose his right by exercising it. If his right exists, it may be exercised in publishing nine editions, as in this case, as well as in one edition. If previous restraint is permissible, it may be imposed at once; indeed, the wrong may be as serious in one publication as in several. Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. Similarly, it does not matter that the newspaper or periodical is found to be 'largely' or 'chiefly' devoted to the publication of such derelictions. If the publisher has a right, without previous restraint, to publish them, his right cannot be deemed to be dependent upon his publishing something else, more or less, with the matter to which objection is made. Nor can it be said that the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are made of derelictions which constitute crimes. With the multiplying provisions of penal codes, and of municipal charters and ordinances carrying penal sanctions, the conduct of public officers is very largely within the purview of criminal statutes. The freedom of the press from previous restraint has never been regarded as limited to such animadversions as lay outside the range of penal enactments. Historically, there is no such limitation; it is inconsistent with the reason which underlies the privilege, as the privilege so limited would be of slight value for the purposes for which it came to be established. [4] | ” |
| —Charles E. Hughes, majority opinion in Near v. Minnesota[2] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice Pierce Butler dissented, arguing that the Minnesota statute should be affirmed because states should have the power to restrain businesses from publishing defamatory content.[2]
| “ | The decision of the Court in this case declares Minnesota and every other State powerless to restrain by injunction the business of publishing and circulating among the people malicious, scandalous and defamatory periodicals that in due course of judicial procedure has been adjudged to be a public nuisance. It gives to freedom of the press a meaning and a scope not heretofore recognized, and construes 'liberty' in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to put upon the States a federal restriction that is without precedent. [4] | ” |
| —Pierce Butler, dissenting opinion in Near v. Minnesota[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
Near v. Minnesota established that prior decisions of the court that placed restraints on speech are unconstitutional, specifically when they prohibit the publication of malicious or defamatory language.[2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Oyez, "Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson," accessed July 20, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 Justia, "Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)," accessed July 20, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 LexisNexis, "Near v. Minnesota - 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931)," accessed July 20, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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