Noteworthy cases heard by current justices on the U.S. Supreme Court

Imprisoned people entitled to jury trial on Prison Litigation Reform Act exhaustion (2024)

See also: Perttu v. Richards

Justice Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Perttu v. Richards, holding that parties are entitled to a jury trial on Prison Litigation Reform Act exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.^[2]

“	If Congress had expressly provided in the PLRA that exhaustion disputes must be resolved by judges, then we would have been required to consider today whether such a provision violates the Seventh Amendment. But it is a ‘cardinal principle’ that we not address such a constitutional question unless necessary. Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, n. 3 (1987). Meanwhile, as we have shown, the usual practice of the federal courts in cases of intertwinement is to send common issues to the jury. Because nothing in the PLRA suggests Congress intended to depart from that practice here, we hold that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim protected by the Seventh Amendment. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed.^[3]	”
—Justice Chief Justice John Roberts

Native American tribal nations’ health care funding (2024)

Roberts authored a 5-4 opinion in the case Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, holding that "The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) requires the Indian Health Service (IHS) to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract."^[4] Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett.

In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:^[4]

“	Contract support costs are necessary to prevent a funding gap between tribes and IHS. By definition, these are costs that IHS does not incur when it provides healthcare services funded by congressional appropriations and third-party income. §§5325(a)(2)(A) and (B). But they are costs that tribes must bear when they provide, on their own,healthcare services funded by the Secretarial amount and program income. If IHS does not cover costs to support a tribe’s expenditure of program income, the tribe would have to divert some program income to pay such costs, or it would have to pay them out of its own pocket. Either way, the tribe would face a systemic funding shortfall relative to IHS—a penalty for pursuing self-determination. The self-determination contracts of the San Carlos Apache Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe require them to collect and spend program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to them from IHS. When the Tribes do so and incur administrative costs, ISDA requires IHS to pay those support costs.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Alabama redistricting map and the Voting Rights Act (2023)

See also: Allen v. Milligan

Roberts authored an opinion in Allen v. Milligan. In a 5-4 decision, the court affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, holding that the plaintiffs showed a reasonable likelihood of success concerning their claim that Alabama's redistricting map (HB1) violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the court.^[5]^[6]

In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:^[5]

“

But this Court has never held that a State’s adherence to a previously used districting plan can defeat a §2 claim. If that were the rule, a State could immunize from challenge a new racially discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it resembled an old racially discriminatory plan. That is not the law: §2 does not permit a State to provide some voters “less opportunity . . . to participate in the political process” just because the State has done it before. ...

The heart of these cases is not about the law as it exists. It is about Alabama’s attempt to remake our §2 jurisprudence anew.

The centerpiece of the State’s effort is what it calls the“race-neutral benchmark.” The theory behind it is this: Using modern computer technology, mapmakers can now generate millions of possible districting maps for a given State.The maps can be designed to comply with traditional districting criteria but to not consider race. The mapmaker can determine how many majority-minority districts exist in each map, and can then calculate the median or average number of majority-minority districts in the entire multi-million-map set. That number is called the race-neutral benchmark. ... [W]e find Alabama’s new approach to §2 compelling neither in theory nor in practice.^[3]

”

—Chief Justice John Roberts

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Roberts authored an opinion concurring in judgment in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Roberts wrote that he would uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not overturn Roe and Casey. Associate Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion, holding that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was also joined by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Alito wrote:

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

In his concurring opinion, Roberts wrote:

“	I would take a more measured course. I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare decisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abortion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right should therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportunity to choose, but need not extend any further—certainly not all the way to viability. Mississippi’s law allows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well beyond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a pregnancy. See A. Ayoola, Late Recognition of Unintended Pregnancies, 32 Pub. Health Nursing 462 (2015) (pregnancy is discoverable and ordinarily discovered by six weeks of gestation). I see no sound basis for questioning the adequacy of that opportunity. But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more. Perhaps we are not always perfect in following that command, and certainly there are cases that warrant an exception. But this is not one of them. Surely we should adhere closely to principles of judicial restraint here, where the broader path the Court chooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we have not only previously recognized, but also expressly reaffirmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court’s opinion is thoughtful and thorough, but those virtues cannot compensate for the fact that its dramatic and consequential ruling is unnecessary to decide the case before us.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Transportation orders in post-conviction claims (2022)

See also: Shoop v. Twyford

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Shoop v. Twyford, holding that a transportation order allowing a prisoner to search for new evidence is not necessary or appropriate in aid of a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief.^[7]

In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:^[7]

“	The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. §1651(a). In this case, the District Court ordered the State to transport a prisoner in its custody to a hospital for medical testing. The prisoner argued that the testing could reveal evidence helpful in his effort to obtain habeas corpus relief. The question is whether the District Court’s order is “necessary or appropriate in aid of ” the federal court’s resolution of the prisoner’s habeas case. We hold that it is not, and therefore reverse.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Jurisdictional requirements of eminent domain under the Natural Gas Act (2021)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, holding that Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or by states. Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch.^[8]

In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:^[8]

“	From humble beginnings in central Indiana, the Nation’s interstate pipeline system has grown to span hundreds of thousands of miles. This development was made possible by the enactment of §717f(h) in 1947. By its terms, §717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or States. Such condemnation actions do not offend state sovereignty, because the States consented at the founding to the exercise of the federal eminent domain power, whether by public officials or private delegatees. Because the Third Circuit reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Authority of administrative patent judges in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (2021)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in United States v. Arthrex Inc., holding that the system granting Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) the power to issue final decisions without effective oversight was unconstitutional. The court ruled 7-2 to fix the constitutional issue by removing the statutory provisions that blocked the director of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) from unilaterally reviewing APJ decisions. Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan in parts I and II.^[9]

In the court's majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:^[9]

“

Today, we reaffirm and apply the rule from Edmond that the exercise of executive power by inferior officers must at some level be subject to the direction and supervision of an officer nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Constitution therefore forbids the enforcement of statutory restrictions on the Director that insulate the decisions of APJs from his direction and supervision. To be clear, the Director need not review every decision of the PTAB. What matters is that the Director have the discretion to review decisions rendered by APJs. In this way, the President remains responsible for the exercise of executive power—and through him, the exercise of executive power remains accountable to the people.^[3]

”

Decision to end DACA (2020)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, holding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) decision to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program did not properly follow the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor.^[10]

In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:^[10]

“	The dispute before the Court is not whether DHS may rescind DACA. All parties agree that it may. The dispute is instead primarily about the procedure the agency followed in doing so. ... Because DHS was 'not writing on a blank slate,' ... it was required to assess whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns. ... Acting Secretary Duke should have considered those matters but did not. That failure was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Copyright of a state's official annotated code (2019)

In Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, holding "under the government edicts doctrine, officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of the works they create in the course of their official duties." Therefore, "the OCGA annotations are ineligible for copyright protection."^[11] Roberts authored the Court's 5-4 majority opinion. He was joined in the majority by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.^[11]

“	Under what has been dubbed the government edicts doctrine, officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot copyright—the works they create in the course of their official duties. ... Copyright does not vest in works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and legislative duties.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

Tax breaks for religiously-affiliated schools (2019)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, holding the application of Article X, Section 6 of the Montana Constitution, known as Montana's Blaine Amendment banning the use of public funds for aiding a religious school, violated the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.^[12]

The chief justice wrote:^[12]

“	Disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from a public benefit “solely because of their religious character” imposes “a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.” ... Montana’s no-aid provision bars religious schools from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the schools. The provision also bars parents who wish to send their children to a religious school from those same benefits, again solely because of the religious character of the school. This is apparent from the plain text.^[3]	”
—Chief Justice Roberts

President's appointment and removal powers (2019)

In Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified the 9th Circuit's ruling with a 5-4 vote against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and sent the case back to the 9th Circuit for further proceedings. Roberts authored the majority opinion, holding that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—an independent agency that exercised executive powers and had a director protected from at-will termination by the president—was unconstitutional. Specifically, a majority of the justices ruled that making the director of the CFPB removable by the president alone for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated the separation of powers. Chief Justice Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.^[13]

In the opinion of the Court, Roberts wrote:^[13]

“

A decade ago, we declined to extend Congress’s authority to limit the President’s removal power to a new situation, never before confronted by the Court. We do the same today. In our constitutional system, the executive power belongs to the President, and that power generally includes the ability to supervise and remove the agents who wield executive power in his stead. While we have previously upheld limits on the President’s removal authority in certain contexts, we decline to do so when it comes to principal officers who, acting alone, wield significant executive power. The Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.^[3]

”

SCOTUS 2014 term (Click to expand)

Census citizenship question (2018)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York, ruling that the Trump administration's decision to add a citizenship question to the census did not violate the Enumeration Clause or the Census Act, but that Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross' rationale for the decision was inconsistent with the administrative record. Roberts was joined in part by the following justices:^[14]

The justices ruled unanimously in Parts I and II of the decision, which provided background on Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross' decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 U.S. Census and affirmed that "at least some" of the respondents in the case had Article III standing.
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh joined in Parts III, IV-B, and IV-C. Part III held that the citizenship question did not violate the Enumeration Clause. Part IV-B held that the evidence before Ross supported his decision to add the citizenship question to the census. Part IV-C held that Ross' decision did not violate the Census Act.
Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh joined in Part IV-A, which ruled that Ross' action was subject to judicial review.
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined in Part V of the decision, which held that Ross' rationale for adding the citizenship question in order to support enforcement of the Voting Rights Acts was inconsistent with the administrative record.

In the Court's opinion, Roberts wrote:^[15]

“

We do not hold that the agency decision here was substantively invalid. But agencies must pursue their goals reasonably. Reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an explanation for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction.^[3]

”

Partisan gerrymandering (2018)

See also: Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion in a joint ruling for Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek. The court ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions that fall beyond the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Roberts wrote:^[16]

“

Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate level of political power and influence. Explicitly or implicitly, a districting map is alleged to be unconstitutional because it makes it too difficult for one party to translate statewide support into seats in the legislature. But such a claim is based on a 'norm that does not exist' in our electoral system—'statewide elections for representatives along party lines. ... [Federal] courts are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that they were authorized to do so.^[3]

”

State-litigation requirement from Williamson Cty. Planning v. Hamilton Bank (1985) overruled (2018)

Roberts authored a 5-4 majority opinion that overturned the exahustion requirement established in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985) that a person claiming unlawful taking of their property by a state or local government must first seek all available options for redress in a state court before petitioning a federal court. It found that the requirement conflicted with the San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) decision 20 years later that held a state court's ruling in such cases precludes any federal judgment, creating a situation where a plaintiff had no opportunity to appeal a taking to the federal government until after it was too late for the federal government to act. Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Roberts wrote:^[17]

“

We now conclude that the state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled. A property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim when the government takes his property without paying for it. That does not mean that the government must provide compensation in advance of a taking or risk having its action invalidated: So long as the property owner has some way to obtain compensation after the fact, governments need not fear that courts will enjoin their activities. But it does mean that the property owner has suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights when the government takes his property without just compensation, and therefore may bring his claim in federal court under §1983 at that time.^[3]

”

Ambiguous agreements cannot provide necessary contractual basis for class arbitration (2018)

See also: Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varela

Prior to the ruling, Supreme Court precedent under Stolt-Nielsen (2010) "held that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration. In Lamps Plus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Stolt-Nielsen did not apply because the Lamps agreement was ambiguous, not silent, concerning class arbitration."^[18] SCOTUS reversed the Ninth Circuit; Chief Justice Roberts authored the 5-4 opinion, holding that "an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration," under the Federal Arbitration Act.^[19] Roberts was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Roberts wrote:^[19]

“

Courts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis. The doctrine of contra proferentem cannot substitute for the requisite affirmative “contractual basis for concluding that the part[ies] agreed to [class arbitration].” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]

”

Affordable Care Act tax credits extend to federally created exchanges (2015)

See also: King v. Burwell (2015)

Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), state governments were required to establish a marketplace through which residents could purchase health insurance., known as exchanges. If a state failed to create an exchange, the federal government would establish one under the authority of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Under the ACA, individuals were required to purchase health insurance or risk paying a penalty on their annual income tax returns unless they qualified for a low-income exemption. To limit the number of individuals faling under the exemption, the ACA authorized tax credits to offset the cost of coverage; however, the statutory language stipulated that the credits were for those who enrolled via exchanges established by state governments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), by regulation, extended the tax credits to those who enrolled through a marketplace created by the Department of Health and Human Services. In King v. Burwell (2015), the Court examined the legal question—whether the IRS regulation violated congressional prerogatives under the ACA.^[20]

Writing for the six-justice majority, Chief Justice John Roberts held that Congress' intent was for the tax credits to go to individuals who signed up for health insurance through the exchanges regardless of whether the exchanges were established by the federal government or a state government:^[20]

“

In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined—“to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.

Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we adopt.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed.^[3]

”

—Chief Justice John Roberts

SCOTUS 2011 term (Click to expand)

Affordable Care Act allowed to stand (2012)

In June 2012, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a case challenging the Obama administration's Affordable Care Act. Challengers to the law argued that the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause was not valid to make individuals purchase a good or service, in this case, healthcare. Roberts agreed with that interpretation. However, he allowed the law to stand on the basis of Congress' authority to levy a tax.^[21]}}

For a thorough explanation of the federal healthcare act and the challenges it faced in court, see: Obamacare overview.

Response

Following the ruling, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced a constitutional amendment that would mandate that every piece of legislation passed by Congress apply to every U.S. citizen and members of the House and Senate equally. In a statement about the legislation, Paul said:^[22]

“	My amendment says basically that everybody including Justice Roberts — who seems to be such a fan of Obamacare — gets it too. See, right now, Justice Roberts is still continuing to have federal employee health insurance subsidized by the taxpayer. And if he likes Obamacare so much, I’m going to give him an amendment that gives Obamacare to Justice Roberts.^[3]	”
—Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.)

In his remarks following the ruling, President Barack Obama (D) said:^[23]

“

Good afternoon. Earlier today, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act -- the name of the health care reform we passed two years ago. In doing so, they've reaffirmed a fundamental principle that here in America -- in the wealthiest nation on Earth – no illness or accident should lead to any family’s financial ruin.

I know there will be a lot of discussion today about the politics of all this, about who won and who lost. That’s how these things tend to be viewed here in Washington. But that discussion completely misses the point. Whatever the politics, today’s decision was a victory for people all over this country whose lives will be more secure because of this law and the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold it.

... The highest Court in the land has now spoken. We will continue to implement this law. And we'll work together to improve on it where we can. But what we won’t do -- what the country can’t afford to do -- is refight the political battles of two years ago, or go back to the way things were.

With today’s announcement, it’s time for us to move forward -- to implement and, where necessary, improve on this law. And now is the time to keep our focus on the most urgent challenge of our time: putting people back to work, paying down our debt, and building an economy where people can have confidence that if they work hard, they can get ahead.^[3]

”

—President Barack Obama (D)

SCOTUS 2006 term (Click to expand)

Constitutionality of race-based school assignments (2007)

In June 2007, Chief Justice Roberts authored the plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1. At issue was whether it was constitutionally permissible for a public school district to (1) classify students by race and (2) rely upon such racial classifications in making school assignments.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag

The school districts involved voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that relied upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. The Seattle, Washington school district classified children as white or nonwhite, while the Jefferson County school district in Louisville, Kentucky classified children as Black or “other.” In Seattle, this racial classification was used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson County, it was used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. In each case, the school districts relied upon an individual student's race in assigning them to a particular school so that the racial balance at the school fell within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race filed a lawsuit, challenging the assignment systems allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race for allegedly violating the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.^[24]^[25]

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the Court, writing:^[24]^[25]

“

The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the Jefferson County school district as black or “other.” In Seattle, this racial classification is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson County, it is used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. In each case, the school district relies upon an individual student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. The Courts of Appeals below upheld the plans. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. ... The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.^[3]

”

Clarence Thomas

See also: Clarence Thomas

Since he joined the court through the 2023-2024 term, Thomas authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision 40 times and authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision 36 times. The table below details these cases by year.^[26]

Clarence Thomas noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	40	36
2023-2024	0	1
2022-2023	0	2
2021-2022	0	3
2020-2021	0	3
2019-2020	0	2
2018-2019	4	1
2017-2018	3	1
2016-2017	1	0
2015-2016	0	0
2014-2015	0	3
2013-2014	1	0
2012-2013	2	0
2011-2012	0	1
2010-2011	4	0
2009-2010	1	1
2008-2009	3	3
2007-2008	1	3
2006-2007	4	2
2005-2006	1	0
2004-2005	1	1
2003-2004	1	2
2002-2003	0	2
2001-2002	3	0
2000-2001	1	0
1999-2000	3	0
1998-1999	1	1
1997-1998	3	0
1996-1997	1	0
1995-1996	0	1
1994-1995	0	2
1993-1994	0	0
1992-1993	1	0
1991-1992	0	1

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Thomas joined the 6-3 majority and authored a concurring opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), holding that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Associate Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion, joined by Associate Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). In the majority opinion, Alito wrote:^[27]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that all of the Court's substantive due process precedents needed reconsideration, including cases establishing the constitutional right to privacy for married couples regarding contraception, invalidating state laws criminalizing anal and/or oral sex between consenting adults, and protecting the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples:^[27]

“	... [I]n future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any substantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,” we have a duty to “correct the error” established in those precedents. After overruling these demonstrably erroneous decisions, the question would remain whether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myriad rights that our substantive due process cases have generated. For example, we could consider whether any of the rights announced in this Court’s substantive due process cases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. To answer that question, we would need to decide important antecedent questions, including whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects any rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution and, if so, how to identify those rights. That said, even if the Clause does protect unenumerated rights, the Court conclusively demonstrates that abortion is not one of them under any plausible interpretive approach.^[3]	”
—Justice Clarence Thomas

SCOTUS 2005 term (Click to expand)

Supervised release (2019)

See also: Mont v. United States

Thomas authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Mont v. United States (2019), holding that Mont's supervised release was tolled under 18 U.S.C. §3624(e), which says a "term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a . . . crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."^[28] Thomas was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh. Thomas wrote:^[29]

“

This case requires the Court to decide whether a convicted criminal’s period of supervised release is tolled—in effect, paused—during his pretrial detention for a new criminal offense. ... Given the text and statutory context of §3624(e), we conclude that if the court’s later imposed sentence credits the period of pretrial detention as time served for the new offense, then the pretrial detention also tolls the supervised-release period.^[3]

”

Use of force overcoming robbery victim's resistance deemed a violent felony under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) (2019)

See also: Stokeling v. United States

state robbery offense that has as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it necessitates the use of “physical force.”

Thomas authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Stokeling v. United States (2019) holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) "elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that requires the defendant to overcome the victim’s resistance." Thomas was joined in the majority by Justices Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Thomas wrote:^[30]

“

'Physical force,' or 'force capable of causing physical pain or injury,' Johnson, 559 U. S., at 140, includes the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance. Robbery under Florida law corresponds to that level of force and therefore qualifies as a 'violent felony' under ACCA’s elements clause. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit.^[3]

”

Nevada v. Hall overturned, states immune from suits in other states' courts (2019)

Thomas authored a 5-4 majority opinion in this case that overturned Nevada V. Hall (1979), which allowed states to be haled into other states' courts without their consent. Thomas was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Thomas wrote:^[31]

“

Nevada v. Hall is contrary to our constitutional design and the understanding of sovereign immunity shared by the States that ratified the Constitution. Stare decisis does not compel continued adherence to this erroneous precedent. We therefore overrule Hall and hold that States retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in the courts of other States.^[3]

”

Third-party defendants to counterclaims in state court civil actions cannot remove to federal court (2019)

In Home Depot U.S.A. Inc. v. Jackson (2019), Thomas authored the Court's 5-4 majority opinion, holding that "Home Depot could not remove the class-action claim filed against it" because provisions in 28 U.S. Code §1441(a) and in the CAFA do not permit "removal by a third-party counterclaim defendant." Thomas was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Thomas wrote:^[32]

“

In this case, we address whether either provision allows a third-party counterclaim defendant—that is, a party brought into a lawsuit through a counterclaim filed by the original defendant—to remove the counterclaim filed against it. Because in the context of these removal provisions the term "defendant" refers only to the party sued by the original plaintiff, we conclude that neither provision allows such a third party to remove. ^[3]

”

Kansas death sentence upheld (2006)

Kansas v. Marsh (2006) came on an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States after the Kansas Supreme Court overturned Michael Lee Marsh's II death penalty sentence ordered by the Crawford district court. The state district court found that the equal balance of mitigating factors and aggravating factors in the case—known as equipoise—result in a tie-breaker of implementing the death penalty, in accordance with Kansas state law. After Marsh's sentencing, the state supreme court in State v. Kleypas (2001) held that the state law imposing the death penalty as a tie-breaker was an instructional error in the case, and that "fundamental fairness requires that a "tie goes to the defendant" when life or death is at issue."^[33] With that, the Kansas Supreme Court overturned Marsh's death penalty sentence as unconstitutional.^[34]^[35]

After reviewing the case, SCOTUS reversed the state supreme court in a 5-4 vote, holding that the district court had properly sentenced Marsh in accordance with state law. For the majority, Justice Thomas wrote:^[34]^[35]

“

The dissent’s general criticisms against the death penalty are ultimately a call for resolving all legal disputes in capital cases by adopting the outcome that makes the death penalty more difficult to impose. While such a bright-line rule may be easily applied, it has no basis in law. Indeed, the logical consequence of the dissent’s argument is that the death penalty can only be just in a system that does not permit error. Because the criminal justice system does not operate perfectly, abolition of the death penalty is the only answer to the moral dilemma the dissent poses. This Court, however, does not sit as a moral authority. Our precedents do not prohibit the States from authorizing the death penalty, even in our imperfect system. And those precedents do not empower this Court to chip away at the States’ prerogatives to do so on the grounds the dissent invokes today.^[3]

”

In his dissent, Justice David Souter wrote:^[34]^[35]

“

In Kansas, when a jury applies the State’s own standards of relative culpability and cannot decide that a defendant is among the most culpable, the state law says that equivocal evidence is good enough and the defendant must die. A law that requires execution when the case for aggravation has failed to convince the sentencing jury is morally absurd, and the Court’s holding that the Constitution tolerates this moral irrationality defies decades of precedent aimed at eliminating freakish capital sentencing in the United States.^[3]

”

SCOTUS 2000 term (Click to expand)

Freedom of religious speech protected under First Amendment (2001)

See also: Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)

Consistent with the laws of New York, Milford Central School authorized district residents to use its facilities for after-school activities under its community use policy. Two district residents, Stephen and Darleen Fournier, sought approval to use school facilities for a children's Christian organization called the Good News Club. The school denied the Fourniers' request on the basis that the organization's proposed activities including prayer and Bible study constituted a practice of religious worship in violation of the school's community use policy. The club sued the school in federal court alleging that the denial of the club's application violated its rights of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A federal district court awarded summary judgment to the school, holding that "because the school had not allowed other groups providing religious instruction to use its limited public forum, the court held that it could deny the club access without engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding.^[36]
The case Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001) was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Clarence Thomas reversed the Second Circuit's judgment. In his opinion for the court, Justice Thomas held that "when Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."^[37]

SCOTUS 1999 term (Click to expand)

Nebraska law prohibiting dilation and extraction abortion procedure held unconstitutional (2000)

Justice Thomas was a dissenting writer in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), which involved a Nebraska law that banned partial birth abortions, a political term first coined by the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) in 1995 in order to describe a medical procedure to remove fetuses from the womb, also known as dilation and extraction.^[38] The Supreme Court of the United States majority ruled that the Nebraska law was unconstitutional in placing an undue burden upon a pregnant person's right to an abortion and because there was no exception for cases in which the pregnant person's health was threatened. For the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote:^[39]^[40]

“	In sum, using this law some present prosecutors and future Attorneys General may choose to pursue physicians who use D&E procedures, the most commonly used method for performing previability second trimester abortions. All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. The result is an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision. We must consequently find the statute unconstitutional.^[3]	”
—Justice Stephen Breyer

Thomas' dissenting opinion argued that while the Constitution defined the right to an abortion, it did not define how a state must regulate those abortions. In the conclusion of his dissent, he wrote:^[39]^[40]

“	We were reassured repeatedly in Casey that not all regulations of abortion are unwarranted and that the States may express profound respect for fetal life. Under Casey, the regulation before us today should easily pass constitutional muster. But the Court's abortion jurisprudence is a particularly virulent strain of constitutional exegesis. And so today we are told that 30 States are prohibited from banning one rarely used form of abortion that they believe to border on infanticide. It is clear that the Constitution does not compel this result.^[3]	”
—Justice Clarence Thomas

In 2003, President George W. Bush (R) signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act into law, prohibiting physicians from performing intact dilation and extraction abortion procedure. The law was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) ^[38]

Samuel Alito

See also: Samuel Alito

Since he joined the court through the 2023-2024 term, Alito authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision 27 times and authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision 12 times. The table below details these cases by year.^[41]

Samuel Alito noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	27	12
2023-2024	1	0
2022-2023	0	2
2021-2022	0	0
2020-2021	0	1
2019-2020	2	1
2018-2019	2	0
2017-2018	3	2
2016-2017	0	0
2015-2016	0	1
2014-2015	3	1
2013-2014	2	0
2012-2013	5	2
2011-2012	1	0
2010-2011	0	1
2009-2010	3	1
2008-2009	1	0
2007-2008	1	0
2006-2007	3	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

Clean Water Act does not authorize the EPA to include end-result requirements (2024)

Justice Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, holding that challenged end-result permitting provisions exceeded the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority under the Clean Water Act. Alito was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. For the majority, Alito wrote:^[42]

“

The EPA may itself determine what a facility should do to protect water quality, and the Agency has ample tools to obtain whatever information it needs to make that determination. If the EPA does its work, our holding should have no adverse effect on water quality.^[3]

”

Non-citizens may not cancel removal orders in absentia lacking time and date details (2024)

See also: Campos-Chaves v. Garland

Alito authored a 5-4 opinion in Campos-Chaves v. Garland, holding, "Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)."^[43] Alito was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Alito wrote:^[43]

“	Today’s decision does not mean that the Government is free of its obligation to provide an NTA. That document has an important place within the statutory scheme because it contains information that aliens may need to present their case, including the conduct for which they are charged and the provisions of law they allegedly violated. See§§1229(a)(1)(A)–(E). Although an alien who receives only paragraph (2) notice must still attend the hearing or face in absentia removal, he can raise issues regarding incomplete notice at that time. That gives the immigration judge a chance to reschedule the hearing to cure any prejudice from the missing information. But §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) does not allow aliens to seek rescission of removal orders in perpetuity based on arguments they could have raised in a hearing that they chose to skip.^[3]	”
—Justice Samuel Alito

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Alito authored a 6-3 majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). For the majority, Alito wrote:^[44]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

Preemption and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (2020)

See also: Kansas v. Garcia

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Kansas v. Garcia (2020), holding the Kansas statutes under which respondents Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales, and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were convicted "are not expressly preempted."^[45] Alito was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. For the majority, Alito wrote:^[45]

“	Kansas law makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud to obtain a benefit. Respondents—three aliens who are not authorized to work in this country—were convicted under these provisions for fraudulently using another person’s Social Security number on state and federal tax-withholding forms that they submitted when they obtained employment. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 100 Stat. 3359, expressly preempts the Kansas statutes at issue insofar as they provide a basis for these prosecutions. We reject this reading of the provision in question, as well as respondents’ alternative arguments based on implied preemption. We therefore reverse.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

Suing federal agents in a personal capacity did not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting (2019)

See also: Hernandez v. Mesa

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Hernandez v. Mesa (2019), holding the plaintiffs could not sue a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agent for damages under the U.S. Constitution and that the Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics (1971) (Bivens) holding did not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting. Alito was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh.^[46]

“	... a claim based on a cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new. Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications. In addition, Congress has been notably hesitant to create claims based on allegedly tortious conduct abroad. Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field. When evaluating whether to extend Bivens, the most important question “is ‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?” The correct “answer most often will be Congress.” That is undoubtedly the answer here.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

SCOTUS 2017 term (Click to expand)

Mandatory detention and the Immigration and Naturalization Act (2019)

See also: Nielsen v. Preap

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Nielsen v. Preap (2019) that ruled that the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act still applies to defendants even if they are not detained immediately after being released from criminal custody. Alito was joined in this decision by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Alito wrote:^[47]

“

In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this mandatory-detention requirement applies only if a covered alien is arrested by immigration officials as soon as he is released from jail. If the alien evades arrest for some short period of time—according to respondents, even 24 hours is too long—the mandatory-detention requirement is inapplicable, and the alien must have an opportunity to apply for release on bond or parole. Four other Circuits have rejected this interpretation of the statute, and we agree that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is wrong. We therefore reverse the judgments below and remand for further proceedings.^[3]

”

Warrantless sobriety blood tests (2019)

See also: Mitchell v. Wisconsin

Alito authored a 5-4 plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, ruling that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test to discern sobriety, a blood test can generally be permitted without a warrant. Alito was joined in this decision by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Alito wrote:^[48]

“

When a breath test is impossible, enforcement of the drunk-driving laws depends upon the administration of a blood test. And when a police officer encounters an unconscious driver, it is very likely that the driver would be taken to an emergency room and that his blood would be drawn for diagnostic purposes even if the police were not seeking BAC information. In addition, police officers most frequently come upon unconscious drivers when they report to the scene of an accident, and under those circumstances, the officers’ many responsibilities—such as attending to other injured drivers or passengers and preventing further accidents—may be incompatible with the procedures that would be required to obtain a warrant. Thus, when a driver is unconscious, the general rule is that a warrant is not needed.^[3]

”

Ohio voter list maintenance and vote suppression claims (2018)

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Husted v. Randolph Institute (2018), ruling that Ohio's methods for maintaining its voter registration rolls did not violate the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) or the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Alito was joined in this decision by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch. For the majority, Alito wrote:^[49]^[50]

“

When Congress clarified the meaning of the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause in HAVA, here is what it said: '[C]onsistent with the [NVRA], . . . no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.' §21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The meaning of these words is straightforward. 'Solely' means 'alone.' And 'by reason of' is a quite formal way of saying '[b]ecause of.' Thus, a State violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause only if it removes registrants for no reason other than their failure to vote . . . Ohio’s Supplemental Process does not strike any registrant solely by reason of the failure to vote. Instead, as expressly permitted by federal law, it removes registrants only when they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a change-of-residence notice.^[3]

”

The power of public-sector unions to collect fees (2018)

See also: Janus v. AFSCME

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in the case Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (2018), overruling the Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) decision which established that agency fees were constitutional, holding that "the State of Illinois’ extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment."^[51] Alito was joined in this decision by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch. For the majority, Alito wrote:^[51]^[52]

“

Abood was poorly reasoned. It has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore overruled.^[3]

”

Racial gerrymander reviewed in Texas redistricting case (2018)

See also: Abbott v. Perez

Alito authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Abbott v. Perez (2018), holding that new representative districts adopted by the Texas State Legislature in 2013 did not violate the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act aside from one district, which was ruled to be a racial gerrymander. Alito was joined in this decision by Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch. For the majority, Alito wrote:^[53]^[54]

“

Texas does not dispute that race was the predominant factor in the design of HD90, but it argues that this was permissible because it had 'good reasons to believe' that this was necessary to satisfy Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' ... Perhaps Texas could have made a stronger showing, but it is the State's burden to prove narrow tailoring, and it did not do so on the record before us. We hold that HD90 is an impermissible racial gerrymander. On remand, the District Court will have to consider what if any remedy is appropriate at this time.^[3]

”

SCOTUS 2010 term (Click to expand)

Westboro Baptist Church picketing case (2011)

In 2011, Samuel Alito was the lone dissenter in Snyder v. Phelps (2011), a case involving the Westboro Baptist Church's frequent picketing of military funerals. Chief Justice John Roberts summarized in the majority opinion, "The church’s congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals."^[55] The church picketed Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder's military funeral. Afterward, Snyder's family sued the church and founder Fred Phelps for defamation, invasion of privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court's majority affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling in favor of Westboro Baptist Church allowing them to picket a funeral so long as it fell within the defined rules of a legal protest. Justice Alito dissented from the majority, writing:^[55]

“

Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.^[3]

”

He wrote that the Westboro Baptist Church publicized the funeral, depriving Snyder of his basic right to bury his son in peace. He concluded that the Westboro Baptist Church picketers acted to cause intentional infliction of emotional distress, emphasizing the manner in which the church specifically verbally addressed the Snyder family and not broader topics. Alito said that the church had the right to make its positions known in any form of communication, but:^[55]

“

It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate. ... Because I cannot agree either with the holding of this Court or the other grounds on which the Court of Appeals relied, I would reverse the decision below and remand for further proceedings.^[3]

”

SCOTUS 2009 term (Click to expand)

Second Amendment ruling in Heller extended to states (2010)

In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the District's handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. Local laws in Washington, D.C., however, were subject to the authority of the federal government, which left open the question of whether the Second Amendment applied to state governments. Pursuant to the court's opinion in Heller, lawsuits were filed against similar handgun bans in Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois in the case McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010). The question for the Court was whether the 14th Amendment made the Second Amendment binding on state governments as well. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Samuel Alito adopted the Heller rationale in holding that the right to self-defense under the Second Amendment was a fundamental right under the Constitution and was entitled to protection against encroachment by state governments:^[56]

“	In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense. Unless considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and the States. See Duncan, 391 U. S., at 149, and n. 14. We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.^[3]	”
—Justice Samuel Alito

Sonia Sotomayor

See also: Sonia Sotomayor

Since she joined the court through the 2022-2023 term, Sotomayor authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision ten times and authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision 18 times. The table below details these cases by year.^[57]

Sonia Sotomayor noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	10	18
2023-2024	0	0
2022-2023	1	0
2021-2022	1	4
2020-2021	1	4
2019-2020	0	1
2018-2019	1	0
2017-2018	0	0
2016-2017	0	2
2015-2016	0	2
2014-2015	2	2
2013-2014	0	1
2012-2013	1	0
2011-2012	2	2
2010-2011	1	0
2009-2010	0	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

State court deference and federal judicial review (2023)

See also: Cruz v. Arizona

Justice Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Cruz v. Arizona (2023), holding that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision below was not adequately supported in prior state law to preclude federal court review:^[58]

“	In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law, that decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal question. The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g) in a manner that abruptly departed from and directly conflicted with its prior interpretations of that Rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Justice Sotomayor

Dissent in case deciding there is no constitutional right to abortion (2022)

Sotomayor was part of the three-justice dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022). Sotomayor and Associate Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan jointly authored the dissenting opinion. The majority opinion, authored by Associate Justice Samuel Alito, held that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe (1973) and Casey (1992). Alito wrote:^[27]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

The dissenting justices wrote:^[27]

“	Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. ... The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all. ... Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe and Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the decisions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a constitutional right for an individual to make her own choices about “intimate relationships, the family,” and contraception. Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have themselves formed the legal foundation for subsequent decisions protecting these profoundly personal choices. As discussed earlier, the Court relied on Casey to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex intimate relationships. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 23. The Court later invoked the same set of precedents to accord constitutional recognition to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 665–666; supra, at 23. In sum, Roe and Casey are inextricably interwoven with decades of precedent about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra, at 21–24. While the majority might wish it otherwise, Roe and Casey are the very opposite of “‘obsolete constitutional thinking.’” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Casey 505 U. S., at 857). Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have undermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience unplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in pregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous physical, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncomplicated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, unavoidably involving significant physiological change and excruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and childbirth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even death. Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra, at 22. ... With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.^[3]	”
—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan

Scope of judicial review in administrative agencies' actions (2020)

Justice Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board (2020), holding that the Board’s refusal to reopen a prior benefits determination was subject to judicial review. Justice Sotomayor was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor wrote:^[59]

“	It is also worth noting that judicial review of reopening decisions will be limited. The Board’s decision to grant or deny reopening, while guided by substantive criteria, is ultimately discretionary and therefore subject to reversal only for abuse of discretion. See 20 CFR §261.11; Stovic, 826 F. 3d, at 506; Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 370 F. 2d 253, 254 (CA2 1966) (Friendly, J., for the court). Most decisions will be upheld under this deferential standard. See ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 288 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). Judicial review plays a modest, but important, role in guarding against decisions that are arbitrary, inconsistent with the standards set by the Board's own regulations, or otherwise contrary to law.^[3]	”
—Justice Sotomayor

SCOTUS 2013 term (Click to expand)

Crow Tribal Nation's hunting rights survived Wyoming's statehood (2018)

See also: Herrera v. Wyoming

Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Herrera v. Wyoming (2018), holding that the Crow Tribal Nation's hunting rights under an 1868 treaty did not expire upon Wyoming's statehood. Sotomayor was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Neil Gorsuch. Sotomayor wrote:^[60]

“

The Wyoming courts held that the treaty-protected hunting right expired when Wyoming became a State and, in any event, does not permit hunting in Bighorn National Forest because that land is not "unoccupied." We disagree. The Crow Tribe’s hunting right survived Wyoming’s statehood, and the lands within Bighorn National Forest did not become categorically "occupied" when set aside as a national reserve.^[3]

”

Dissent holds that Court ignored key purpose of Equal Protection Clause in affirmative action case (2014)

In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014), Justice Sotomayor wrote the dissenting opinion in the Court's 6-2 ruling upholding a Michigan constitutional amendment banning any preferential selection based on sex or race, also known as affirmative action. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor wrote:^[61]

“

The effect of §26 is that a white graduate of a public Michigan university who wishes to pass his historical privilege on to his children may freely lobby the board of that university in favor of an expanded legacy admissions policy, whereas a Black Michagander who was denied the opportunity to attend that very university cannot lobby the board in favor of a policy that might give his children a chance that he never had and that they might never have absent that policy.^[3]

”

Sotomayor agreed with the majority that Michigan did nothing wrong in following the political process to offer an amendment, but wrote that the issue lies in the amendment itself. She wrote that the amendment takes away the ability of university board members to create admission standards that aid minorities but allows ones that aid athletes and legacies, effectively creating uneven admission standards.^[61]

Elena Kagan

See also: Elena Kagan

Since she joined the court through the 2021 term, Kagan authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision 12 times and had not authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision. The table below details these cases by year.^[62]

Elena Kagan noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	12	0
2021	2	0
2020	2	0
2019	0	0
2018	2	0
2017	1	0
2016	0	0
2015	0	0
2014	1	0
2013	2	0
2012	1	0
2011	1	0
2010	0	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

Dissent in case deciding no right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Kagan was part of the three-justice dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022). Kagan and Associate Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor jointly authored the dissenting opinion. The majority opinion, authored by Associate Justice Samuel Alito, held that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe (1973) and Casey (1992). Alito wrote:^[27]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

The dissenting justices wrote:^[27]

“	Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. ... The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all. ... Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe and Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the decisions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a constitutional right for an individual to make her own choices about “intimate relationships, the family,” and contraception. Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have themselves formed the legal foundation for subsequent decisions protecting these profoundly personal choices. As discussed earlier, the Court relied on Casey to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex intimate relationships. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 23. The Court later invoked the same set of precedents to accord constitutional recognition to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 665–666; supra, at 23. In sum, Roe and Casey are inextricably interwoven with decades of precedent about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra, at 21–24. While the majority might wish it otherwise, Roe and Casey are the very opposite of “‘obsolete constitutional thinking.’” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Casey 505 U. S., at 857). Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have undermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience unplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in pregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous physical, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncomplicated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, unavoidably involving significant physiological change and excruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and childbirth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even death. Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra, at 22. ... With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.^[3]	”
—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan

Judicial remedies for convicted inmates to challenge a state's method of execution (2022)

See also: Nance v. Ward

Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Nance v. Ward (2022), holding that 42 U.S.C. §1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights "remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute."^[63] Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissent, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch.^[63]

In the Court's majority opinion, Kagan wrote:^[63]

“	In several recent decisions, this Court has set out rules for challenging a State’s proposed method of execution under the Eighth Amendment. To prevail on such a claim, a prisoner must identify a readily available alternative method of execution that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain. In doing so, the prisoner is not confined to proposing a method authorized by the executing State’s law; he may instead ask for a method used in other States. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 19). This case concerns the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim. We have held that such a claim can go forward under 42 U. S. C. §1983, rather than in habeas, when the alternative method proposed is already authorized under state law. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, 644–647 (2004). Here, the prisoner has identified an alternative method that is not so authorized. The question presented is whether §1983 is still a proper vehicle. We hold that it is.^[3]	”
—Justice Elena Kagan

The patent law doctrine of assignor estoppel (2021)

Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc. (2021), upholding assignor estoppel and clarifying that the doctrine applies only when the patent assignor-seller’s invalidity claim contradicts explicit or implicit representations they made when assigning the patent. Kagan was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.^[64]

Kagan wrote:^[64]

“

In Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924), this Court approved the “well settled” patent-law doctrine of “assignor estoppel.” That doctrine, rooted in an idea of fair dealing, limits an inventor’s ability to assign a patent to another for value and later contend in litigation that the patent is invalid. The question presented here is whether to discard this century-old form of estoppel. Continuing to see value in the doctrine, we decline to do so. But in upholding assignor estoppel, we clarify that it reaches only so far as the equitable principle long understood to lie at its core. The doctrine applies when, but only when, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations he made in assigning the patent.

... This Court recognized assignor estoppel a century ago, and we reaffirm that judgment today. But as the Court recognized from the beginning, the doctrine is not limitless. Its boundaries reflect its equitable basis: to prevent an assignor from warranting one thing and later alleging another. Assignor estoppel applies when an invalidity defense in an infringement suit conflicts with an explicit or implicit representation made in assigning patent rights. But absent that kind of inconsistency, an invalidity defense raises no concern of fair dealing—so assignor estoppel has no place.

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]

”

—Justice Elena Kagan

A reckless offense cannot qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (2021)

See also: Borden v. United States

Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Borden v. United States (2021), holding that a reckless offense cannot qualify as a violent felony if it only requires a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. Kagan was joined in the majority by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.^[65]

Kagan wrote:^[65]

“	The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a gun who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The question here is whether a criminal offense can count as a violent felony if it requires only a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. We hold that a reckless offense cannot so qualify. ... Offenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA. They do not require, as ACCA does, the active employment of force against another person. And they are not the stuff of armed career criminals. The judgment below is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Justice Elena Kagan

SCOTUS 2014 term (Click to expand)

SORNA's delegation is constitutional (2018)

See also: Gundy v. United States

In Gundy v. United States (2018), Kagan authored a 5-3 majority opinion in this case that affirmed the U.S. Attorney General's delegated power from Congress to specify the applicability of SORNA’s registration requirements to sex offenders convicted before SORNA was enacted. Kagan wrote:^[66]

“	Indeed, if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.^[3]	”
—Justice Elena Kagan

Panetti Eighth Amendment precedent prohibits execution of certain prisoners (2018)

See also: Madison v. Alabama

Kagan authored the 5-3 majority opinion of the Court in Madison v. Alabama (2018), ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing prisoners with psychosis or dementia such that they are unable to understand the reason for their execution. Kagan was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Kagan wrote:^[67]

“

The sole question on which Madison’s competency depends is whether he can reach a 'rational understanding' of why the State wants to execute him. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958. In answering that question—on which we again express no view, see supra, at 6—the state court may not rely on any arguments or evidence tainted with the legal errors we have addressed. And because that is so, the court should consider whether it needs to supplement the existing record. Some evidence in that record, including portions of the experts’ reports and testimony, expressly reflects an incorrect view of the relevance of delusions or memory; still other evidence might have implicitly rested on those same misjudgments. The state court, we have little doubt, can evaluate such matters better than we. It must do so as the first step in assessing Madison’s competency—and ensuring that if he is to be executed, he understands why.^[3]

”

Supreme Court upholds Brulotte rule on royalties for expired patents (2014)

In 1997, Stephen Kimble sued Marvel Enterprises Inc., later Marvel Entertainment LLC, for patent violation after Marvel produced a Spider-Man toy that was similar to a patented design held by Kimble. In 2001, Kimble and Marvel settled out of court with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties without an expiration. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed. Five years later, in 2006, Marvel had a licensing agreement with Hasbro giving Hasbro the right to produce the toy. Kimble sued Marvel, claiming the original patent would be infringed if royalties weren't paid. A federal district court, acting on the determination of a federal magistrate judge, awarded summary judgment to Marvel in holding that the 2001 settlement agreement between Kimble and Marvel was subject to the U.S. Supreme Court's Brulotte rule. The rule was developed in the court's opinion in Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964). In Brulotte, the Court ruled, "when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit."^[68] The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, and Kimble appealed to SCOTUS in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment.

On June 22, 2015, the Court held that patent holders could not charge royalties for their invention after the patent term has expired, and that they would not overrule Brulotte, adhering to stare decisis.^[69] Writing for the six-justice majority, Justice Kagan wrote:^[70]

“

Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers, but only for a limited time.

... As against this superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a superspecial justification to warrant reversing Brulotte. But the kinds of reasons we have most often held sufficient in the past do not help Kimble here. If anything, they reinforce our unwillingness to do what he asks.

... What we can decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly. Cf. S. Lee and S. Ditko, Amazing Fantasy No. 15: “Spider-Man,” p. 13 (1962) (“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility”). Finding many reasons for staying the stare decisis course and no “special justification” for departing from it, we decline Kimble’s invitation to overrule Brulotte.^[3]

”

—Justice Elena Kagan

SCOTUS 2012 term (Click to expand)

Dissent holds that Court's arbitration ruling shielded companies from antitrust liability (2013)

Justice Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion in the case of American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013). Italian Colors Restaurant and a group of merchants brought a class-action lawsuit against credit card company American Express, alleging that American Express' Card Acceptance Agreement violated U.S. antitrust law by using monopoly power to leverage merchants into accepting credit cards at higher rates than competitors' credit card fees.^[71] American Express' acceptance agreement forbid class-action lawsuits and compelled arbitration. The Court agreed, holding that the arbitration agreement preventing class or collective arbitration was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) "even if the proposed class of plaintiffs proves that it would be economically infeasible for individuals to pursue arbitration on their own."^[71] Justice Antonin Scalia authored the opinion for the 5-3 majority.^[72]

In her dissent, Kagan wrote:^[71]

“

So if the arbitration clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from anti-trust liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.

And here is the nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.

That answer is a betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws.

... In short, the Court does not consider—and does not decide—Italian Colors's (and similarly situated litigants') actual argument about why the effective-vindication rule precludes this agreement's enforcement.

As a result, Amex's contract will succeed in depriving Italian Colors of any effective opportunity to challenge monopolistic conduct allegedly in violation of the Sherman Act. The FAA, the majority says, so requires. Do not be fooled. Only the Court so requires; the FAA was never meant to produce this outcome. The FAA conceived of arbitration as a “method of resolving disputes”—a way of using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U. S., at 481 (emphasis added). In the hands of today's majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability. The Court thus undermines the FAA no less than it does the Sherman Act and other federal statutes providing rights of action. I respectfully dissent.^[3]

”

—Justice Kagan

SCOTUS 2011 term (Click to expand)

Juveniles convicted of homicide cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole (2012)

On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in two consolidated cases, Miller v. Alabama (2012) and Jackson v. Hobbs (2012). Both cases concerned lower court rulings in which a juvenile defendant was convicted for capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Kagan held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbade mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide. In noting that children are different from adults under the Constitution for sentencing purposes, the Court held that life without parole was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles, but not for adult offenders:^[73]

Neil Gorsuch

See also: Neil Gorsuch

Since he joined the court through the 2023-2024 term, Gorsuch authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision fifteen times and authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision six times. The table below details these cases by year.^[74]

Neil Gorsuch noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	15	6
2023-2024	2	0
2022-2023	3	1
2021-2022	1	3
2020-2021	0	0
2019-2020	1	0
2018-2019	3	1
2017-2018	5	1

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

Medicaid patients may not sue state for excluding qualified health care provider (2025)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 6-3 majority opinion in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (2025), holding that Medicaid patients' freedom of choice to select a qualified health care provider does not allow them to sue a state excluding that provider from its Medicaid program as a way of enforcing their individual rights. The ruling allowed states to exclude qualified health care provider Planned Parenthood from their Medicaid programs because it provides abortion procedures, even if patients were not seeking an abortion. He wrote:^[75]

“	These rules vindicate separation of powers. ... First enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, §1983 allows private parties to sue state actors who violate their “rights” under “the Constitution and laws” of the United States. But federal statutes do not confer “rights” enforceable under §1983 “as a matter of course.” Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599U. S. 166, 183 (2023). That is particularly true of statutes,like Medicaid, enacted pursuant to Congress’s spendingpower. The spending power allows Congress to offer fundsto States that agree to certain conditions. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207–208 (1987). But when a State violates those conditions, “ ‘the typical remedy’ ” is nota private enforcement suit “ ‘but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.’ ” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 280 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451U. S. 1, 28 (1981)). ... Though it is rare enough for any statute to confer an enforceable right, spending-power statutes like Medicaid are especially unlikely to do so.^[3]	”
—Justice Gorsuch

U.S. military reservists called to active duty during national emergency are entitled to differential pay (2025)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Feliciano v. Department of Transportation (2025), holding that a federal civilian employee called to active duty according to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” is entitled to differential pay without having to prove that their service was substantively connected to some particular emergency. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.^[76]

“	(a) Several considerations support this interpretation. First, the word 'during' normally 'denotes a temporal link' and means 'contemporaneous with.' United States v. Ressam, 553 U. S. 272, 274–275. It does not generally imply any substantive connection. Absent evidence that Congress intended a specialized meaning, those governed by law are entitled to rely on its ordinary meaning.^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

Voluntary-departure deadline extends to next business day (2025)

See also: Velazquez v. Bondi

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Velazquez v. Bondi (2025), in which the Court held that if a voluntary-departure deadline falls on a weekend or legal holiday, it is extended to the next business day. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.^[77]

“

Does every calendar day count? Or does the statute operate to extend a deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day?

In truth, the statute is susceptible to both understandings. ... But here, evidence suggesting the possibility of specialized meaning does exist. In legal settings, the term ‘days’ is often understood to extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. ... The question before us thus boils down to whether §1229c(b)(2) uses the term ‘days’ in its ordinary or specialized sense.

To resolve that question, we turn to one of this Court’s customary interpretive tools. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a ‘longstanding administrative construction,’ this Court generally presumes the new provision should be understood to work in harmony with what has come before.

That presumption is all but dispositive here. For many years, Congress has authorized the executive branch to draw up regulations to enforce the immigration laws. See 8 U. S. C. §1103(a)(3). And since at least the 1950s, those regulations have provided that, when calculating the deadline for the ‘taking of any action,’ the term ‘day’ carries its specialized meaning by excluding Sundays and legal holidays if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. 8 CFR §1.1(a)(6) (1958) (emphasis added). In all the years since, the only notable change to this rule has been the addition of Saturdays to the list of excluded days. 52 Fed. Reg. 2935 (1987). Congress adopted §1229c(b)(2) against the backdrop of this consistent, longstanding administrative construction. And, given that, we presume the statute employs the same understanding.^[3]

”

—Justice Neil Gorsuch

Purdue Pharma bankruptcy settlement overturned, Sackler family not released from criminal liability (2024)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (2024), holding that the U.S. "bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants."^[78] Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.^[78]

“	As important as the question we decide today are ones we do not. Nothing in what we have said should be construed to call into question consensual third-party releases offered in connection with a bankruptcy reorganization plan; those sorts of releases pose different questions and may rest on different legal grounds than the nonconsensual release at issue here... Nor do we have occasion today to express a view on what qualifies as a consensual release or pass upon a plan that provides for the full satisfaction of claims against a third-party nondebtor. Additionally, because this case involves only a stayed reorganization plan, we do not address whether our reading of the bankruptcy code would justify unwinding reorganization plans that have already become effective and been substantially consummated. Confining ourselves to the question presented, we hold only that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants. Because the Second Circuit ruled otherwise, its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

California’s Proposition 12 did not violate the dormant commerce clause (2023)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 plurality opinion in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023); the Court dismissed the challenge against California’s Proposition 12, holding that the state proposition did not violate the dormant commerce clause. Gorsuch was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Amy Coney Barrett.^[79]

“	Petitioners would have us cast aside caution for boldness. They have failed—repeatedly—to persuade Congress to use its express Commerce Clause authority to adopt a uniform rule for pork production. And they disavow any reliance on this Court’s core dormant Commerce Clause teachings focused on discriminatory state legislation. Instead, petitioners invite us to endorse two new theories of implied judicial power. They would have us recognize an “almost per se” rule against the enforcement of state laws that have “extraterritorial effects”—even though this Court has recognized since Gibbons that virtually all state laws create ripple effects beyond their borders. Alternatively, they would have us prevent a State from regulating the sale of an ordinary consumer good within its own borders on nondiscriminatory terms—even though the Pike line of cases they invoke has never before yielded such a result. Like the courts that faced this case before us, we decline both of petitioners’ incautious invitations.^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

Bank Secrecy Act’s maximum penalty for non-willful failure to file a compliant report accrues per report (2023)

See also: Bittner v. United States

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Bittner v. United States (2023), in which the Court held that the Bank Secrecy Act’s maximum penalty for the non-willful failure to file a compliant report accrues per report, rather than per account. Justice Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Gorsuch wrote:^[80]

“	Best read, the BSA treats the failure to file a legally compliant report as one violation carrying a maximum penalty of $10,000, not a cascade of such penalties calculated on a per-account basis. Because the Fifth Circuit thought otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

State registration statute does not violate out-of-state businesses' Due Process Clause (2023)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. (2023), holding that Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 controlled the case and remained the law, holding that lawsuits based on the defendant's consent to jurisdiction does not deny them due process of law. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.^[81]

“	Pennsylvania Fire held that suits premised on these grounds do not deny a defendant due process of law. Mr. Mallory no longer lives in Pennsylvania and his cause of action did not accrue there. But none of that makes any difference. To decide this case, the Court need not speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would suffice to establish consent to suit. It is enough to acknowledge that the state law and facts before the Court fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire’s rule. In the proceedings below, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed to recognize that Pennsylvania Fire dictated an answer in Mr. Mallory’s favor but ruled for Norfolk Southern because, in its view, intervening decisions from this Court had “implicitly overruled” Pennsylvania Fire. See 266 A. 3d, at 559, 567. That was error. As this Court has explained: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,” as Pennsylvania Fire does here, a lower court “should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484. This is true even if the lower court thinks the precedent is in tension with “some other line of decisions.”^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Gorsuch joined the 6-3 majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Associate Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion, which was also joined by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Alito wrote:^[27]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

Gaming regulation on tribal lands, sovereign authority of Native American tribal nations (2022)

Justice Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas (2022), holding that the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act (1987) functions as a federal ban on gaming activities occurring on tribal lands that are also banned in Texas. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Amy Coney Barrett.^[82]

In the court's majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:^[82]

“	Native American Tribes possess “inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U. S. 505, 509 (1991). Under our Constitution, treaties, and laws, Congress too bears vital responsibilities in the field of tribal affairs. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 200 (2004). From time to time, Congress has exercised its authority to allow state law to apply on tribal lands where it otherwise would not. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976); Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945). In this case, Texas contends that Congress expressly ordained that all of its gaming laws should be treated as surrogate federal law enforceable on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reservation. In the end, however, we find no evidence Congress endowed state law with anything like the power Texas claims. ... Texas contends that Congress in the Restoration Act has allowed all of its state gaming laws to act as surrogate federal law on tribal lands. The Fifth Circuit took the same view in Ysleta I and in the proceedings below. That understanding of the law is mistaken. The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. To allow the Fifth Circuit to revise its precedent and reconsider this case in the correct light, its judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]	”
—Justice Neil Gorsuch

State court jurisdiction in lands deemed to be Indian Country (2020)

See also: McGirt v. Oklahoma

Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020), holding that under the Indian Major Crimes Act, lands reserved for the Creek Nation in eastern Oklahoma constituted Indian Country. As a result, the state of Oklahoma could not legally try a Creek citizen for criminal conduct in state court. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.^[83]

“	Today we are asked whether the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. Because Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word. ... But, in seeking to defend the state-court judgment below, Oklahoma has put aside whatever procedural defenses it might have and asked us to confirm that the land once given to the Creeks is no longer a reservation today. ... Under our Constitution, States have no authority to reduce federal reservations lying within their borders. ... Likewise, courts have no proper role in the adjustment of reservation borders. ... The relevant statute expressly contemplates private land ownership within reservation boundaries. Nor under the statute’s terms does it matter whether these individual parcels have passed hands to non-Indians. To the contrary, this Court has explained repeatedly that Congress does not disestablish a reservation simply by allowing the transfer of individual plots, whether to Native Americans or others. ... Now, the State points to historical practices and demographics ... to prove disestablishment. ... But Oklahoma does not point to any ambiguous language in any of the relevant statutes that could plausibly be read as an Act of disestablishment. Nor may a court favor contemporaneous or later practices instead of the laws Congress passed. As Solem explained, “[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.” 465 U. S., at 470 (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909)). ... In conjunction with the MCA, §1151(a) not only sends to federal court certain major crimes committed by Indians on reservations. Two doors down, in §1151(c), the statute does the same for major crimes committed by Indians on “Indian allotments, the Indian titles of which have not been extinguished.” ... The MCA applies to Oklahoma according to its usual terms: Only the federal government, not the State, may prosecute Indians for major crimes committed in Indian country.^[3]	”
—Justice Gorsuch

Legal standards for challenging state execution methods (2019)

See also: Bucklew v. Precythe

Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe (2019), involving a death-row inmate's allegations that the state’s execution method constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violating their Eighth Amendment protections. The Court held that the inmate's claim did not meet the burden of proof required—to show (1) that a feasible and readily implemented alternative method existed and, (2) that the state refused to use the method without a good reason. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh. Gorsuch wrote:^[84]

“	In sum, even if execution by nitrogen hypoxia were a feasible and readily implemented alternative to the State’s chosen method, Mr. Bucklew has still failed to present any evidence suggesting that it would significantly reduce his risk of pain. For that reason as well, the State was entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment claim. ... The people of Missouri, the surviving victims of Mr. Bucklew’s crimes, and others like them deserve better. Even the principal dissent acknowledges that “the long delays that now typically occur between the time an offender is sentenced to death and his execution” are “excessive.” ... If litigation is allowed to proceed, federal courts “can and should” protect settled state judgments from “undue interference” by invoking their “equitable powers” to dismiss or curtail suits that are pursued in a “dilatory” fashion or based on “speculative” theories.^[3]	”
—Justice Gorsuch

Residual clause deemed unconstitutionally vague (2019)

See also: United States v. Davis

Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in United States v. Davis (2019) rejecting the government's argument that lower courts should adopt a case-specific approach when considering cases involving crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) governing penalties. The Court held that this rule, the residual clause, was unconstitutionally vague. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Gorsuch wrote:^[85]

“	It might have been a good idea for Congress to have written a residual clause for §924(c) using a case-specific approach. It doesn’t tell us whether Congress actually wrote such a clause. To answer that question, we need to examine the statute’s text, context, and history. And when we do that, it becomes clear that the statute simply cannot support the government's newly minted case-specific theory.^[3]	”
—Justice Gorsuch

Mandatory five-year sentence unconstitutional (2019)

See also: United States v. Haymond

Gorsuch authored a 5-4 majority opinion in United States v. Haymond (2019), ruling that portions of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) requiring a judge to sentence someone violating supervised release to five years imprisonment was unconstitutional. Gorsuch was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion. Gorsuch wrote:^[86]

“	Only a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a person’s liberty. ... Yet in this case a congressional statute compelled a federal judge to send a man to prison for a minimum of five years without empaneling a jury of his peers or requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As applied here, we do not hesitate to hold that the statute violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.^[3]	”
—Justice Gorsuch

Brett Kavanaugh

See also: Brett Kavanaugh

Since he joined the court through the 2022 term, Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision ten times and has not authored a dissent in a 8-1 decision. The table below details these cases by year.

Brett Kavanaugh noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	10	0
2022-2023	2	0
2021-2022	1	0
2020-2021	1	0
2019-2020	4	0
2018-2019	2	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

Alabama may not enforce an administrative-exhaustion rule (2024)

Justice Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Williams v. Reed, holding that state courts cannot require plaintiffs to complete all state administrative processes before filing a lawsuit if those delays are the basis of the legal challenge. The decision clarified the role of courts in reviewing administrative delays and limited procedural requirements that could prevent timely legal review. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson. Kavanaugh wrote:^[87]

“

Alabama’s exhaustion requirement operates to immunize state officials from a narrow class of claims brought under §1983—namely, claims of unlawful delay in the administrative process. Under Alabama’s exhaustion requirement, state courts cannot review claims of unlawful delays under §1983 unless and until the claimants first complete the administrative process and receive a final decision on their claims. In essence, Alabama has said that to challenge delays in the administrative process under §1983, you first have to exhaust the administrative process. Of course, that means that you can never challenge delays in the administrative process. That catch-22 prevents the claimants here from obtaining a merits resolution of their §1983 claims in state court and in effect immunizes state officials from those kinds of §1983 suits for injunctive relief.

The Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the State’s administrative-exhaustion requirement for unemployment benefits claims to in effect immunize the Alabama Secretary of Labor from §1983 due process suits alleging that the Department has unlawfully delayed in processing benefits claims. By affording immunity from those claims, the Alabama ruling contravenes this Court’s §1983 precedents. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.^[3]

”

—Justice Brett Kavanaugh

Water rights dispute on the Colorado River (2023)

See also: Arizona v. Navajo Nation

Justice Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Arizona v. Navajo Nation. The Court ruled that although the 1868 treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation—the Treaty of Bosque Redondo—reserved necessary water for the Navajo Nation, it did not require the United States to secure the water for them. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett. Kavanaugh wrote:^[88]

“	Fourth, the Tribe argues that, in 1868, the Navajos would have understood the treaty to mean that the United States must take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe. But the text of the treaty says nothing to that effect. And the historical record does not suggest that the United States agreed to undertake affirmative efforts to secure water for the Navajos—any more than the United States agreed to farm land, mine minerals, harvest timber, build roads, or construct bridges on the reservation. The record of the treaty negotiations makes no mention of any waterrelated obligations of the United States at all. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians With a Record of the Discussions That Led to Its Signing.^[3]	”
—Justice Brett Kavanaugh

District courts must stay proceedings during an ongoing interlocutory appeal (2023)

See also: Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski

Justice Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, holding that "[a] district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. Kavanaugh wrote:^[89]

“	When a federal district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the losing party has a statutory right to an interlocutory appeal. See 9 U. S. C. §16(a). The sole question here is whether the district court must stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal is ongoing. The answer is yes: The district court must stay its proceedings. ... If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. That potential for coercion is especially pronounced in class actions, where the possibility of colossal liability can lead to what Judge Friendly called “blackmail settlements.”^[3]	”
—Justice Brett Kavanaugh

State government can prosecute non-Natives committing crimes against Native Americans on Native land (2022)

See also: Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta (2022), holding that "the federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country."^[90] Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Amy Coney Barrett. In the court's majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:^[90]

“

This case presents a jurisdictional question about the prosecution of crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country: Under current federal law, does the Federal Government have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute those crimes? Or do the Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute those crimes? We conclude that the Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.

... the Worcester-era understanding of Indian country as separate from the State was abandoned later in the 1800s. After that change, Indian country in each State became part of that State’s territory. But Congress did not alter the General Crimes Act to make federal criminal jurisdiction exclusive in Indian country. To this day, the text of the General Crimes Act still does not make federal jurisdiction exclusive or preempt state jurisdiction.

... In particular, a state prosecution of a crime committed by a non-Indian against an Indian would not deprive the tribe of any of its prosecutorial authority. That is because, with exceptions not invoked here, Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians such as Castro-Huerta, even when non-Indians commit crimes against Indians in Indian country. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435U. S. 191, 195 (1978). Moreover, a state prosecution of a non-Indian does not involve the exercise of state power over any Indian or over any tribe. The only parties to the criminal case are the State and the non-Indian defendant. Therefore, as has been recognized, any tribal self-government “justification for preemption of state jurisdiction” would be “problematic.” American Indian Law Deskbook §4.8, at 260; see Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U. S., at 148; see also Hicks, 533 U. S.,at 364; McBratney, 104 U. S., at 623–624; Draper, 164 U. S.,at 242–243.^[3]

”

—Justice Brett Kavanaugh

No right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

Kavanaugh joined the 6-3 majority and authored a concurring opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holding that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe and Casey (1992). Alito wrote:^[27]

“	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.^[3]	”
—Justice Alito

In his concurring opinion, Kavanaugh wrote:^[27]

“

The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or morality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution does not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To be sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects unenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as the Court today thoroughly explains.

On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult questions of American social and economic policy that the Constitution does not address.^[3]

”

—Justice Kavanaugh

Standing in class-action lawsuits (2021)

See also: TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, holding that members of the class-action lawsuit whose credit files were not provided to third-party businesses did not suffer a concrete harm from TransUnion's actions and therefore lacked standing to sue under Article III. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. Kavanaugh wrote:^[91]

“	To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, plaintiffs must demonstrate, among other things, that they suffered a concrete harm. No concrete harm, no standing. Central to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms including (as relevant here) reputational harm. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340–341 (2016). In this case, a class of 8,185 individuals sued TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, in federal court under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The plaintiffs claimed that TransUnion failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files, as maintained internally by TransUnion. For 1,853 of the class members, TransUnion provided misleading credit reports to third-party businesses. We conclude that those 1,853 class members have demonstrated concrete reputational harm and thus have Article III standing to sue on the reasonable-procedures claim. The internal credit files of the other 6,332 class members were not provided to third-party businesses during the relevant time period. We conclude that those 6,332 class members have not demonstrated concrete harm and thus lack Article III standing to sue on the reasonable-procedures claim.^[3]	”
—Justice Kavanaugh

Habeas corpus review in cases concerning the death penalty (2020)

See also: McKinney v. Arizona

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in McKinney v. Arizona, holding that a state appellate court, rather than a jury, may conduct a reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances on habeas corpus review in cases concerning the death penalty. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Kavanaugh wrote:^[92]

“

A Clemons reweighing is a permissible remedy for an Eddings error, and when an Eddings error is found on collateral review, a state appellate court may conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral review. McKinney’s argument that a jury must resentence him does not square with Clemons, where the Court held that a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence may be conducted by an appellate court. ... Because Clemons involved an improperly considered aggravating circumstance, McKinney maintains that it is inapposite here, where the case involves an improperly ignored mitigating circumstance. Clemons, however, did not depend on any unique effect of aggravators as distinct from mitigators. For purposes of appellate reweighing, there is no meaningful difference between subtracting an aggravator from one side of the scale and adding a mitigator to the other side. McKinney also argues that Clemons is no longer good law in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, and Hurst v. Florida, where the Court held that a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible.

But that does not mean that a jury is constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate sentencing decision within the relevant sentencing range. ... McKinney notes that the Arizona trial court, not the jury, made the initial aggravating circumstance finding that made him eligible for the death penalty. But McKinney’s case became final on direct review long before Ring and Hurst, which do not apply retroactively on collateral review, ... and the Arizona Supreme Court’s 2018 decision reweighing the aggravators and mitigators did not constitute a reopening of direct review.^[3]

”

—Justice Kavanaugh

Removable offenses in deportation case (2020)

See also: Barton v. Barr

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Barton v. Barr, holding that lawful permanent residents who commit certain crimes cannot obtain cancellation of removal relief under statutory eligibility requirements. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Kavanaugh wrote:^[93]

“	Removal of a lawful permanent resident from the United States is a wrenching process, especially in light of the consequences for family members. Removal is particularly difficult when it involves someone such as Barton who has spent most of his life in the United States. Congress made a choice, however, to authorize removal of non-citizens—even lawful permanent residents—who have committed certain serious crimes. And Congress also made a choice to categorically preclude cancellation of removal for non-citizens who have substantial criminal records. Congress may of course amend the law at any time. In the meantime, the Court is constrained to apply the law as enacted by Congress. Here, as the [Board of Immigration Appeals] explained in its 2006 Jurado-Delgado decision, and as the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have indicated, the immigration laws enacted by Congress do not allow cancellation of removal when a lawful permanent resident has amassed a criminal record of this kind.^[3]	”
—Justice Kavanaugh

Standing in case concerning Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (2020)

See also: Thole v. U.S. Bank

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Thole v. U.S. Bank (2020), holding the plaintiffs did not have standing and would still receive the same amount of monthly benefits regardless of the case's outcome. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch.^[94]

“	We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Thole and Smith have received all of their monthly benefit payments so far, and the outcome of this suit would not affect their future benefit payments. ... The plaintiffs therefore have no concrete stake in this lawsuit.^[3]	”
—Justice Kavanaugh

Public access stations and the First Amendment (2019)

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck (2019) holding that a public access television station was not subject to the First Amendment. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Kavanaugh wrote:^[95]

“

We conclude that operation of public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function. Moreover, a private entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor. In operating the public access channels, MNN is a private actor, not a state actor, and MNN therefore is not subject to First Amendment constraints on its editorial discretion. We reverse in relevant part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.^[3]

”

App store monopolization (2019)

See also: Apple v. Pepper

Kavanaugh authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Apple v. Pepper (2019) ruling that those who purchase apps through Apple's App Store are direct purchasers and can therefore sue Apple for allegedly monopolizing the market and increasing prices. Kavanaugh was joined in the majority by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Kavanaugh wrote:^[96]

“	A claim that a monopolistic retailer (here, Apple) has used its monopoly to overcharge consumers is a classic antitrust claim. But Apple asserts that the consumer plaintiffs in this case may not sue Apple because they supposedly were not “direct purchasers” from Apple under our decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 745–746 (1977). We disagree. The plaintiffs purchased apps directly from Apple and therefore are direct purchasers under Illinois Brick. At this early pleadings stage of the litigation, we do not assess the merits of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against Apple, nor do we consider any other defenses Apple might have. We merely hold that the Illinois Brick direct-purchaser rule does not bar these plaintiffs from suing Apple under the antitrust laws. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.^[3]	”
—Brett Kavanaugh (2019)

Amy Coney Barrett

See also: Amy Coney Barrett

Since she joined the court through the 2021-2022 term, Barrett authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision one time and had not authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision.

The table below details these cases by year.

Amy Coney Barrett noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	1	0
2021-2022	1	0
2020-2021	0	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn (2025)

Justice Coney Barrett authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, holding that under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) §1964(c), a plaintiff can seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss was from a personal injury. Barrett was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil Gorsuch, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.^[97]

“

You can’t replace something with nothing. And aside from its repeated assertions that “injury” means “invasion of a legal right,” Medical Marijuana offers next to nothing about how courts should assess whether the plaintiff has suffered such an invasion.

The proof lies in Medical Marijuana’s own hypotheticals. Unable to identify a guiding principle, it lets pure intuition do the work. It asserts that if a mobster assaults a carwash owner and the owner does “business with the mob” as a result, the owner has suffered a “business or property injury.” ... But why? The business or property loss flowed from an assault on the carwash owner. According to Medical Marijuana, the example works because “[f]orcing someone to do business with the mob instead of a cheaper, legitimate competitor is a prototypical business or property injury.” Ibid. It offers nothing, however, to sup- port this ipse dixit. What makes choosing a more expensive business partner a “prototypical” business injury? And why does this rationale not extend to losing your job, as Horn did after consuming Dixie X? Medical Marijuana does not say.

... Medical Marijuana tries valiantly to engineer a rule that yields its preferred outcomes. (Civil RICO should permit suit against Tony Soprano, but not against an ordinary tortfeasor.) But its textual hook—the word “injured”—does not give it enough to go on. When all is said and done, Medical Marijuana is left fighting the most natural interpretation of the text—that “injured” means “harmed”—with no plausible alternative in hand. That is a battle it cannot win.^[3]

”

—Justice Amy Coney Barrett