Oregon v. Mitchell
 | |
| Oregon v. Mitchell | |
| Reference: 400 U.S. 112 | |
| Term: 1970 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: October 19, 1970 Decided: December 21, 1970 | |
| Outcome | |
| Granted in part and denied in part | |
| Majority | |
| Hugo Black • William Douglas • William Brennan • Byron White • Thurgood Marshall | |
| Dissenting | |
| Warren Burger • John Harlan II • Potter Stewart • Harry Blackmun | |
Oregon v. Mitchell is a case decided on December 21, 1970, by the United States Supreme Court holding that Congress has the authority to regulate voting requirements in federal elections, but not in state and local elections. The case concerned whether the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 infringed on states' constitutional rights. The Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion that ruled in favor of Oregon on the matter of regulating voting requirements for state and local elections.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that Congress has the power to regulate requirements for voting in federal elections, but it is prohibited from regulating requirements in state and local elections. To read more about the impact of Oregon v. Mitchell click here.
Background
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act Amendments in 1970 which lowered the minimum voting age from 21 to 18, prohibited the use of literacy tests in elections for five years, prohibited states from disqualifying voters in federal elections based on state residency requirements, and provided uniform rules for absentee voting in federal elections.
Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, arguing that the amendments infringed on states' constitutional rights.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on October 19, 1970. The case was decided on December 21, 1970.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to rule in favor of Oregon. Justice Hugo Black delivered the plurality opinion of the court. Justice William Douglas filed a separate opinion. Justices John Harlan II, William Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, and Potter Stewart filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun joined Stewart's opinion.[1][2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the court, argued that Congress is granted the power to establish federal election regulations by the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[2]
| “ | In short, the Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that, if Congress became dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress could alter them. [Footnote 5] A newly created national government could hardly have been expected to survive without the ultimate power to rule itself and to fill its offices under its own laws. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, now before this Court, evidence dissatisfaction of Congress with the voting age set by many of the States for national elections. I would hold, as have a long line of decisions in this Court, that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections. [Footnote 6] Similarly, it is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections and to set the qualifications for voters for electors for those offices. It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections. [4] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Black added that, although Congress has the power to establish federal election regulations, the Constitution grants authority to the states to establish their own regulations for state and local elections.[2]
| “ | No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine, within the limits of the Constitution, the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices. Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (194); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1875). Moreover, Art. I, § 2, [Footnote 9] is a clear indication that the Framers intended the States to determine the qualifications of their own voters for state offices, because those qualifications were adopted for federal offices unless Congress directs otherwise under Art. I, § 4. It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people, through constitutional amendments, have specifically narrowed the powers of the States. Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, and Twenty-four, each of which has assumed that the States had general supervisory power over state elections, are examples of express limitations on the power of the States to govern themselves. [4] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in Oregon v. Mitchel[2] | ||
The second claim brought in this suit was against the ban on literacy tests in all federal, state, and local elections for five years. Black argued that the ban on literacy tests was constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes that the right to vote should not be denied on account of race. The Enforcement Clause grants power to Congress to enforce this amendment through legislation.
| “ | I would hold that the literacy test ban of the 1970 Amendments is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that it supersedes Arizona's conflicting statutes under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. In enacting the literacy test ban of Title II, Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race. [4] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
The final claim in this suit was against the amendment to ban state residency requirements in presidential and vice presidential elections and to establish uniform absentee voting regulations for federal elections. Black contended that the amendment was constitutional because Congress has the authority to regulate federal elections.
| “ | In enacting these regulations, Congress was attempting to insure a fully effective voice to all citizens in national elections. What I said in 400 U. S. Acting under its broad authority to create and maintain a national government, Congress unquestionably has power under the Constitution to regulate federal elections. The Framers of our Constitution were vitally concerned with setting up a national government that could survive. Essential to the survival and to the growth of our national government is its power to fill its elective offices and to insure that the officials who fill those offices are as responsive as possible to the will of the people whom they represent. [4] | ” |
| —Hugo Black, majority opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Concurring and dissenting opinions
Justice William Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 should be applicable to all elections, including those at the state and local levels of government. Douglas referenced the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which establishes that all citizens should maintain equal protection of their privileges and rights under the law. He concurred with Black's opinion that the ban on literacy tests and state residency requirements for federal elections was valid.[2]
| “ | It is a reasoned judgment that those who have such a large 'stake' in modern elections as 18-year-olds, whether, in times of war or peace, should have political equality. As was made plain in the dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 328 U. S. 566 (whose reasoning was approved in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 372 U. S. 379), the Equal Protection Clause does service to protect the right to vote in federal as well as in state elections. I would sustain the choice which Congress has made. [4] | ” |
| —William Douglas, opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Justice John Harlan II concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to establish voter qualifications in federal, state, or local elections. He concurred with Black's opinion that the ban on literacy tests was valid as a method for enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.[2]
| “ | I am of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit, and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections. I find no other source of congressional power to lower the voting age as fixed by state laws, or to alter state laws on residency, registration, and absentee voting, with respect to either state or federal elections. The suspension of Arizona's literacy requirement, however, can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and I would sustain it on that basis. [4] | ” |
| —John Harlan II, opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Justices William Brennan, Byron White, and Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. They argued that Congress has the power to lower the minimum voting age in all elections as a result of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also concurred with Black's opinion that the ban on literacy tests and state residency requirements for federal elections was valid.[2]
| “ | Congress had ample evidence upon which it could have based the conclusion that exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise is wholly unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 653-656. If discrimination is unnecessary to promote any legitimate state interest, it is plainly unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has ample power to forbid it under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We would uphold § 302 of the 1970 Amendments as a legitimate exercise of congressional power. [4] | ” |
| —William Brennan, Byron White, and Thurgood Marshall, opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Justice Potter Stewart, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part. The justices concurred with Black's opinion that the ban on literacy tests was valid. They also agreed that the ban on state residency requirements for federal elections was valid, but disagreed on the reasoning provided for that judgment. The final point Stewart argued was that Congress did not have the authority to lower the minimum voting age for any election at the federal, state, or local level.[2]
| “ | The state laws that [§ 302] invalidates do not invidiously discriminate against any discrete and insular minority. Unlike the statute considered in Morgan, § 302 is valid only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests are 'compelling.' I concurred in MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's dissent in Morgan. That case, as I now read it, gave congressional power under § 5 the furthest possible legitimate reach. Yet to sustain the constitutionality of § 302 would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale. I cannot but conclude that § 302 was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact. [4] | ” |
| —Potter Stewart, opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
|---|
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates •State oversight of federal grants • Federalism by the numbers • Index |
Oregon v. Mitchell established that Congress has the power to regulate requirements for voting in federal elections, but it is prohibited from regulating requirements for voting in state and local elections. This decision preceded the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971 which lowered the minimum voting age to 18 for all elections. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution states:
| “ | The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. [4] | ” |
| —Constitution of the United States[5] | ||
The ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was proposed following the Supreme Court's decision that Congress did not have the authority to lower the minimum voting age for state and local elections. The decision to ratify the Twenty-Sixth Amendment established a new precedent regarding Congress' authority over state and local elections.[2][6]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "Oregon v. Mitchell," accessed June 15, 2022
- ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 Justia, "Oregon v. Mitchell," accessed June 15, 2022
- ↑ LexisNexis, "Oregon v. Mitchell - 400 U.S. 112, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970)," accessed June 15, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Constitution Annotated, "Twenty-Sixth Amendment," accessed June 15, 2022
- ↑ National Constitution Center, "The Twenty-Sixth Amendment," accessed June 15, 2022
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