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Parker v. Gladden

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Supreme Court of the United States
Parker v. Gladden
Reference: 385 U.S. 363
Term: 1966
Important Dates
Argued: November 9, 1966
Decided: December 12, 1966
Outcome
Oregon Supreme Court reversed
Majority
Earl WarrenHugo BlackWilliam DouglasTom ClarkWilliam BrennanPotter StewartByron WhiteAbe Fortas
Dissenting
John Harlan II

Parker v. Gladden is a case decided on December 12, 1966, by the United States Supreme Court that incorporated the right to an impartial jury of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to states. The case concerned a bailiff attempting to influence a jury's opinion of the defendant in a case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.[1][2]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Lee E. A. Parker was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to serve up to life in prison. Following his conviction and appeal, Parker discovered that the bailiff had stated to a juror during his trial: "Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty." Parker argued that the bailiff's statement violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury, which the Oregon Supreme Court rejected.
  • The issue: Did the defendant have his constitutional right to an impartial jury violated?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and held that the right to an impartial jury applies to state criminal proceedings.

  • Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that individuals' Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is applicable in state courts. To read more about the impact of Parker v. Gladden click here.

    Background

    Lee E. A. Parker was convicted of second-degree murder by the Multnomah County Circuit Court on May 19, 1961, and sentenced to serve up to life in prison. He appealed his conviction to the Oregon Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision. Parker later discovered that, during his trial, the bailiff told Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror: "Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty." The bailiff's statement was overheard by two other jurors, Mrs. Inwards and Mrs. Drake. Parker enlisted the help of his wife to contact the jurors regarding the bailiff's comments. Mrs. Gattman testified that she was sure of what the bailiff had said and was displeased with the verdict. Mrs. Inwards testified that the bailiff's statement may have impacted her decision.

    Upon Parker's appeal for post-conviction relief, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the bailiff's statement had not violated Parker's constitutional rights.[1][2]

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on November 9, 1966. The case was decided on December 12, 1966.[1]

    Decision

    The Supreme Court decided 8-1 to reverse the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court. The court issued a per curiam decision, meaning that the decision was published as a decision of the court with authorship not indicated. Justice John Harlan II wrote a dissenting opinion.[2]

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    The court argued, in a per curiam decision, that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is incorporated to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court contended that the bailiff spoke to jurors in a private setting in an attempt to influence their decision, which did not allow for the defendant's counsel to confront and cross-examine the bailiff. This action violated Parker's constitutional right to a fair trial.[2]

    We believe that the statements of the bailiff to the jurors are controlled by the command of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It guarantees that 'the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . [and] be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .' As we said in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 379 U. S. 472-473 (1965), 'the 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.'


    Here, there is dispute neither as to what the bailiff, an officer of the State, said nor that when he said it he was not subjected to confrontation, cross-examination or other safeguards guaranteed to the petitioner. Rather, his expressions were 'private talk,' tending to reach the jury by 'outside influence.' Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 205 U. S. 462 (1907). We have followed the 'undeviating rule,' Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 384 U. S. 351 (1966), that the rights of confrontation and cross-examination are among the fundamental requirements of a constitutionally fair trial. Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 174 U. S. 55-56 (1899); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 333 U. S. 273 (1948); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965).[3]

    —majority opinion in Parker v. Gladden[2]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice John Harlan II, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not make the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states. He also posited that overturning Parker's conviction would have a far-reaching and negative impact on other similar cases.[2]

    The potentialities of today's decision may go far beyond what, I am sure, the Court intends. Certainly the Court does not wish to encourage convicted felons to 'intimidate, beset and harass,' Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 346 U. S. 178, a discharged jury in an effort to establish possible grounds for a new trial. Our courts have always been alert to protect the sanctity of the jury process. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264; see Castaldi v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 681. But, in allowing Parker to overturn his conviction on the basis of what are no more than inconsequential incidents in an otherwise constitutionally flawless proceeding, the Court encourages others to follow his example in pursuing the jury and may be thought by some to commit federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings to interrogate the jury upon the mere allegation that a prejudicial remark has reached the ears of one of its members. Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227. To any such result, I cannot subscribe.[3]
    John Harlan II, dissenting opinion in Parker v. Gladden[2]

    Impact

    Federalism
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    Key terms
    Court cases
    Major arguments
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    See also: Incorporation

    Parker v. Gladden established that the right to an impartial jury of the Sixth Amendment applies to state court criminal proceedings.[2]

    The decision in this case was responsible for incorporating the right to an impartial jury to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation is the process of binding a fundamental right onto the states through a Supreme Court decision.[4]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes