Ross v. Moffitt

Ross v. Moffitt
Reference: 417 U.S. 600
Term: 1974
Important Dates
Argued: April 22, 1974 Decided: June 17, 1974
Outcome
Fourth Circuit reversed
Majority
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger • Harry Blackmun • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist • Potter Stewart • Byron White
Dissenting
William Brennan • William O. Douglas • Thurgood Marshall

Ross v. Moffitt was decided on June 17, 1974, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case is famous for limiting the right to counsel for indigent defendants only to those appeals conferred by a state as a matter of right. The right to counsel does not apply to secondary or discretionary appeals in either state or federal court.

Questions presented: Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal, established in Douglas v. California, extend to either discretionary or secondary appeals in state court, or to applications to the U.S. Supreme Court appealing the judgment of a state court of last resort?

Case background

The respondent in this case, Claude Franklin Moffitt, was arrested and charged with forgery and "uttering a forged instrument" (i.e., attempting to pass a forged document with intent to injure or defraud) in two separate North Carolina counties, Mecklenburg County and Guilford County. Because Moffitt was an indigent defendant, he was afforded court-appointed counsel for his criminal trials in both counties. Moffitt was convicted in both counties on the charges. He appealed both of his convictions to the North Carolina Court of Appeals as a matter of right. He was again afforded court-appointed counsel for his appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions.

Following the affirmation of his conviction in Mecklenburg County, Moffitt attempted to have his case reviewed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. Such an appeal is discretionary and not one afforded as a matter of right. Moffitt's court-appointed counsel for his appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals inquired about reappointment as Moffitt's counsel for his appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, but this request was denied, and Moffitt's counsel was informed that the state of North Carolina did not provide court-appointed counsel for secondary or discretionary appeals because the state was not required to do so. Moffitt filed a petition for relief in a federal court, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, but the district court denied this petition. Moffitt appealed the district court's denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Moffitt's petition with the stipulation that he should exhaust all of his avenues for relief in state court first. After exhausting his state remedies, Moffitt again petitioned the Western District of North Carolina and he was again denied relief. He appealed that denial to the Fourth Circuit.

Meanwhile, as Moffitt appealed his conviction in Mecklenburg County, he also appealed his conviction in Guilford County to the North Carolina Supreme Court. In this instance, however, just as during his trial and mandatory appeal, Moffitt was represented by court-appointed counsel for his discretionary appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Exercising its discretion to hear appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied hearing Moffitt's appeal. Moffitt sought court-appointed counsel in order to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in order to challenge the North Carolina Supreme Court's denial to hear the appeal of his Guilford County conviction. In addition, Moffitt also sought court-appointed counsel for other state remedies. These requests were denied. Moffitt petitioned for federal relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina and was denied. Moffitt appealed the denial of relief by the Middle District to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In reversing both the Western and Middle Districts, the Fourth Circuit held that both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution required a state to provide counsel to indigent defendants in discretionary or secondary appeals in state court, which is the relief Moffitt sought for his Mecklenburg County conviction, and that a state was required to provide counsel to indigent defendants who petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is the relief Moffitt sought for his Guilford County conviction.

The Fourth Circuit based its reasoning, in part, on the belief that "as long as the state provides such procedures and allows other convicted felons to seek access to the higher court with the help of retained counsel, there is a marked absence of fairness in denying an indigent the assistance of counsel as he seeks access to the same court ... [t]he same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals." Both Major Fred Ross and the state of North Carolina appealed the Fourth Circuit's decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Oral argument

Oral argument was held on April 22, 1974.

Decision

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit was reversed.

Opinion

Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court for a six-justice majority. Justice Rehnquist noted that the court had "given extensive consideration to the rights of indigent persons on appeal" at the time of the court's opinion in Ross. In reviewing the court's opinions in cases such as Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California, Justice Rehnquist affirmed that these decisions stood for "the proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons." However, Justice Rehnquist identified a difficulty in the line of Griffin-Douglas cases addressing the rights of indigent defendants. In his view,

“

The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached, each depending on a different inquiry which emphasizes different factors. 'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.

”

Justice Rehnquist indicated that the court would consider this disposition of this case through both a due process and an equal protection analysis.

Due process analysis

Justice Rehnquist stated that the court did "not believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to provide respondents with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court." In distinguishing between rights of counsel afforded in proceedings initiated by the state, such as a trial, Justice Rehnquist noted, "it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below ... This difference is significant for, while no one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant's consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all. The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way."

In interpreting the Constitution in this way, the court held that a state's denial of counsel to indigents did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Justice Rehnquist allowed, however, that if "unfairness results ... if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. That question is more profitably considered under an equal protection analysis."

Equal protection analysis

Justice Rehnquist noted that equal protection "is prominent both in Douglas and in other cases treating the rights of indigents on appeal." Despite its importance in Ross and in cases involving indigent rights generally, Justice Rehnquist said,

“

Despite the tendency of all rights 'to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme,' there are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed without doing violence to principles recognized in other decisions of this Court ... The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees. In this case we do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause, when interpreted in the context of these cases, requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file petitions for certiorari in this Court.

”

Equal protection - discretionary appeals

After a review of North Carolina's law governing appeals in the state, and in reviewing Moffitt's uncounseled discretionary appeal of his Mecklenburg County conviction to the North Carolina Supreme Court in light of the equal protection clause, Justice Rehnquist concluded,

“

The facts show that respondent, in connection with his Mecklenburg County conviction, received the benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state Court of Appeals. Thus, prior to his seeking discretionary review in the State Supreme Court, his claims had 'once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court.' We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court ... the fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. We think respondent was given that opportunity under the existing North Carolina system.

”

Equal protection - certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court

The court next turned to the question of whether a state must provide counsel to indigent defendants who seek discretionary review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist noted that much of the equal protection analysis provided for reviewing Moffitt's denial of counsel in state court was "equally relevant" to this question as well, but Justice Rehnquist went further to note that requiring states to provide counsel for an appeal in federal court was something that even the federal government was not required to do. In his words,

“

The suggestion that a State is responsible for providing counsel to one petitioning this Court simply because it initiated the prosecution which led to the judgment sought to be reviewed is unsupported by either reason or authority. It would be quite as logical under the rationale of Douglas and Griffin, and indeed perhaps more so, to require that the Federal Government or this Court furnish and compensate counsel for petitioners who seek certiorari here to review state judgments of conviction. Yet this Court has followed a consistent policy of denying applications for appointment of counsel by persons seeking to file jurisdictional statements or petitions for certiorari in this Court ... it would be odd, indeed, to read the Fourteenth Amendment to impose such a requirement on the States, and we decline to do so.

”

Decision

In determining that a state government neither violates due process nor equal protection in denying counsel to indigent defendants for discretionary appeals in state court or in denying counsel to indigent defendants seeking a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, the court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.

Dissent

Justice William O. Douglas, who authored the court's opinion in Douglas v. California, dissented in this case. His dissent was joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. Justice Douglas relied heavily on the opinion of the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, Clement Haynsworth, who "found no logical basis for differentiation between appeals of right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Constitution and the right to counsel."

In Justice Douglas' view, "Douglas v. California was grounded on concepts of fairness and equality. The right to seek discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that the 'same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals.'"

Impact

As a result of the court's opinion in this case, the court limited the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defendants on appeal in state courts only to those appeals provided for under state law as a matter of right. A state does not have to provide counsel for indigent defendants for secondary or discretionary appeals. A state also does not have to provide counsel for indigent defendants seeking relief in the U.S. Supreme Court.

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court
• Griffin v. Illinois
• Douglas v. California

External links

• Supreme Court of the United States