Redistricting in Alaska

Redistricting
State-by-state redistricting procedures
Majority-minority districts
Congressional district demographics
United States census, 2020

Redistricting is the process by which new congressional and state legislative district boundaries are drawn. Alaska's single United States Representative and 60 state legislators are elected from political divisions called districts. United States Senators are not elected by districts, but by the states at large. District lines are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States census. The federal government stipulates that districts must have nearly equal populations and must not discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity.

HIGHLIGHTS

Following the 2010 United States Census, Alaska was apportioned one at-large congressional district.

The Alaska State Legislature comprises 20 state Senate districts, each of which contains two state House districts (for a total of 40 House districts).

Because Alaska has only one congressional district, congressional redistricting is not necessary. A non-politician commission draws state legislative district lines.

See the sections below for further information on the following topics:

1. Background: This section summarizes federal requirements for redistricting at both the congressional and state legislative levels. In addition, common state-level requirements are discussed. Recent court decisions affecting redistricting policy are also summarized.
2. State process: This section provides details about the redistricting process in Alaska, identifying the entities responsible for redistricting and delineating state-imposed requirements.
3. District maps: This section provides information about current congressional and state legislative district maps.
4. Issues: This section discusses issues that intersect with redistricting policy, including electoral competitiveness and the consideration of race and ethnicity in electoral policy.
5. Historical information: This section provides summaries of the redistricting processes that occurred in Alaska following the 2010 and 2000 censuses.
6. State legislation and ballot measures: This section lists state legislation and state and local ballot measures relevant to redistricting policy.

Background

What is redistricting and what does it entail?

Federal requirements for congressional redistricting

According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the states and their legislatures have primary authority in determining the "times, places, and manner" of congressional elections. Congress may also pass laws regulating congressional elections.

“	The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.	”
—United States Constitution

Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution stipulates that congressional representatives be apportioned to the states on the basis of population. There are 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives. Each state is allotted a portion of these seats based on the size of its population relative to the other states. Consequently, a state may gain seats in the House if its population grows or lose seats if its population decreases, relative to populations in other states. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders that the populations of House districts must be equal "as nearly as practicable."

The equal population requirement for congressional districts is strict. According to All About Redistricting, "Any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the 'ideal' population), must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a 1 percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."

Federal requirements for state legislative redistricting

The United States Constitution is silent on the issue of state legislative redistricting. In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of rulings in an effort to clarify standards for state legislative redistricting. In Reynolds v. Sims, the court ruled that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the United States Constitution] demands no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races." According to All About Redistricting, "it has become accepted that a [redistricting] plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts [within a state or jurisdiction] are more than 10 percent apart."

State-based requirements

In addition to the federal criteria noted above, individual states may impose additional requirements on redistricting. Common state-level redistricting criteria are listed below.

1. Contiguity refers to the principle that all areas within a district should be physically adjacent. A total of 49 states require that districts of at least one state legislative chamber be contiguous (Nevada has no such requirement, imposing no requirements on redistricting beyond those enforced at the federal level). A total of 23 states require that congressional districts meet contiguity requirements.
2. Compactness refers to the general principle that the constituents within a district should live as near to one another as practicable. A total of 37 states impose compactness requirements on state legislative districts; 18 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.
3. A community of interest is defined by FairVote as a "group of people in a geographical area, such as a specific region or neighborhood, who have common political, social or economic interests." A total of 24 states require that the maintenance of communities of interest be considered in the drawing of state legislative districts. A total of 13 states impose similar requirements for congressional districts.
4. A total of 42 states require that state legislative district lines be drawn to account for political boundaries (e.g., the limits of counties, cities, and towns). A total of 19 states require that similar considerations be made in the drawing of congressional districts.

Methods

In general, a state's redistricting authority can be classified as one of the following:

1. Legislature-dominant: In a legislature-dominant state, the legislature retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. Maps enacted by the legislature may or may not be subject to gubernatorial veto. Advisory commissions may also be involved in the redistricting process, although the legislature is not bound to adopt an advisory commission's recommendations.
2. Commission: In a commission state, an extra-legislative commission retains the ultimate authority to draft and enact district maps. A non-politician commission is one whose members cannot hold elective office. A politician commission is one whose members can hold elective office.
3. Hybrid: In a hybrid state, the legislature shares redistricting authority with a commission.

Gerrymandering

In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry signed into law a state Senate district map that, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, "consolidated the Federalist Party vote in a few districts and thus gave disproportionate representation to Democratic-Republicans." The word gerrymander was coined by The Boston Gazette to describe the district.

See also: Gerrymandering

The term gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to favor one political party, individual, or constituency over another. When used in a rhetorical manner by opponents of a particular district map, the term has a negative connotation but does not necessarily address the legality of a challenged map. The term can also be used in legal documents; in this context, the term describes redistricting practices that violate federal or state laws.

For additional background information about gerrymandering, click "[Show more]" below.

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The phrase racial gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district lines to dilute the voting power of racial minority groups. Federal law prohibits racial gerrymandering and establishes that, to combat this practice and to ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act, states and jurisdictions can create majority-minority electoral districts. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial group or groups comprise a majority of the district's populations. Racial gerrymandering and majority-minority districts are discussed in greater detail in this article.

The phrase partisan gerrymandering refers to the practice of drawing electoral district maps with the intention of favoring one political party over another. In contrast with racial gerrymandering, on which the Supreme Court of the United States has issued rulings in the past affirming that such practices violate federal law, the high court had not, as of November 2017, issued a ruling establishing clear precedent on the question of partisan gerrymandering. Although the court has granted in past cases that partisan gerrymandering can violate the United States Constitution, it has never adopted a standard for identifying or measuring partisan gerrymanders. Partisan gerrymandering is described in greater detail in this article.

Recent court decisions

See also: Redistricting cases heard by the Supreme Court of the United States

The Supreme Court of the United States has, in recent years, issued several decisions dealing with redistricting policy, including rulings relating to the consideration of race in drawing district maps, the use of total population tallies in apportionment, and the constitutionality of independent redistricting commissions. The rulings in these cases, which originated in a variety of states, impact redistricting processes across the nation.

For additional background information about these cases, click "[Show more]" below.

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Gill v. Whitford (2018)

See also: Gill v. Whitford

In Gill v. Whitford, decided on June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the plaintiffs—12 Wisconsin Democrats who alleged that Wisconsin's state legislative district plan had been subject to an unconstitutional gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments—had failed to demonstrate standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring a complaint. The court's opinion, penned by Chief Justice John Roberts, did not address the broader question of whether partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Roberts was joined in the majority opinion by Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Kagan penned a concurring opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Associate Justice Clarence Thomas penned an opinion that concurred in part with the majority opinion and in the judgment, joined by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch.

Cooper v. Harris (2017)

See also: Cooper v. Harris

In Cooper v. Harris, decided on May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, finding that two of North Carolina's congressional districts, the boundaries of which had been set following the 2010 United States Census, had been subject to an illegal racial gerrymander in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the court's majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor (Thomas also filed a separate concurring opinion). In the court's majority opinion, Kagan described the two-part analysis utilized by the high court when plaintiffs allege racial gerrymandering as follows: "First, the plaintiff must prove that 'race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district.' ... Second, if racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must withstand strict scrutiny. The burden shifts to the State to prove that its race-based sorting of voters serves a 'compelling interest' and is 'narrowly tailored' to that end." In regard to the first part of the aforementioned analysis, Kagan went on to note that "a plaintiff succeeds at this stage even if the evidence reveals that a legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals, including political ones." Justice Samuel Alito delivered an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority opinion. This opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Evenwel v. Abbott (2016)

See also: Evenwel v. Abbott

Evenwel v. Abbott was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts in Texas. The plaintiffs, Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger, argued that district populations ought to take into account only the number of registered or eligible voters residing within those districts as opposed to total population counts, which are generally used for redistricting purposes. Total population tallies include non-voting residents, such as immigrants residing in the country without legal permission, prisoners, and children. The plaintiffs alleged that this tabulation method dilutes the voting power of citizens residing in districts that are home to smaller concentrations of non-voting residents. The court ruled 8-0 on April 4, 2016, that a state or locality can use total population counts for redistricting purposes. The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2016)

Justice Stephen Breyer penned the majority opinion in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.

See also: Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2016. At issue was the constitutionality of state legislative districts that were created by the commission in 2012. The plaintiffs, a group of Republican voters, alleged that "the commission diluted or inflated the votes of almost two million Arizona citizens when the commission intentionally and systematically overpopulated 16 Republican districts while under-populating 11 Democrat districts." This, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a partisan gerrymander. The plaintiffs claimed that the commission placed a disproportionately large number of non-minority voters in districts dominated by Republicans; meanwhile, the commission allegedly placed many minority voters in smaller districts that tended to vote Democratic. As a result, the plaintiffs argued, more voters overall were placed in districts favoring Republicans than in those favoring Democrats, thereby diluting the votes of citizens in the Republican-dominated districts. The defendants countered that the population deviations resulted from legally defensible efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act and obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice. At the time of redistricting, certain states were required to obtain preclearanceA jurisdiction subject to preclearance needed to get approval from the U.S. Department of Justice before changing election laws or district maps. from the U.S. Department of Justice before adopting redistricting plans or making other changes to their election laws—a requirement struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). On April 20, 2016, the court ruled unanimously that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that a partisan gerrymander had taken place. Instead, the court found that the commission had acted in good faith to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The court's majority opinion was penned by Justice Stephen Breyer.

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015)

See also: Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2015. At issue was the constitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, which was established by state constitutional amendment in 2000. According to Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, "the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." The state legislature argued that the use of the word "legislature" in this context is literal; therefore, only a state legislature may draw congressional district lines. Meanwhile, the commission contended that the word "legislature" ought to be interpreted to mean "the legislative powers of the state," including voter initiatives and referenda. On June 29, 2015, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, finding that "redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the state's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the governor's veto." The majority opinion was penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito dissented.

State process

See also: State-by-state redistricting procedures

Because Alaska has only one congressional district, congressional redistricting is not necessary. A non-politician commission draws state legislative district lines. In place since 1998, Alaska's redistricting commission comprises five members. Two commissioners are appointed by the governor, one by the state Senate majority leader, one by the state House majority leader, and one by the chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court. State law mandates that commissioners "be chosen without regard to party affiliation." One commissioner must be selected from each of the state's judicial districts.

The Alaska Constitution requires that state legislative districts be contiguous and compact. Furthermore, every state legislative district must contain a "relatively integrated socio-economic area." Each state legislative district is served by one state senator and two state representatives.

District maps

Congressional districts

See also: United States congressional delegations from Alaska

Click the above image to enlarge it.
Source: The National Atlas of the United States of America

Alaska comprises a single at-large congressional district, depicted in the map to the right. The table below lists Alaska's current House representative.

Office	Name	Party	Date assumed office	Date term ends
U.S. House Alaska At-large District	Don Young	Republican	March 6, 1973	January 3, 2023

State legislative maps

See also: Alaska State Senate and Alaska House of Representatives

The Alaska State Legislature comprises 20 state Senate districts, each of which contains two state House districts (for a total of 40 House districts). State senators are elected every four years in partisan elections. State representatives are elected every two years in partisan elections. To access a map of Alaska's legislative districts, click here.

Political impacts of redistricting

Competitiveness

There are conflicting opinions regarding the correlation between partisan gerrymandering and electoral competitiveness. In 2012, Jennifer Clark, a political science professor at the University of Houston, said, "The redistricting process has important consequences for voters. In some states, incumbent legislators work together to protect their own seats, which produces less competition in the political system. Voters may feel as though they do not have a meaningful alternative to the incumbent legislator. Legislators who lack competition in their districts have less incentive to adhere to their constituents’ opinions."

In 2006, Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz and Ph.D. students Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning wrote, "[Some] studies have concluded that redistricting has a neutral or positive effect on competition. ... [It] is often the case that partisan redistricting has the effect of reducing the safety of incumbents, thereby making elections more competitive."

In 2011, James Cottrill, a professor of political science at Santa Clara University, published a study of the effect of non-legislative approaches (e.g., independent commissions, politician commissions) to redistricting on the competitiveness of congressional elections. Cottrill found that "particular types of [non-legislative approaches] encourage the appearance in congressional elections of experienced and well-financed challengers." Cottrill cautioned, however, that non-legislative approaches "contribute neither to decreased vote percentages when incumbents win elections nor to a greater probability of their defeat."

Congress

See also: United States House of Representatives elections, 2016

In 2016, Ballotpedia analyzed the margins of victory in all 435 contests for the United States House of Representatives. Ballotpedia found that the average margin of victory was 36.6 percent. A total of 321 elections (73.8 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of 20 percent or more. Sixteen elections (3.7 percent of all House elections) were won by margins of victory of less than 5 percent.

Alaska's single election for the United States House of Representatives in 2016 was won by a margin of victory of 14.3 percent. See the table below for full details.

Electoral margins of victory in 2016 United States House of Representatives elections, Alaska
District	Winner	Margin of victory	Total votes cast	Top opponent
Alaska's At-Large District	Don Young	14.3%	308,198	Steve Lindbeck

State legislatures

See also: Margin of victory in state legislative elections

In 2014, Ballotpedia conducted a study of competitive districts in 44 state legislative chambers between 2010, the last year in which district maps drawn after the 2000 census applied, and 2012, the first year in which district maps drawn after the 2010 census applied. Ballotpedia found that there were 61 fewer competitive general election contests in 2012 than in 2010. Of the 44 chambers studied, 25 experienced a net loss in the number of competitive elections. A total of 17 experienced a net increase. In total, 16.2 percent of the 3,842 legislative contests studied saw competitive general elections in 2010. In 2012, 14.6 percent of the contests studied saw competitive general elections. An election was considered competitive if it was won by a margin of victory of 5 percent or less. An election was considered mildly competitive if it was won by a margin of victory between 5 and 10 percent. For more information regarding this report, including methodology, see this article.

The Alaska State Legislature was not included in this study.

Partisan composition

The tables below summarize the current partisan composition of the Alaska House of Representatives and the Alaska State Senate.

House

Party		As of July 2021
	Democratic Party	15
	Republican Party	21
	Independent	3
	Nonpartisan	1
	Vacancies	0
Total		40

Senate

Party		As of July 2021
	Democratic Party	7
	Republican Party	13
	Vacancies	0
Total		20

Race and ethnicity

See also: Majority-minority districts

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that electoral district lines cannot be drawn in such a manner as to "improperly dilute minorities' voting power."

“	No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.	”
—Voting Rights Act of 1965

States and other political subdivisions may create majority-minority districts in order to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A majority-minority district is a district in which minority groups compose a majority of the district's total population. As of 2015, Alaska was home to zero congressional majority-minority districts.

Proponents of majority-minority districts maintain that these districts are a necessary hindrance to the practice of cracking, which occurs when a constituency is divided between several districts in order to prevent it from achieving a majority in any one district. In addition, supporters argue that the drawing of majority-minority districts has resulted in an increased number of minority representatives in state legislatures and Congress.

Critics, meanwhile, contend that the establishment of majority-minority districts can result in packing, which occurs when a constituency or voting group is placed within a single district, thereby minimizing its influence in other districts. Because minority groups tend to vote Democratic, critics argue that majority-minority districts ultimately present an unfair advantage to Republicans by consolidating Democratic votes into a smaller number of districts.

Demographics

See also: Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 and Demographics of congressional districts as of 2015 (as percentages)

The tables below provide demographic information for Alaska's congressional district as of 2015.

Demographics of Alaska's congressional districts (as percentages)
District	Hispanic or Latino of any race	White	Black or African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander	Other	Multiple races
District (at large), Alaska	7.02%	61.27%	3.35%	13.31%	6.20%	0.86%	0.30%	7.69%
Source: United States Census Bureau, "American Fact Finder: 2015 1-year estimates," accessed May 23, 2017

Demographics of Alaska's congressional districts
District	Hispanic or Latino of any race	White	Black or African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander	Other	Multiple races	Total
District (at large), Alaska	51,825	452,472	24,739	98,300	45,753	6,341	2,201	56,801	738,432
Source: United States Census Bureau, "American Fact Finder: 2015 1-year estimates," accessed May 23, 2017

Redistricting after the 2010 census

See also: Redistricting in Alaska after the 2010 census

Alaska's independent redistricting commission published its state legislative district map on June 13, 2011. This plan was precleared by the United States Department of Justice on October 11, 2011. Ultimately, however, the Alaska Supreme Court ordered the board to draw new lines "first under [the requirements of] the state constitution and only then adjusting for Voting Rights Act compliance where necessary." On April 5, 2011, the commission published a new map, but this too was the subject of a series of court challenges. The state supreme court permitted the use of this map for 2012 elections only. The redistricting commission adopted another state legislative map on July 14, 2013. Lawsuits were filed against the map, but a court ultimately dismissed the challenges, allowing the newly drawn map to stand.

Redistricting after the 2000 census

The redistricting commission's first attempt at a state legislative district map was, according to All About Redistricting, "struck down by the state supreme court, largely on compactness and equal population grounds." A second plan was approved on April 25, 2002. The state supreme court allowed this plan to stand, and the United States Department of Justice granted preclearance on June 11, 2012.

State legislation and ballot measures

Redistricting legislation

See state election laws

The following is a list of recent redistricting bills that have been introduced in or passed by the Alaska state legislature. To learn more about each of these bills, click the bill title. This information is provided by BillTrack50 and LegiScan.

Note: Due to the nature of the sorting process used to generate this list, some results may not be relevant to the topic. If no bills are displayed below, no legislation pertaining to this topic has been introduced in the legislature recently.

Redistricting ballot measures

See also: Redistricting measures on the ballot and List of Alaska ballot measures

Ballotpedia has tracked the following ballot measure(s) relating to redistricting in Alaska.

1. Alaska Reapportionment Board, Measure 3 (1998)

Recent news

The link below is to the most recent stories in a Google news search for the terms Redistricting Alaska. These results are automatically generated from Google. Ballotpedia does not curate or endorse these articles.

Redistricting in Alaska - Google News

See also

• United States census, 2020
• Redistricting in Alaska after the 2010 census
• Redistricting
• State-by-state redistricting procedures
• Majority-minority districts
• State legislative and congressional redistricting after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory in state legislative elections before and after the 2010 census
• Margin of victory analysis for the 2014 congressional elections

External links

• All About Redistricting
• National Conference of State Legislatures, "Redistricting Process"
• FairVote, "Redistricting"