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Schilb v. Kuebel

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Supreme Court of the United States
Schilb v. Kuebel
Reference: 404 U.S. 357
Term: 1971
Important Dates
Argued: October 12, 1971
Decided: December 20, 1971
Outcome
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
Majority
Harry Blackmun • Warren Burger • Byron White
Concurring
Thurgood Marshall
Dissenting
William Douglas • Potter Stewart • William Brennan

Schilb v. Kuebel is a case decided on December 20, 1971, by the United States Supreme Court holding that the Illinois bail system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The case concerned the constitutionality of an Illinois bail statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.[1][2][3]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: John Schilb was charged with leaving the scene of a car accident and obstructing traffic. He paid 10% of his bail, in accordance with state law, to the clerk of the courts. After his trial, the amount he had deposited was returned to him with $7.50 less than the amount paid. The court clerk had retained 1% of the amount deposited as a bail bond cost. The defendant filed a class action against the court clerk on the grounds that the charge violated the Equal Protection Clause.
  • The issue: Did the Illinois bail statute violate the Equal Protection Clause?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court and held that the bail system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.


    • Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that the Illinois bail system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. To read more about the impact of Schilb v. Kuebel click here.

    Background

    John Schilb was arrested and charged with leaving the scene of a car accident and obstructing traffic in January 1969. In accordance with the Illinois bail statutes, he paid 10% of his bail ($75) to the clerk of the court. Schilb's case proceeded to trial where he was acquitted of the charge of leaving the scene of a car accident but was found guilty of obstructing traffic. The amount deposited for bail was returned to him with $7.50 less than the amount paid. The court clerk retained 1% of the amount deposited as a bail bond cost, pursuant to the Illinois statute. Schilb filed a class action against the court clerk on the grounds that the 1% charge violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    The circuit court dismissed the complaint and upheld the constitutionality of the state statute. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.[2]

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on October 12, 1971. The case was decided on December 20, 1971.[1]

    Decision

    The Supreme Court decided 4-3 to affirm the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Byron White and Thurgood Marshall. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion. Justice William Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice William Brennan.[2]

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the court, argued that the Illinois bail statutes did not violate the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. He dismissed the key arguments in this case, which were that the 1% charge was only imposed on poor defendants and that acquitted individuals should not be required to pay bail bond costs. Blackmun contended that the Illinois bail system had been reformed to better serve nonaffluent defendants and that it could not be guaranteed that affluent individuals would take advantage of the system. He also posited that administrative costs are necessary for all individuals, guilty or innocent, who aim to benefit from pretrial release.[2]

    “ Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951); Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351, 99 L. Ed. 1299, 1301 (1955) (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.), and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (CA8 1963); see Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660, 370 U. S. 666 (1962), and id. at 370 U. S. 675 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). But we are not at all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment question of bail excessiveness. Our concern, instead, is with the 1% cost retention provision. This smacks of administrative detail and of procedure, and is hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right or as based upon any suspect criterion. The applicable measure, therefore, must be the traditional one: is the distinction drawn by the statutes invidious and without rational basis? Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 397 U. S. 483-487 (1970). See Richardson v. Belcher, ante, p. 404 U. S. 78, at 404 U. S. 81.[4] ”
    —Harry Blackmun, majority opinion in Schilb v. Kuebel[2]

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the decision of the court and emphasized that the Illinois bail statutes were a notable improvement from the state's previous bail system.[2]

    “ All agree that the central purpose of the statute was to restrict severely the activities of professional bail bondsmen who had customarily collected 10% of the amount of each bond as a fee and retained all of it regardless of what happened. All agree that the new scheme is, in general, an admirable attempt to reduce the cost of liberty for those awaiting trial.


    The new scheme dealt only with the class of which appellant Schilb was a member -- those persons charged with crimes who, under the old system, were relegated to professional bondsmen who, along with other requirements, charged a 10% fee for the bond regardless of the outcome of the case. This is the only class affected by the new scheme. Members of this class now pay 1% instead of 10%. In the evolving struggle for meaningful bail reform, I cannot find the present Illinois move toward that objective to be unconstitutional.[4]

    		”
    —Thurgood Marshall, concurring opinion in Schilb v. Kuebel[2]

    Dissenting opinions

    Justice William Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, argued that defendants' should not be required to pay bail bond costs for charges in which they have been acquitted.[2]

    “ Some costs are the unavoidable consequences of a system of government which is required to proceed against its citizens in a public trial in an adversary proceeding. Yet I see no basis for saying that an accused must bear the costs incurred by the Government in its unsuccessful prosecution of him. Imposition of costs upon individuals who have been acquitted has long been eschewed by our courts. E.g., State v. Brooks, 33 Kan. 708, 715, 7 P. 591, 596 (1885); Biester v. State, 65 Neb. 276, 91 N.W. 416 (1902); Childers v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 456, 198 S.E. 487 (1938). Some jurisdictions have provided that the imposition of costs upon acquitted individuals is reprehensible. See, e.g., Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 48 (1952); Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice 31-32 (1963); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 205, 223-224 (1964); Note, 1962 Wash.U.L.Q. 76. Where there is such uniform condemnation of a practice as onerous as the imposition of costs upon acquitted defendants, cf. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 343 U. S. 798 (1952), I would conclude, with JUSTICES STEWART and Fortas in Giaccio, that it violates due process.[4] ”
    —William Douglas, dissenting opinion in Schilb v. Kuebel[2]


    Justice Potter Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice William Brennan, argued that the Illinois bail statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause because they limit the imposition of administrative costs to one class of defendants.[2]

    “ Given the infirmities in the asserted justifications for § 110-7(f), I think the imposition of administrative costs on only one class of those persons seeking pretrial release violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment before us.[4] ”
    —Potter Stewart, dissenting opinion in Schilb v. Kuebel[2]

    Impact

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    See also: Equal Protection Clause

    Schilb v. Kuebel established that the Illinois bail system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[2]

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Oyez, "Schilb v. Kuebel," accessed September 7, 2022
    2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 Justia, "Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)," accessed September 7, 2022
    3. ↑ LexisNexis, "Schilb v. Kuebel - 404 U.S. 357, 92 S. Ct. 479 (1971)," accessed September 7, 2022
    4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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