Sessions v. Dimaya
 | |
| Sessions v. Dimaya | |
| Term: 2017 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argument: January 17, 2017 Reargued: October 2, 2017 Decided: April 17, 2018 | |
| Outcome | |
| Ninth Circuit affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| Elena Kagan • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor | |
| Concurring | |
| Neil Gorsuch | |
| Dissenting | |
| John Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito | |
Sessions v. Dimaya is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was first held during the court's October 2016 term on January 17, 2017. On June 26, 2017, at the end of the court's 2016 term, the court announced that the case would be restored to the calendar for the 2017 term. Reargument in the case was held on October 2, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
You can review the Ninth Circuit's opinion here.[2]
Background
In 1992, James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. In both 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted in California of first-degree residential burglary. In both instances, upon conviction, Dimaya was sentenced to two years in prison. Under federal law, if a non-citizen is convicted of an aggravated felony, then that individual is subject to removal from the United States. Based on Dimaya's two first-degree burglary convictions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alleged that Dimaya was subject to removal because the crimes for which he was convicted under California law constituted crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment [was] at least one year. Such a crime constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which utilizes the definition of crime of violence provided under 18 U.S.C. § 16.
18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a crime of violence as,[3]
| “ |
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or |
” |
In a deportation hearing, an immigration judge agreed with DHS' argument that first-degree burglary in California constituted a crime of violence. The judge explained that "unlawful entry into a residence is by its very nature an offense where is apt to be violence [sic], whether in the efforts of the felon to escape or in the efforts of the occupant to resist the felon." The judge held that Dimaya was subject to removal from the United States and ineligible for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Dimaya appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
After oral argument in Dimaya's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. ACCA's residual clause provided that anyone who committed a crime punishable by at least one year in prison and that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another was guilty of a violent felony under the Act. In striking the residual clause, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that "by combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates ... this Court's repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy."[5]
Given the textual similarities, and based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit directed the parties to file supplemental briefs and held supplemental argument on whether the statutory definition of crime of violence here was unconstitutionally vague. In holding that both the statutory provision in this case and the residual clause in Johnson were subject to review using the categorical approach, which requires courts to look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime, a divided three-judge Ninth Circuit panel struck the definition of a crime of violence as unconstitutionally vague, consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in Johnson v. United States.[2]
Petitioner's challenge
U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, the petitioner, challenged the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that the statutory definition for crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague. She was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general.
Certiorari granted
On June 10, 2016, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Lynch's certiorari request on September 29, 2016. Argument in the case was held on January 17, 2017. Lynch was replaced as the named petitioner by Jeff Sessions upon his confirmation as attorney general. On June 26, 2017, at the end of the court's 2016 term, the court announced that the case would be restored to the calendar for the 2017 term. Reargument in the case was held on October 2, 2017.
Question presented
| Question presented: "Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague."[6] |
2017 audio
- Audio of oral argument:[7]
2017 transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[8]
2016 audio
- Audio of oral argument:[9]
2016 transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[10]
Outcome
In a 5 -4 decision, the court ruled that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.[1]
Majority and plurality opinion by Justice Kagan
Justice Elena Kagan wrote an opinion joined by a majority of the court in part. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Stephen Breyer joined the opinion in full, while Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the judgment and in most of Kagan's opinion.[1]
Writing for the court majority, Kagan ruled, "Johnson is a straightforward decision, with equally straightforward application here." Comparing the two statutes, she wrote that the statute at issue in Johnson "has the same two features as ACCA's, combined in the same constitutionally problematic way." Kagan concluded:
| “ | In sum, §16(b) has the same [t]wo features that conspire[d] to make [ACCA’s residual clause] unconstitutionally vague. It too requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in the ordinary case, and to judge whether that abstraction presents some not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk. The result is that §16(b) produces, just as ACCA’s residual clause did, more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due | ” |
Concurrence by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch joined in the court's judgment and in most of Justice Kagan's opinion. In response to arguments made by the dissenting justices, Gorsuch argued that the vagueness doctrine was based on originalist principles. He focused on due process rights under the Constitution, emphasizing that the Constitution required laws to provide fair notice of what actions were unlawful and of the consequences for unlawful behavior. Like Breyer, Gorsuch rejected the government's argument that the reasoning in Johnson was not applicable outside of criminal cases. However, Gorsuch suggested that the reasoning should apply more broadly. "Why, for example, would due process require Congress to speak more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no good answer."[1][12]
Dissent by Chief Justice Roberts
Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. Roberts argued that the statute at issue in this case was not vague and "does not give rise to the concerns that drove the Court’s decision in Johnson." Roberts wrote, "A plurality of the Court rejects the Government’s argument in favor of a civil standard, because of the 'grave nature of deportation'; Justice Gorsuch does so for broader reasons. I see no need to resolve which standard applies, because I would hold that §16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague even under the standard applicable to criminal laws."[1]
Dissent by Justice Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts' dissent and also wrote separately. Thomas' dissent was joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito. Thomas agreed with Roberts' conclusion that the statute at issue was not vague. He also challenged the vagueness doctrine as a whole, writing, "I continue to harbor doubts about whether the vagueness doctrine can be squared with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause."[1]
The opinion
Reactions
| Administrative State |
|---|
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| Five Pillars of the Administrative State |
| • Judicial deference • Nondelegation • Executive control • Procedural rights • Agency dynamics |
| Click here for more coverage of the administrative state on Ballotpedia |
Reactions to Gorsuch's vote and opinion
- See also: Administrative state and Chevron deference
In the weeks following the court's decision in Dimaya, a number of commentators reacted to Justice Neil Gorsuch's decision to cast a tie-breaking vote for the liberal side of the court, concurring in the judgment of the court and most of the majority opinion. Gorsuch also filed a concurring opinion that explained his own reasoning and responded to the disstenting opinions of Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts.
In a piece published by The Volokh Conspiracy legal blog, law professor Jonathan H. Adler argued that Dimaya suggests that although Gorsuch is not a liberal, he may side with the more liberal justices on the court at least as often as his predecessor Justice Antonin Scalia, and possibly more:[13]
| “ | Justice Gorsuch's opinion, and Justice Thomas' dissent, are the opening salvos in what promises to be an interesting intra-originalist debate over the proper scope and applicaiton of the 'void for vagueness' doctrine, and the extent to which this doctrine is part of an originalist understanding of Due Process. ... Is Justice Gorsuch's decision to side with the Court's more liberal judges a sign of things to come? Perhaps. Justice Gorsuch is just as likely to join with the Court's left wing as was the justice he replaced, Justice Scalia, and likely for some of the same reasons. ...
None of this means Justice Gorsuch should be considered a 'liberal' justice. To confirm the point, Justice Gorsuch dissented today in Wilson v. Sellers, voting to reject the claims of a habeas petitioner on death row. Wilson was a 6-3 decision, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined the liberal justices, and Justice Grosuch was joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in dissent.[4] |
” |
| —Jonathan H. Adler, "More on Sessions v. Dimaya and Crossover Sensation Neil Gorsuch"[13] | ||
Slate legal reporter Mark Joseph Stern argued that Gorsuch's reasoning in Dimaya shows his general skepticism of government power and could lead to outcomes favored by liberals or conservatives if applied in future decisions:[14]
| “ | What may be most remarkable about Monday’s ruling is the voting lineup: For the first time, Justice Neil Gorsuch cast a decisive fifth vote with the more liberal justices to reach a progressive outcome. Gorsuch is not drifting to the left. But his vote indicates that the justice has the same independent streak that led his role model, Justice Antonin Scalia, to occasionally push the law leftward. ...
Regardless of where Gorsuch takes this idea in the future, he deserves credit for following his principles to a fundamentally liberal result. The justice channeled his inner Scalia, drawing upon a deep skepticism of the government’s power to capriciously punish citizens and immigrants alike. Will his reasoning help a future court annihilate the administrative state? Maybe! But it might rein in overzealous police and prosecutors, too. Progressives should savor their SCOTUS wins where they can find them. And Dimaya is, without a doubt, a landmark liberal victory.[4] |
” |
| —Mark Joseph Stern, "Neil Gorsuch’s Long Game"[14] | ||
Washington Post columnist George Will argued that Gorsuch's reasoning in Dimaya could be applied in future cases across a range of policy areas other than immigration, with the effect of limiting the authority and discretion of administrative agencies. In an opinion piece titled "Gorsuch strikes a blow against the administrative state," Will wrote:[15]
| “ | The principle Gorsuch enunciates [in Dimaya] regarding one provision of immigration law is a scythe sharp enough to slice through many practices of the administrative state, which translates often vague congressional sentiments into binding rules, a practice indistinguishable from legislating. Gorsuch’s principle is also pertinent to something pernicious concerning which he has hitherto expressed wholesome skepticism: 'Chevron deference.' This is the policy (named for a 1984 case) whereby courts are required to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of 'ambiguous' laws when the interpretations are 'reasonable.'
|
” |
| —George Will, "Gorsuch strikes a blow against the administrative state"[15] | ||
Adam White, a Hoover Institution fellow and director of the Center for the Study of the Administrative State, argued that Gorsuch's opinion in Dimaya suggests the justice's concern for protecting the separation of powers and limiting vague delegations of authority by Congress. In a piece published by The Weekly Standard, White wrote:[16]
| “ | The split between Gorsuch, Thomas, and other conservatives on the court in Dimaya reminds us that even justices who might agree generally on the need to preserve the Constitution’s structure can disagree in individual cases. But by the same token, the unusual alignment of Gorsuch with the court's liberal justices should also remind us that a case’s outcome—or, more specifically, the partisan valence of the policy at issue in the case—can sometimes be a very poor proxy for the structural constitutional values at stake. Gorsuch’s invocation of themes critical of the modern administrative state, in an opinion supporting a decision against a generally deregulatory Trump administration, calls to my mind another recent opinion.
By the same token, after the political dust settles from the aourt’s decision in Dimaya, Gorsuch's concurrence might be remembered less for its limited impact on immigration policy than for being one of Gorsuch's first efforts as a justice to contribute to a judicial framework for much greater judicial skepticism of Congress's eager delegations of power (and thus accountability) to the other branches of our federal government, and for much greater judicial willingness to play a more significant role in preserving the Constitution's separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers.[4] |
” |
| —Adam White, "The Dimaya Decision Was More Than Gorsuch v. Trump"[16] | ||
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 United States Supreme Court, "Sessions v. Dimaya Opinion," April 17, 2018
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, James Garcia Dimaya v. Loretta E. Lynch, October 19, 2015
- ↑ Cornell University's Legal Information Institute, "18 U.S. Code § 16 - Crime of violence defined," accessed October 27, 2016
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States (via Findlaw), Johnson v. United States, decided June 26, 2015
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Dimaya, September 29, 2016
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Sessions v. Dimaya, argued October 2, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Sessions v. Dimaya, argued October 2, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Dimaya, argued January 17, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Lynch v. Dimaya, argued January 17, 2017
- ↑ Internal citations omitted.
- ↑ Internal citations omitted.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 The Volokh Conspiracy, "More on Sessions v. Dimaya and Crossover Sensation Neil Gorsuch," April 17, 2018
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Slate, "Neil Gorsuch’s Long Game," April 17, 2018
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 The Kansas City Star, "Gorsuch strikes a blow against the administrative state," April 19, 2018
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 The Weekly Standard, "The Dimaya Decision Was More Than Gorsuch v. Trump," April 19, 2018
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