Sweatt v. Painter
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| Sweatt v. Painter | |
| Reference: 339 U.S. 629 | |
| Term: 1950 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: April 4, 1950 Decided: June 5, 1950 | |
| Outcome | |
| Texas Supreme Court reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Frederick Vinson • Hugo Black • Stanley Reed • Felix Frankfurter • William Douglas • Robert H. Jackson • Harold Burton • Tom Clark • Sherman Minton | |
Sweatt v. Painter is a case decided on June 5, 1950, by the United States Supreme Court holding that the Equal Protection Clause challenged the separate but equal doctrine regarding law school admissions. The case concerned an individual who was rejected admission to the University of Texas Law School on the basis of his race. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Texas Supreme Court.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the Texas university from rejecting applications on the basis of race because their separate facility for African American law students was not equivalent to the original school. To read more about the impact of Sweatt v. Painter click here.
Background
A Black man named Herman Sweatt applied to the University of Texas Law School in 1946. The university limited admission to white students and therefore rejected Sweatt's application. When Sweatt appealed the decision, the university argued that they provided separate but equal facilities for African American law students. The lower court denied Sweatt's motion and ruled in favor of the university. Sweatt filed a writ of certiorari on the grounds that the rejection of his application had violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.[1][3]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on April 4, 1950. The case was decided on June 5, 1950.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided unanimously to reverse the decision of the Texas Supreme Court. Chief Justice Frederick Vinson delivered the opinion of the court.[2]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Chief Justice Frederick Vinson, writing for the court, argued that the University of Texas Law School's separate facility for African American students was not equal to the original law school. Vinson contended that Sweatt's right to equal protection had been violated because there was not substantial equality between the educational opportunities at the two facilities.[2]
| “ | Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close.[4] | ” |
| —Frederick Vinson, majority opinion in Sweatt v. Painter[2] | ||
Vinson continued that Sweatt had a constitutional right to an equal education which could not be achieved at another institution. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that the University of Texas Law School was required to admit Sweatt.
| “ | In accordance with these cases, petitioner may claim his full constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State. We cannot, therefore, agree with respondents that the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), requires affirmance of the judgment below. Nor need we reach petitioner's contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial segregation. See supra, p. 339 U. S. 631.
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| —Frederick Vinson, majority opinion in Sweatt v. Painter[2] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Equal Protection Clause
Sweatt v. Painter established that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the Texas university from rejecting applicants on the basis of race. The decision in this case challenged the separate but equal doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson and later influenced the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. This case was decided in conjunction with McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.[2]
See also
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Sweatt v. Painter," accessed September 14, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Justia, "Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)," accessed September 14, 2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 LexisNexis, "Sweatt v. Painter - 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950)," accessed September 14, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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