Tanner v. United States
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| Tanner v. United States | |
| Reference: 483 U.S. 107 | |
| Term: 1986 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: March 31, 1987 Decided: June 22, 1987 | |
| Outcome | |
| U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and remanded | |
| Majority | |
| Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist • Sandra Day O'Connor • Lewis Powell • Antonin Scalia • Byron White | |
| Concurring | |
| None | |
| Dissenting | |
| Harry Blackmun • William Brennan • Thurgood Marshall • John Paul Stevens | |
Tanner v. United States was decided on June 22, 1987, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case is famous for holding that a federal rule of evidence, Rule 606(b), did not require a federal district court to hold a second post-verdict evidentiary hearing in order to impeach a jury verdict allegedly tainted by juror drug and alcohol use during both the trial and jury deliberations.[1]
| Questions presented: Was a federal district court required to hold a second post-verdict evidentiary hearing to investigate claims of drug and alcohol use by jurors during trial proceedings? |
Case background
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), obtained a bank loan to fund construction of a power plant near Palatka, Florida. As part of the plant's construction, an access road would be built. The Rural Electrification Association (REA), a federal agency that guaranteed Seminole's loan, had rights to supervise the project. Seminole's procurement manager, William Conover, steered contracts for fill materials for the access road to his friend, Anthony Tanner, who illegally compensated Conover in cash and cash-equivalent services in return for steering Tanner the contracts. After a first trial resulted in a hung jury, Conover and Tanner were reindicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of mail fraud. Conover was convicted on all counts, and Tanner was convicted on the conspiracy charge and three of the four counts of mail fraud.
In the period between the jury verdict and sentencing, Tanner's attorney was contacted by a juror in the trial, Vera Asbul, who alleged in an affidavit that "several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons." Based on this affidavit, Tanner's attorney petitioned the court for an evidentiary hearing in order to interview jurors and for a new trial. A hearing was held, but the district court ruled that "[o]n the basis of the admissible evidence offered I specifically find that the motions for leave to interview jurors or for an evidentiary hearing at which jurors would be witnesses is not required or appropriate." The district court denied the motion for a new trial. While an appeal before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was pending, Tanner's attorney again filed motions with the district court for an evidentiary hearing to interview jurors and for a new trial. These motions were filed with an affidavit from another juror—Daniel Hardy—who alleged pervasive alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine use among some of the jurors during the trial, including his own marijuana use during the trial. The district court denied the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the motions contained "supplemental allegations which differ quantitatively but not qualitatively from those" motions filed previously. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.[1]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on March 31, 1987. The case was decided on June 22, 1987.[1]
Decision
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit was affirmed in part and remanded.[1]
Opinion
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor held that a federal rule of procedure, Rule 606(b), did not require the district court to hold a secondary post-verdict evidentiary hearing. Rule 606(b) prohibits admission of juror testimony to impeach a verdict absent an "extraneous influence" which could prejudice the verdict, such as a juror taking a bribe. Rule 606(b) says,[1]
| “ |
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. [2] |
” |
In Justice O'Connor's view, this rule was not applicable to juror affidavits alleging drug and alcohol abuse during the trial, noting that "however severe their effect and improper their use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an 'outside influence' than a virus, poorly prepared food, or a lack of sleep." Justice O'Connor noted several aspects of the trial process exist that protect against an impaired jury, such as jury selection (voir dire) and observation of the jury by the court, by counsel, by court personnel, and by other jurors prior to rendering a verdict. In addition, Justice O'Connor noted that a party may impeach a verdict by nonjuror evidence as well.[1]
Decision
Upon this interpretation of Rule 606(b), the court held that the district court was not wrong to deny a postverdict evidentiary hearing based on the inadmissibility of juror testimony and the insufficiency of the nonjuror evidence offered.[1]
Dissent
Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion—concurring in part and dissenting in part—that was joined by Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, and John Paul Stevens. Justice Marshall did not agree with the court's interpretation of Rule 606(b), arguing that "it is undisputed that Rule 606(b) does not exclude juror testimony as to matters occurring before or after deliberations ... Because petitioners' claim of juror misconduct and incompetency involves objectively verifiable conduct occurring prior to deliberations, juror testimony in support of the claims is admissible under Rule 606(b)" and that the "obvious conclusion ... is that ... Rule 606(b) would have permitted jurors to testify as to matters not involving deliberations." Because Justice Marshall felt that Rule 606(b) did not prohibit the type of testimony provided by jurors Absul and Hardy, arguing that the alleged drug and alcohol abuse was the type of "outside influence" that permitted admission of juror testimony under 606(b), he would have reversed the district court decision to deny an evidentiary hearing.[1]
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