United States v. Morrison
 | |
| United States v. Morrison | |
| Reference: 529 US 598 | |
| Term: 2000 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: Jan 11, 2000 Decided: May 15, 2000 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed | |
| Majority | |
| Sandra Day O'Connor • Anthony Kennedy • Chief Justice William Rehnquist • Antonin Scalia | |
| Concurring | |
| Clarence Thomas | |
| Dissenting | |
| Stephen Breyer • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • David Souter • John Paul Stevens | |
United States v. Morrison was a case decided on May 15, 2000, by the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that parts of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 were unconstitutional because they exceeded the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The decision invalidated the section of the Violence Against Women Act that gave victims the right to sue their attackers in federal court.[1] [2]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison determined that Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause or the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to enact Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act. To find out more about the impact of United States v. Morrison, click here.
Background
Congress in 1994 passed the Violence Against Women Act. Section 13981 of the act established a federal civil remedy for female victims of sexual violence even if no criminal charges had been filed against the alleged perpetrator.
In the fall of 1994, Virginia Tech student Christy Brzonkala alleged that she was assaulted by Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, two other students at the school. After the school-conducted hearings, Morrison was suspended. A state grand jury did not find sufficient evidence to charge either Morrison or Crawford with a crime. Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia heard the case and held that Congress lacked the authority to enact Section 13981 of the act. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reheard the case and reversed the panel, upholding the district court's judgment.
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on February 22, 2011. The case was decided on June 16, 2011.[2]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 5-4 to invalidate Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act. Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court and was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justices Stephen Breyer and David Souter wrote dissenting opinions joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.[1][2]
Opinions
- See also: Commerce Clause
Majority opinion
The majority ruled that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 exceeded congressional power and that Congress did not have the power to establish Section 13981 under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that Congress lacked authority to pass Section 13981 under the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
| “ | If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of ... Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States.[3] | ” |
| —Chief Justice William Rehnquist, majority opinion in United States v. Morrison[2] | ||
Concurring opinion
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence in which he called into question the substantial effects test of the Commerce Clause. In his opinion, Justice Thomas argued that Congress would continue to abuse the Commerce Clause if the court continued to adhere to a malleable standard:
| “ | I write separately only to express my view that the very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, however circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.[3] | ” |
| —Justice Thomas, concurring opinion in United States v. Morrison[2] | ||
Dissenting opinions
Justices Stephen Breyer and David Souter wrote dissenting opinions and were joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Breyer wrote that the case showed the difficulty of interpreting the Commerce Clause. He wrote that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone."[1]
In Justice Souter's dissent, he argued that the act illustrated the effect of violence against women on interstate commerce. He wrote that the bill contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."[1]
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Commerce Clause
United States v. Morrison invalidated Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 that gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court.[2] Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the majority and said that the result was controlled by United States v. Lopez, which had held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional. Additionally, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Constitution sets up enumerated powers that limit federal power to maintain "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."[2] The majority also held that Congress lacked the power to enact VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Attorney and author Wendy Kaminer agreed with the court's ruling and argued that upholding Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act would mean granting the government unlimited power that it could use to abuse individual rights. She wrote, "The price of upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy is an unconstitutional grant of unlimited power to Congress, power that will not always be used wisely or with regard to individual rights. We need to combat sexual violence without making a federal case of it."[4]
Feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon criticized the court's ruling for relying on what she considered to be implicitly patriarchal legal reasoning.[5] She argued that the court used the principle of federalism to protect state sovereignty in the sphere of equality and individual rights and she drew parallels between the doctrines of federalism embraced by the Taney Court and the Rehnquist Court with respect to equal rights for minorities:
| “ | There may be a more direct relation between the denial of equality and the Court's new view of the formal doctrine of federalism. On a deeper level of law and politics, and against an historical backdrop of the use of federalism to deny racial equality and enforce white supremacy, Morrison can be seen to employ ostensibly gender-neutral tools to achieve a substantive victory for the social institution of male dominance. Read substantively, Morrison is not an abstract application of neutral institutional priorities, but a refusal to allow Congress to redress violence against women—a problem the Court declined to see as one of economic salience or national dimension. In Morrison, the Court revived and deployed against women the odious 'states' rights' doctrine, the principal legal argument for the maintenance of slavery that was used to deny equality rights on racial grounds well into this century.[3] | ” |
| —Catharine MacKinnon, "Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison," in Harvard Law Review Vol. 114: 135.[5] | ||
See also
External links
- Oyez, United States v. Morrison
- Justia, United States v. Morrison
- Cornell, United States v. Morrison
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oyez, "United States v. Morrison" accessed June 10,2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Justia, "United States v. Morrison" accessed June 10,2022
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ The American Prospect, "Sexual Congress," February 14, 2000
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Harvard Law Review, "Disputing Male Sovereignty," accessed June 13, 2022
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