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Weaver v. Massachusetts

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Supreme Court of the United States
Weaver v. Massachusetts
Reference: 16-240
Issue: Sixth Amendment
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: April 19, 2017
Decided: June 22, 2017
Outcome
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
Vote
7-2 to affirm
Majority
Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Sonia Sotomayor • Neil Gorsuch
Concurring
Thomas • Samuel Alito (in the judgment) • Gorsuch
Dissenting
Stephen Breyer • Elena Kagan


Weaver v. Massachusetts is a case argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on April 19, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

On June 22, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court affirmed the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment only which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Elena Kagan.

In this case, the court held that a criminal defendant must demonstrate prejudice when making an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim even if counsel's error results in a structural error. Structural errors typically do not require a criminal defendant to prove prejudice in order to secure a vacated conviction and a new trial; however, even if a structural error results from counsel's performance, the court held that a defendant must still make a necessary showing of prejudice when making an IAC claim.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Under the Sixth Amendment, structural errors – fundamental errors which affects the structure of a trial – do not require a criminal defendant to prove these types of errors prejudiced a conviction. The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, on the other hand, requires a criminal defendant to prove not only that counsel erred, but that the error prejudiced the outcome at trial. Weaver alleged his attorney's failure to object to a courtroom closure during jury selection constituted deficient performance of counsel and that this deficiency caused a structural error. Because the closure was a structural error, Weaver argued that he did not need to demonstrate prejudice. A Massachusetts lower court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected Weaver's claim, holding that any claim of deficient performance – even one attending a structural error – required a defendant to a make a necessary showing that his trial was prejudiced based on his counsel's performance.
  • The issue: Must a criminal defendant demonstrate prejudice when claiming deficient performance of counsel if counsel's error results in a structural error?
  • The outcome: The appeal is pending adjudication before the U.S. Supreme Court.


    • In brief: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the closure of a public trial under the Sixth Amendment is a structural error– a fundamental error which affects the structure of a trial – and that this error does not require a criminal defendant to demonstrate that the lack of a public trial prejudiced a conviction. The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, on the other hand, requires a criminal defendant to prove not only that counsel erred but that the outcome at trial was prejudiced as a result of the error, based the court's holding in Strickland v. Washington. Weaver alleged his attorney's failure to object to the closure of a courtroom during jury selection constituted deficient performance of counsel and that this deficiency caused a structural error. Because of this, Weaver argued that he did not need to demonstrate prejudice, even though this is a requirement to prove deficient counsel under the Sixth Amendment. A Massachusetts lower court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected Weaver's claim, holding that any claim of deficient performance – even one attending a structural error – required a defendant to demonstrate prejudice. Argument in the case was held on April 19, 2017.

    You can review the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion here.[1]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case

    Background

    In 2003, then 16-year-old Kentel Myrone Weaver was arrested for murder. During jury selection, the pool of potential jurors was so large that the courtroom was closed because the room could not accommodate the large number. Some of the potential jurors were required to wait outside. Weaver's mother and other supporters could not enter the courtroom during two days of jury selection as the courtroom was closed. Weaver's attorney was notified but raised no objection under the belief that the courtroom closure was constitutional. After two days of jury selection, there were no further closures to the courtroom. Weaver was convicted at trial.[1]

    Five years later, Weaver moved for a new trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a public trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that denial of a public trial under the Constitution is a structural error – a fundamental error which affects the structure of a trial – and that this error does not require a criminal defendant to demonstrate that the lack of a public trial prejudiced his conviction.[1]

    Weaver, however, alleged that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel that is also required under the Sixth Amendment because his attorney did not object to the closed courtroom during jury selection. In order to prove deficient counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington that not only must a defendant demonstrate counsel made an unreasonable error but the defendant must also demonstrate this error prejudiced the defendant so much that, without the error, the outcome would have been different.[1]

    A trial judge in Massachusetts denied Weaver his motion for a new trial because Weaver's claim of deficient counsel was not advanced by any evidence that the jury was prejudiced by this error. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed under its own precedents, holding when a courtroom closure is not challenged at trial but is instead part of a post-trial claim of deficient counsel, that the requirement a defendant demonstrate prejudice in order to prove deficient counsel is not waived even if the courtroom closure is itself a structural error.[1]

    According to Rory Little of SCOTUSBlog, "This question of which standard should govern – the 'no-prejudice' rule for structural errors or the prejudice requirement for ineffective assistance claims – when a structural error results from a lawyer’s ineffective assistance has 'split' a number of state supreme and federal circuit courts. It is obviously important as a general matter for structural errors of all kinds (not just public-trial errors), because it shifts the burden of proving or disproving prejudice from one party to the other, thereby affecting the likelihood that criminal convictions will be reversed."[2]

    Petitioner's challenge

    Kentel Myrone Weaver, the petitioner, challenged the holding of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that he must meet the Strickland requirement to demostrate prejudice when his attorney's error caused a structural error in his trial.

    Certiorari granted

    On August 18, 2016, Kentel Myrone Weaver, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the town's certiorari request on January 13, 2017. Argument in the case was held on April 19, 2017.[3]

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "The question presented is whether a defendant asserting ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness, as held by four circuits and five state courts of last resort; or whether prejudice is presumed in such cases, as held by four other circuits and two state high courts."[3]


    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[4]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[5]

    Outcome

    Decision

    On June 22, 2017, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court affirmed the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment only which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Elena Kagan.

    In this case, the court held that a criminal defendant must demonstrate prejudice when making an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim even if counsel's error results in a structural error. Structural errors typically do not require a criminal defendant to prove prejudice in order to secure a vacated conviction and a new trial; however, even if a structural error results from counsel's performance, the court held that a defendant must still make a necessary showing of prejudice when making an IAC claim.[6]

    Opinion

    After a review of the factual and procedural record of the case, Justice Kennedy outlined the standards by which these types of claims must be considered. He wrote,[6]

    “

    The question ... becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. ... when a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, ... prejudice is not shown automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or her case or, as the Court has assumed for these purposes ... to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair. ... Although the case comes on the assumption that petitioner has shown deficient performance by counsel ... petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel’s failure to object, and he has not shown that counsel’s shortcomings led to a fundamentally unfair trial. He is not entitled to a new trial.[7]

    		”

    As a result of the court's opinion, the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was affirmed.

    Concurring opinions

    Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas wrote separately to mark two observations about the court's holdnig. He wrote that he was not certain the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to jury selection. He also disagreed with the court's assumption that, under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant can establish prejudice merely by demonstrating counsel's errors rendered a trial fundamentally unfair; however, because this assumption was not central to the court's ultimate holding in this case, Justice Thomas felt that he no part of that discussion was necessary to the court's result.[6]

    Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment only which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. In his view, Justice Alito argued that the court's prior holding in Strickland v. Washington was sufficient to dispose of this case as the petitioner principally addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As Justice Alito wrote, "this case calls for a straightforward application of the familiar standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. ... Weaver cannot meet that standard, and therefore his claim must be rejected."[6]

    Dissenting opinions

    Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Elena Kagan. Justice Breyer agreed with the court that a prejudice inquiry under Strickland was "not meant to be applied in a 'mechanical' fashion." However, Justice Breyer argued,[6]

    “

    in my view, it follows from this principle that a defendant who shows that his attorney’s constitutionally deficient performance produced a structural error should not face the additional—and often insurmountable—Strickland hurdle of demonstrating that the error changed the outcome of his proceeding. ... Nor would I give lower courts the unenviably complex job of deciphering which structural errors really undermine fundamental fairness and which do not—that game is not worth the candle. I would simply say that just as structural errors are categorically insusceptible to harmless-error analysis on direct review, so too are they categorically insusceptible to actual-prejudice analysis in Strickland claims. A showing that an attorney’s constitutionally deficient performance produced a structural error should consequently be enough to entitle a defendant to relief.[7]

    		”

    The opinion


    Filings

    The U.S. Supreme Court granted Weaver's certiorari request on January 31, 2017.

    Merits filings

    Parties' briefs

    • Kentel Myrone Weaver, the petitioner, filed a merits brief on February 27, 2017.

    Amicus curiae briefs

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioner, Kentel Myrone Weaver:

    • Brief of the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
    • Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
    • Brief of the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press and the Society of Professional Journalists
    • Brief of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics et al.

    The United States of America filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the respondent, the commonwealth of Massachusetts:

    • Brief of the United States of America

    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • Kentel Myrone Weaver, the petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari on August 18, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs in support of granting certiorari:

    See also

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth v. Kentel Myrone Weaver, decided July 20, 2016
    2. ↑ SCOTUSBlog.com, "Argument preview: Case asking whether 'prejudice' must be shown when a criminal lawyer’s mistake leads to a 'structural' public-trial error could have vehicle problems," April 12, 2017
    3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Weaver v. Massachusetts, January 13, 2017
    4. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, 'Weaver v. Massachusetts, argued April 19, 2017
    5. ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Weaver v. Massachusetts, argued April 19, 2017
    6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Supreme Court of the United States, Kentel Myrone Weaver v. Massachusetts, June 22, 2017
    7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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