Wilson v. Sellers

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Wilson v. Sellers | |
Term: 2017 | |
Important Dates | |
Argument: October 30, 2017 Decided: April 17, 2018 | |
Outcome | |
Eleventh Circuit reversed | |
Vote | |
6 - 3 to reverse | |
Majority | |
Stephen Breyer • Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan | |
Dissenting | |
Neil Gorsuch • Clarence Thomas • Samuel Alito |
Wilson v. Sellers is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 30, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit.
You can review the lower court's opinion here.[2]
Background
Legal background
On appeal, many individuals convicted of a crime will raise a challenge to the manner or procedure under which they were convicted. These types of proceedings are known as habeas proceedings and the type of relief sought is called habeas relief. Habeas proceedings take place at both the state and federal level. Federal law mandates that a petitioner must exhaust all avenues of state habeas relief in order to petition for federal habeas relief.
During state habeas proceedings, the initial lower court to hear the petition for relief will issue a reasoned opinion. A reasoned opinion will provide a legal basis and discussion of why a petitioner's claims were granted or denied. If a petitioner's claims are denied, the petitioner may often appeal the lower court's decision to a state appellate court. These appeals are mandatory in some states, like Georgia, and discretionary in other states.
Given the volume of state habeas petitions on appeal, if, upon examination, a state appeals court holds that the lower court's judgment on the habeas petition was correct, the state appellate court may issue a summary disposition upholding the lower court's judgment that is unaccompanied by a reasoned opinion.[3] "Summary dispositions are unexplained decisions that typically contain no information beyond the result—in other words, just 'granted' or 'denied.'"[4]
Under a federal law, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), federal habeas courts are directed to review the last state court judgment on the merits. Depending on the state, the process used for state habeas review will determine whether the lower court's reasoned opinion or the state appellate court's summary disposition constitutes the last adjudication on the merits. If a state court's habeas review is discretionary, the state appellate court's summary disposition is not considered to have been an adjudication on the merits. Under a precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court, Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the federal habeas court must look through the state appellate court's summary disposition to evaluate the last reasoned opinion as this opinion is considered the last adjudication on the merits.
On the other hand, if a state provides a petitioner a right of mandatory habeas review by a state appellate court, as was required in Georgia at the time of this case, then the state appellate court's decision is considered the last adjudication on the merits based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harrington v. Richter. This is true even if the state appellate court's judgment is a summary disposition. Under Richter, when the last adjudicated decision on the merits is a summary disposition, §2254(d) requires a petitioner to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for a state court to deny habeas relief.[2][4]
Case background
Marion Wilson Jr., the petitioner, was convicted of several felonies in Georgia related to the 1996 death of Donovan Parks, including malice murder and felony murder. Wilson received a capital sentence for the crimes. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld Wilson's convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Subsequent to that decision, Wilson filed for habeas relief in the Superior Court of Butts County. Wilson argued that his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to present evidence that may have mitigated his capital sentence. After proceedings were held, the superior court issued a reasoned decision in which the court outlined its rationale for denying Wilson's petition. Under Georgia law, in order to review a denial for habeas relief, Wilson was required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal (CPC). Wilson was afforded a mandatory right of appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court to petition for the CPC. The state supreme court upheld the superior court's decision and denied the CPC in a one-line summary disposition: "Denied."[2][4]
Wilson petitioned for habeas relief in federal district court. The court denied habeas relief, holding that the state court reasonably applied the law. The court, however, granted Wilson a certificate of appealability (COA), which is used in federal habeas proceedings, to appeal Wilson's claim of ineffective counsel. A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal. The panel upheld the federal district court's decision to deny Wilson habeas relief. Citing Richter, the panel determined that the Georgia Supreme Court's one-line summary disposition constituted the final decision on the merits and that, under Richter, Wilson was required to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the state supreme court to deny relief. The panel ruled that Wilson had failed to do so.[2][4]
Wilson petitioned for an en banc rehearing before the full Eleventh Circuit. Wilson "argued that the panel erred when it reviewed the summary denial of his petition for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson argued that, under the decision in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, ... the panel should have instead examined the last reasoned decision by a state court," which in this case was the opinion issued by the Superior Court of Butts County. The court ordered Georgia to respond to Wilson's petition. Georgia argued that, under Richter, the Eleventh Circuit panel was required only to look through to see if the Georgia Supreme Court's summary disposition was procedural or a decision on the merits. Further, Georgia argued that once the federal panel determined that the Georgia Supreme Court's disposition constituted a decision on the merits, the panel was bound by federal law to give deference to the state supreme court's decision.[2][4]
The full Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to rehear the case en banc and vacated the panel's decision. Before the full Eleventh Circuit, Georgia modified its position to match Wilson's. Both argued that the Eleventh Circuit was bound by Ylst to look through the Georgia Supreme Court's summary disposition to the reasoning of the state superior court's opinion. The Eleventh Circuit appointed an amicus curiae to argue the opposite position, which is permitted when an appellate court grants certiorari on a question of law and, subsequent to that decision, a party abandons its original position such that both parties to an appeal are in agreement on the question for which the court granted certiorari.[2][4]
Eleventh Circuit en banc opinion
The full Eleventh Circuit divided 6-5 in favor of upholding the circuit panel's decision to deny Wilson habeas relief.[5] Judge William Pryor wrote the opinion for the panel majority. Judges Adalberto Jordan and Jill Pryor each wrote dissenting opinions that were both joined by all of the judges in the minority.
Writing for the court majority, Judge William Pryor divided the court's opinion into two parts. First, Judge Pryor held that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (hereafter, AEDPA or the Act) and in accordance with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Georgia Supreme Court's summary disposition constituted an adjudication on the merits.
Pryor next addressed the argument raised by both Wilson and Georgia that the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Ylst required the Eleventh Circuit to look through the summary disposition of the Georgia Supreme Court and to the last reasoned opinion, which was the state superior court's decision denying Wilson his petition for habeas relief. Both Wilson and Georgia argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Richter applied in the total absence of a reasoned opinion authored by any state court and that, under §2254(d), "when a previous state adjudication offered a reasoned opinion, Ylst requires federal courts to 'look through' the summary denial and review that previous opinion."[2]
Writing for the court, Judge Pryor rejected this interpretation. Limiting the scope of Ylst to appeals that were procedurally defaulted, Pryor wrote,[2]
“ |
Nothing in the Act or Richter suggests that its reasoning is limited to the narrow subset of habeas petitions where there is no reasoned decision from any state court. Under section 2254(d), a federal court reviewing the judgment of a state court must first identify the last adjudication on the merits. It does not matter whether that adjudication provided a reasoned opinion because section 2254(d) refers only to a 'decision' and does not 'requir[e] a statement of reasons.' ... The federal court then must review that decision deferentially. ... There is no basis in the Act or Richter for two divergent analytical modes—one when there is no previous reasoned decision below and another for when there is. ... We should not apply Ylst to a different context that it did not address. Ylst creates a rebuttable presumption that state procedural default rulings are not undone by unexplained orders. ... It does not direct a federal court to treat the reasoning of a decision on the merits by a lower court as the reasoning adopted by a later summary decision that affirms on appeal, especially since neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court operates that way. ... Because appellate courts may affirm for different reasons, federal courts should not, under the deferential standard of review established in section 2254, assume that the summary affirmances of state appellate courts adopt the reasoning of the court below. ... Nothing in Georgia law or the practice of the Georgia Supreme Court proves that a summary denial of an application for a certificate of probable cause adopts the reasoning of the superior court. ... Because appellate courts may affirm for different reasons, presuming that state appellate courts affirm only for the precise reasons given by a lower court deprives them of the 'benefit of the doubt' that that Act and Richter require.[6] |
” |
Dissenting opinions
Judge Adalberto Jordan authored one of two dissenting opinions in this case. In his opinion, Judge Jordan predicted that the U.S. Supreme Court would reverse the majority in this case by holding that Ylst, and not Richter, was the appropriate governing precedent. In his view, Judge Jordan also argued that none of the other federal appeals courts had interpreted Richter as the majority did, nor did the majority's position find support among at least two of the sitting U.S. Supreme Court justices at the time this case was heard, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan.
Jordan wrote,[2]
“ |
If we are candid, we should acknowledge that the best we can do is predict which line of authority the Supreme Court will use to decide whether, in an AEDPA habeas case, it is appropriate to presume that the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial of a certificate of probable cause is based on the rationale articulated by the trial court in its reasoned decision. My prediction is that the Supreme Court will decide the issue differently than the en banc majority and hold that the presumption in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, ... governs. ... Two members of the Supreme Court believe that we erred in failing to apply the Ylst look-through presumption to the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial of a certificate of probable cause. ... Two Justices do not a majority make, but their views should be given due consideration. As far as I can tell, all of the circuits to have considered the look through issue limit Richter to situations where there is no reasoned decision by any state court. ... There should be strong reasons for creating a circuit split, and I do not see any such reasons here. The views of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, moreover, make practical sense. ... As I understand our circuit precedent following today’s decision, when a state supreme court denies a claim in a reasoned opinion by relying on a single rationale and expressly declines to address a different rationale articulated by the lower court, a federal habeas court can nevertheless look through that state supreme court opinion and review (with AEDPA deference) the different rationale offered by the lower court in its reasoned opinion, on the theory that the supreme court’s silence indicates acquiescence as to that unaddressed rationale. But when a state supreme court denies a claim summarily—i.e., without saying anything whatsoever about the lower court’s rationale—a federal habeas court cannot look through the summary denial to the reasoned opinion of the lower court because in that scenario, apparently, silence does not indicate consent. Why this is so remains a mystery, and it will be left to district courts and future Eleventh Circuit panels to sort out the doctrinal mess.[6] |
” |
Judge Jill Pryor also authored a dissenting opinion in this case. She wrote,[2]
“ |
The majority’s decision today requires federal habeas courts under § 2254(d) to defer to a summary decision of the Georgia Supreme Court so long as a federal court can conjure up any ground upon which relief reasonably could have been denied, even when the superior court’s reasoning was contrary to clearly established law. To reach this result, the majority ignores United States Supreme Court cases that direct us to presume that the Georgia Supreme Court silently adopted the superior court’s reasoning. And the majority ignores the evidence that the Georgia Supreme Court intends and understands its summary denials to mean that it agrees with the superior court’s reasoning. Instead, the majority relies on the unsupported assumption that federal cases addressing the meaning federal appellate courts assign their summary decisions dictate what the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary decisions mean. Rather than working the careful balance between the state and federal system that AEDPA and our Constitution require, the majority opinion does the very opposite.[6] |
” |
Petitioner's challenge
Marion Wilson Jr., the petitioner, challenged the holding of the Eleventh Circuit. Wilson argued that the en banc majority was required to assess his appeal by looking through the Georgia Supreme Court's summary disposition to the last reasoned opinion presented by his habeas appeal, which was the Butts County Superior Court decision.
Certiorari granted
On November 10, 2016, Marion Wilson Jr., the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Wilson's certiorari request on February 27, 2017. Argument in the case was held on October 30, 2017.[7]
Question presented
Question presented: "Did this Court's decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) - that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should 'look through' a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision - as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the 'Ylst' presumption should continue to apply?"[7] |
Audio
- Audio of oral argument:[8]
Transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[9]
Outcome
Decision
On a 6 -3 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.[1]
Majority opinion
Justice Stephen Breyer authored the opinion for the court, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Breyer wrote:
“ | We hold that the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.[1][6] | ” |
Breyer ruled that federal habeas law ",employs a 'look through' presumption," writing that the Supreme Court had previously looked through to lower court rulings. He emphasized that the look through presumption could be overcome, writing, "Where there are convincing grounds to believe the silent court had a different basis for its decision than the analysis followed by the previous court, the federal habeas court is free, as we have said, to find to the contrary. In our view, this approach is more likely to respect what the state court actually did, and easier to apply in practice, than to ask the federal court to substitute for silence the federal court’s thought as to more supportive reasoning."[1]
Dissent
Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented from the majority opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Gorsuch wrote, "As the text and our precedent make clear, a federal habeas court must focus its review on the final state court decision on the merits, not any preceding decision by an inferior state court." Gorsuch argued that the habeas statute did not contain the look through presumption identified by the petitioner and the majority. He concluded:
“ | We demand the opposite presumption for our work—telling readers that we independently review each case and that our summary affirmances may be read only as signaling agreement with a lower court’s judgment and not necessarily its reasons. Because I can discern no good reason to treat the work of our state court colleagues with less respect than we demand for our own, I would reject petitioner’s presumption and must respectfully dissent.[1][6] | ” |
The opinion
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 United States Supreme Court, "Wilson v. Sellers Opinion," April 17, 2018
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Marion Wilson Jr. v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, August 23, 2016
- ↑ Most often, if a state appellate court reverses a lower state court's judgment on habeas relief, there will be a reasoned opinion provided so the lower court judge can properly address any outstanding legal issues on remand.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 University of Chicago Law Review, "Taming Cerberus: The Beast at AEDPA’s Gates," August 15, 2017
- ↑ At the time of this decision, there was a vacancy on the court created by Judge Joel Dubina's 2013 decision to take senior status on the court. Senior federal judges do not sit for en banc rehearings on federal appeals courts.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Wilson v. Sellers, February 27, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Wilson v. Sellers, argued October 30, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Wilson v. Sellers, argued October 30, 2017