Constitutional Case Video

Judicial Deference:

Navigate through this content:

• Syllabus/Course Contents
• Video: Introduction to Judicial Deference
• Reading 1: Cynthia R. Farina, "Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State"
  • Link to the Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Reading 2: Jonathan R. Siegel, "The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference"
  • Link to the Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Reading 3: Michael Kagan, "Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions"
  • Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Expert Interview: Kent Barnett
• Expert Interview: Adam White
• Expert Q and A
• Further Reading

"The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference" by Jonathan R. Siegel

Transcript:

This video is about the article “The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference” by Jonathan Siegel. Siegel defends the constitutionality of Chevron deference by addressing leading critiques of the doctrine. The article presents three main critiques of Chevron deference followed by the author’s responses.

The first critique of Chevron deference presented in the article is the claim that Article III of the U.S. Constitution prohibits courts from deferring to agency interpretations of statutes because it vests judicial power in the courts alone. The article responds to this critique by claiming that judges still interpret the law under Chevron deference. Concluding that a statute contains a delegation of authority to an administrative agency, according to the article, is still an interpretation of the law. Concluding that a statute is ambiguous and that Congress gave agencies the power to make a policy choice is also an interpretation of the law.

The next critique of Chevron deference put forth in the article is that Chevron deference violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution by requiring judges to accept agency interpretations of unclear statutes. Chevron deference, according to this critique, creates bias in favor of agencies that tips the scales in favor of the government. In response to this critique, the article argues that bias does not exist if courts are allowed to deem an ambiguous statute to be a delegation of a policy choice to agencies.

The final critique addressed in the article is that Chevron deference violates the nondelegation doctrine by allowing Congress to delegate legislative power to agencies, which concentrates authority in the executive branch. The article, however, claims that Chevron deference isn’t the root of the nondelegation critique. Instead, nondelegation concerns lie primarily with Congress, which fuels delegation by passing statutes that give agencies vast grants of authority. Chevron deference, according to the article, isn’t the primary driver of nondelegation objections.