Statutory Interpretation Video

Judicial Deference:

Navigate through this content:

• Syllabus/Course Contents
• Video: Introduction to Judicial Deference
• Reading 1: Cynthia R. Farina, "Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State"
  • Link to the Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Reading 2: Jonathan R. Siegel, "The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference"
  • Link to the Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Reading 3: Michael Kagan, "Loud and Soft Anti-Chevron Decisions"
  • Reading
  • Video: About the reading (~5 min)
  • Reflect on "go deeper" questions for self-study
• Expert Interview: Kent Barnett
• Expert Interview: Adam White
• Expert Q and A
• Further Reading

"Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State" by Cynthia Farina

Transcript:

This video is about the article “Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State” by Cynthia Farina. Farina’s piece is about the Chevron deference doctrine, which is the most common form of deference.

According to the article, the Chevron model of deference was more extreme than prior versions of deference because it requires courts to give up their duty to interpret the law any time ambiguity arises in a statute. As a result, the agency’s judgment will virtually always control the outcome. The article further claims that the ability of agencies to define the limits of their own authority under Chevron deference could facilitate the expansion of their own powers.

But what was the Supreme Court’s motivation for creating Chevron deference?

The article claims that the Supreme Court viewed the Chevron decision as an opportunity to control how power flowed through the growing administrative state. At the time, it was argued that Chevron deference would stop judges from usurping congressional delegations of power to agencies. It was also claimed that agencies are more politically accountable than courts and, therefore, Chevron deference safeguarded policymaking power in hands closer to the people.

The article argues, however, that Chevron requires the rejection of basic aspects of earlier constitutional theory by accepting that the U.S. Constitution allows Congress to empower agencies to decide what statutes mean. Ambiguity in statutes, the article claims, does not necessarily mean that Congress meant to allow agencies to make policy choices.

Therefore, the article concludes that Chevron deference threatens the Constitution’s separation of powers by authorizing agencies to determine statutory intent and, at the same time, weakening the ability of judges to act as a check on the abuse of agency power.