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Adarand Constructors v. Peña
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña is a case that was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1995. The Supreme Court held that racial classifications imposed by the federal government must be analyzed under a standard of strict scrutiny and that race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage.[1]
Background
Prior to 1995, many government contracts led by various agencies of the United States government contained incentives for contractors to subcontract to disadvantages individuals. The U.S. Small Business Administration included businesses owned by racial or ethnic minority groups or women as disadvantaged.[1][2]
In 1989, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) awarded a Colorado highway contract to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company. Mountain Gravel subcontracted, with the lowest bid coming from Adarand Constructors. Another company, Gonzales Construction, submitted a higher bid. However, Gonzales Construction was certified by the Small Business Administration as a disadvantaged business, and so Mountain Gravel gave Gonzales Construction the contract due to the financial incentives from the DOT for using a disadvantaged business. [2][3]
Adarand Constructors filed suit in federal court against the DOT, arguing that the subcontracting incentives were unconstitutional. The federal court ruled in favor of the DOT. Adarand Constructors appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard the case in January 1995.[3]
Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found the case in favor of Adarand. The Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review, meaning they must serve a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. The court held that race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and favored treatment based on all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard, but that compensation programs which are based on disadvantage are legal and would be judged by lower standards than strict scrutiny.[1][3]
The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Thomas Kennedy and Clarence Thomas. O'Connor wrote the following in the majority opinion:[1]
| “ | If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, [Korematsu], but the standard of justification will remain constant.[4] | ” |
| —Justice Sandra Day O'Connor | ||
Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer dissented. Ginsburg wrote the following in her dissent:[1]
| “ | The divisions in this difficult case should not obscure the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's acknowledgement of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects.[4] | ” |
| —Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg | ||
See also
External links
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Cornell University Law School, "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena," accessed November 18, 2015
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Civil Rights Monitor, "ADARAND v. PENA," accessed November 18, 2015
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Oyez.org, "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña," accessed November 18, 2015
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
