Terry v. Ohio

Terry v. Ohio
Reference: 392 U.S. 1
Term: 1967
Important Dates
Argued: December 12, 1967 Decided: June 10, 1968
Outcome
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed
Majority
Chief Justice Earl Warren • Hugo Black • William Brennan • Abe Fortas • John M. Harlan • Thurgood Marshall • Potter Stewart • Byron White
Concurring
Black • Harlan • White
Dissenting
William O. Douglas

Terry v. Ohio was decided on June 10, 1968, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case is famous for holding that a limited search of a suspect's exterior clothing to check for weapons based on a police officer's reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The type of searches in this case are known as stop-and-frisk or "Terry" stops.

Questions presented: Did the police officer's search constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure?

Case background

After witnessing John Terry, Richard Chilton, and Carl Katz pausing to stare in the same store window a number of times, Detective Martin McFadden of the Cleveland police department approached the men, identified himself, and asked them to identify themselves. Detective McFadden had 30 years' experience with the force and was working a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years. In the course of his interview, McFadden had cause to spin Terry around and pat down the exterior of his clothing. McFadden discovered a pistol in Terry's overcoat pocket that he was unable to remove. McFadden ordered the three men into the store where he removed Terry's overcoat, told the men to face the wall with their hands raised, and proceeded to pat down the other two men. During Detective McFadden's pat down of the other men, McFadden seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. McFadden did not go inside the interior of Katz's clothing as he found nothing to indicate a weapon during his pat down of Katz. McFadden arrested Terry and Chilton for carrying concealed weapons in violation of Ohio law. At trial, Terry & Chilton's counsel moved to suppress the weapons, arguing that the guns had been seized incident to an unlawful arrest. The court denied this motion, holding that the officer had cause to believe that Terry and Chilton were acting in a suspicious manner, that McFadden's interrogation was warranted, and that the officer had reasonable cause to pat down the suspects for his own personal protection. The court recognized a distinction "between an investigatory 'stop' and an arrest, and between a 'frisk' of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime." Terry and Chilton were convicted. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Terry and Chilton's appeal, finding "no substantial constitutional question" sufficient to warrant review.

Oral argument

Oral argument was held on December 12, 1967. The case was decided on June 10, 1968.

Decision

The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court was affirmed.

Opinion

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the court for an eight-justice majority. Justices Hugo Black, John M. Harlan, and Byron White authored concurring opinions but signed onto the court's opinion as well. After a factual and procedural review of the case, Chief Justice Warren noted the "difficult and troublesome issues"—issues which had "never been squarely presented" to the court—that the case presented. The Chief Justice framed the issues thusly,

“

On the one hand, it is frequently argued that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. For this purpose it is urged that distinctions should be made between a 'stop' and an 'arrest' (or a 'seizure' of a person), and between a 'frisk' and a 'search.' ... On the other side ... it is contended with some force that there is not - and cannot be - a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest.

”

In acknowledging the "limitations of the judicial function", Chief Justice Warren framed the court's opinion around a "quite narrow question posed by the facts." That is, "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for his arrest." After conceding in his opinion that there was "no question" that McFadden both searched and seized Terry and Chilton within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Warren argued that an assessment of the reasonableness of McFadden's search and seizure was necessary, for the Fourth Amendment only protects against searches that are unreasonable. The chief justice maintained that "there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search or seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails.' And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

In his assessment of the balance between Officer McFadden's safety and the scale and scope of McFadden's search, Chief Justice Warren concluded that McFadden's search was reasonable. The chief justice, in affirming the convictions, outlined the proper circumstances in which searches of the type that McFadden performed would be considered reasonable,

“

where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

”

Searches of the type that were upheld as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment are known as stop-and-frisk. As a result of this case, these encounters as also known as "Terry" stops.

Concurrences

Three justices, Justice Hugo Black, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron White each authored concurring opinions. Justice Black's concurrence was a one sentence opinion indicating his concurrence in the judgment and in the court's opinion "except where the opinion quotes from and relies upon this Court's opinion in Katz v. United States and the concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden."

Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurrence arguing for a more pronounced rule regarding the circumstances under which McFadden's search was upheld and which would guide police in the future. Justice Harlan wrote, "I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same reasons the Court relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I think is implicit in affirmance on the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that forced encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take suitable measures for his own safety followed automatically."

Justice White wrote to acknowledge his own view that a brief detention for the purposes of interrogation was merited under the Fourth Amendment. In his words, "if the investigative stop is sustainable at all, constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process."

Dissent

Justice William O. Douglas was the only justice to author a dissent in this case. Justice Douglas felt that the Fourth Amendment did not allow for searches and seizures of any form absent a showing of probable cause. Justice Douglas noted,

“

it is a mystery how that 'search' and that 'seizure' can be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, unless there was 'probable cause' to believe that (1) a crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed. The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of 'probable cause' ... There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today. Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can 'seize' and 'search' him in their discretion, we enter a new regime.

”

Impact

As a result of the court's opinion in this case, investigatory searches for weapons based on a police officer's reasonable suspicion were held to be valid under the Fourth Amendment. The use of stop and frisk procedures, however, have not been without controversy. In August 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in Floyd v. City of New York that the New York Police Department's (NYPD) "stop-and-frisk" rule, which the NYPD credited with saving lives, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Judge Scheindlin also found that officers used racial profiling during the process, unfairly targeting minorities. Judge Scheindlin noted, however, that stop and frisk policies were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and she suggested steps to make the process more equitable, including a pilot project where police officers would wear body cameras to record interactions as well as soliciting public feedback on the program.

In October 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stayed Judge Scheindlin's proposed remedies pending appeal. Judge Scheindlin's objectivity was called into question based on interviews she gave in May 2013. In response to the accusation that she violated the Code of Conduct for federal judges, Scheindlin said:

“

The interviews . . . were conducted under the express condition that I would not comment on the Floyd case. I did not. Some of the reporters used quotes from written opinions in Floyd that gave the appearance that I had commented on the case. However, a careful reading of each interview will reveal that no such comments were made.

”

On November 22, 2013, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals composed of Judges Jose Cabranes, John Walker and Barrington Parker refused to vacate Judge Scheindlin's opinion striking the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy.

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court
• 2016 presidential candidates on stop and frisk

External links

• Supreme Court of the United States