Elena Kagan

Elena Kagan

Nonpartisan

Supreme Court of the United States

Tenure

2010 - Present

Years in position

15

Predecessor

John Paul Stevens

Education

Bachelor's

Princeton University, 1981

Graduate

Worcester College, Oxford, M. Phil., 1983

Law

Harvard Law School, 1986

Personal

Birthplace

New York, N.Y.

Elena Kagan is an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. President Barack Obama (D) nominated Kagan on May 10, 2010, to fill the seat vacated by retiring Justice John Paul Stevens. The U.S. Senate confirmed Kagan on August 5 of that year by a 63-37 vote. She was sworn in two days later.

Prior to assuming the bench, Kagan was the Solicitor General of the United States. She was appointed to the post by President Barack Obama (D) in 2009. She was the first woman to hold this position. A statement from the Obama White House about Kagan's nomination to the Supreme Court in 2010 included the following analysis of her professional experience: "As an academic, her scholarship focused on issues ranging from freedom of speech to government policy making – issues with a profound effect on our daily lives. As a White House lawyer and policy aide, she played lead role in working with Democrats and Republicans on legislation to prevent tobacco companies from targeting children with deceptive advertising practices and addictive products. As a law school Dean, she turned a fractious institution into a united one, and inspired students to use their legal training to serve their communities. And as Solicitor General, she has defended before the Supreme Court Congress’s efforts to protect shareholders’ rights, to implement bipartisan campaign finance reform, and to preserve the national security interests of the United States."

At the time of Kagan's appointment, she was the youngest sitting justice and the only justice who was not a former judge. The last time a non-judge was appointed to the Supreme Court was in 1971, with President Richard Nixon's (R) nominations of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. Of the 111 justices who had served the Supreme Court of the United States at the time of Kagan's nomination, 41 had joined with no prior judicial experience. Due to her previous service as President Bill Clinton’s (D) counsel, Kagan had to recuse from many cases in her first years on the Court. Once Kagan joined the Court, she and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor became the first group of three sitting female U.S. Supreme Court justices in history.

In 2014, Kagan said of her jurisprudence, "I’m kind of what some people call a common-law constitutionalist. I think really hard about how the way of interpreting the due process or equal protection clause has developed over time in case after case after case and try to think about the principles that have emerged in all those cases."

Kagan's Oyez profile highlighted her opinion-writing. She wrote few concurring opinions, rather favoring consensus, and is known for weaving in popular culture and technology into her opinions. In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment (2015), upholding the ban on royalties for expired patents, Kagan referred to and cited Spiderman comics. More of Kagan's notable opinions while on the United States Supreme Court include:

• Joining the 6-3 joint dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), in which the majority held that the U.S. Constitution did not guarantee the right to an abortion.
• Writing the 5-3 majority opinion in Madison v. Alabama (2018), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing prisoners with psychosis or dementia such that they are unable to understand the reason for their execution.
• Writing the 5-4 majority opinion in Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that mandatory life sentences were unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of committing homicide under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Judicial nominations and appointments

Supreme Court of the United States (2010-present)

Nomination Tracker
Nominee Information
Name: Elena Kagan
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Progress
Confirmed 87 days after nomination.
ANominated: May 10, 2010
AABA Rating: Unanimously Well Qualified
Questionnaire: Questionnaire
AHearing: June 28, 2010
QFRs: QFRs (Hover over QFRs to read more)
AReported: July 20, 2010
AConfirmed: August 5, 2010
AVote: 63-37

Kagan was nominated to the Supreme Court of the United States by President Barack Obama (D) on May 10, 2010, to fill the seat of John Paul Stevens. Obama said of Kagan:

“

Widely regarded as one of the nation’s leading legal minds, Solicitor General Elena Kagan has forged a path-breaking career in the law and in government service, distinguishing herself throughout by her penetrating intellect, unwavering integrity, sound judgment and prodigious work ethic. Her family taught her the value not just of education, but of service, and instilled in her an understanding of how the law affects the lives of working Americans.

”

At the time of Kagan's appointment, she was the youngest sitting justice and the only justice who was not a former judge. The last time a non-judge was appointed to the Supreme Court was in 1971, with President Richard Nixon's (R) nominations of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. Of the 111 justices who had served the Supreme Court of the United States at the time of Kagan's nomination, 41 had joined with no prior judicial experience. Due to her previous service as President Bill Clinton’s (D) counsel, Kagan had to recuse from many cases in her first years on the Court. Once Kagan joined the Court, she and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor became the first group of three sitting female U.S. Supreme Court justices in history.

Confirmation hearings

Kagan's Public Questionnaire Available Here

Kagan's Questions For The Record Available Here

C-Span videos of the Kagan confirmation hearings

Kagan's confirmation hearings were held from June 28, 2010, to July 2, 2010. In materials released to the Senate Judiciary Committee before the hearings, it seemed that Kagan would need to recuse herself from at least six of the 18 cases scheduled before the Supreme Court in the fall of 2010. The possible recusals were due to her position as solicitor general:

“

I would recuse in all matters for which I was counsel of record.

”

Upon joining the Court, Kagan frequently recused from cases due to her previous experience as counsel for President Bill Clinton (D) and as U.S. Solicitor General.

The American Bar Association rated Kagan as Unanimously Well Qualified. On July 20, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 13-6 in favor of Kagan's confirmation. On August 5, 2010, the full U.S. Senate confirmed Kagan to the Court in a 63-37 vote.

Biography

Kagan was born in New York City in 1960. She graduated summa cum laude from Princeton University in 1981 with a bachelor's degree in history. She graduated from Worcester College at the University of Oxford with a master's degree in philosophy in 1983. Kagan also attended Harvard University Law School and was supervising editor of the Harvard Law Review. She graduated magna cum laude in 1986 with a juris doctorate degree.

After law school, Kagan clerked for two federal judges: Judge Abner Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. Kagan was also an associate at the Washington, D.C. law firm Williams & Connolly from 1989 to 1991.

Kagan was a professor at the University of Chicago Law School from 1991 to 1997. She was a visiting professor at Harvard Law School from 1999 until she became a professor there in 2001. In 2003, she became the first woman to serve as dean of Harvard Law School.

Kagan worked in two presidential administrations. She was associate counsel to President Bill Clinton (D) from 1995 to 1996 and deputy assistant to the president for domestic policy from 1997 to 1999. In 2009, President Barack Obama (D) appointed Kagan as U.S. Solicitor General.

Professional career

• 2010-present: Associate justice, Supreme Court of the United States
• 2009-2010: Solicitor General of the United States
• 2003-2009: Dean, Harvard Law School
• 1999-2003: Huston Professor of Law, Harvard University
• 1997-1999: Deputy assistant to the president for domestic policy, Clinton administration
• 1993: Special counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee
• 1991-1997: Professor of law, University of Chicago Law School
• 1989-1991: Private practice, Washington, D.C.
• 1987-1988: Law clerk, Hon. Thurgood Marshall, Supreme Court of the United States
• 1986-1987: Law clerk, Hon. Abner Mikva, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Solicitor general nomination (2009)

Kagan Committee Questionnaire available here (Solicitor General nomination)

Questions and Responses for the Record available here (Solicitor General nomination)

Prior to joining the Court, Kagan was the United States Solicitor General. Kagan was nominated by President Barack Obama (D) on January 5, 2009, and confirmed by the U.S. Senate on March 19, 2009. Kagan was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on a supermajority 61-31 vote, with eight senators abstaining.

Approach to the law

Kagan is known to be a member of the court's liberal bloc. Oyez, a law project created by Cornell’s Legal Information Institute, Justia, and Chicago-Kent College of Law, said in 2019 that Kagan has "a more pragmatic approach to the law" as the only sitting justice in 2019 with no previous judicial experience. The website Supreme Court Review wrote of Kagan's jurisprudence:

“	As a Supreme Court justice, Kagan has been compared to Justice Scalia because of her quick wit, strong writing and aggressive questioning at oral arguments. Justice Kagan, however, has a unique style and is praised for being the justice most in touch with new technology and popular culture. At oral arguments on the sale of violent video games, Justice Kagan asked whether the statute would prohibit "Mortal Combat," [sic] a video game she considered to be "iconic." Justice Scalia interjected, "I don't know what she's talking about." At oral arguments on the FCC's indecency policy, Kagan expressed that she didn't see much of a difference between broadcast television, which is subject to the FCC's indecency policy, and basic cable, which is not subject to the policy.	”
—Supreme Court Review

Martin-Quinn score

Kagan's Martin-Quinn score following the 2023-2024 term was -2.51, making her the second most liberal justice on the court at that time. Martin-Quinn scores were developed by political scientists Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn from the University of Michigan, and measure the justices of the Supreme Court along an ideological continuum. The further from zero on the scale, the more conservative (>0) or liberal (<0) the justice. The chart below details every justice's Martin-Quinn score for the 2023-2024 term. These are preliminary scores provided by Kevin Quinn that may differ slightly from the final version of the scores that Martin and Quinn will make publicly available at a later date.

Video discussion

Kagan spoke at Harvard Law School in August 2019 discussing life as the court's junior justice, her law school experience, and her approach to arguments. The video of that event is embedded below.

Kagan spoke at Harvard Law School in September 2013 discussing her career and her role on the court. The video of that event is embedded below.

Supreme Court statistics

Opinions by year

Below is a table of the number of opinions, concurrences, and dissents that Kagan has issued since joining the Supreme Court, according to the Supreme Court record and from the annual Stat Pack produced by the website SCOTUSBlog. This information is updated annually at the end of each term. Information for the 2022 term is from a dataset provided by Dr. Adam Feldman, author of Empirical SCOTUS. Data for the 2022-2023 term does not include concurrences and dissents in part. Information for the 2023-2024 term is from the Empirical SCOTUS 2023 Stat Review.

Opinions written by year, Elena Kagan
	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	2018-2019	2019-2020	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023	2023-2024
Opinions	7	7	8	7	7	8	7	6	8	6	6	6	6	7
Concurrences	0	1	2	0	2	1	0	2	1	3	1	4	1	2
Dissents	3	1	3	3	2	3	1	1	3	1	4	7	3	2
Totals	10	9	13	10	11	12	8	9	12	10	11	17	10	11

Justice agreement

In the 2023-2024 term, Kagan had the highest agreement rate with Sonia Sotomayor. She had the lowest agreement rate with Clarence Thomas. In the 2022-2023 term, Kagan had the highest agreement rate with Sonia Sotomayor. She had the lowest agreement rate with John Roberts.

The table below highlights Kagan's agreement rate with each justice on the court during that term.

Elena Kagan agreement rates by term, 2017 - Present
Justice	2017-2018	2018-2019	2019-2020	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023	2023-2024
John Roberts	72%	69%	78%	72%	63%	82%	71%
Anthony Kennedy	71%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Clarence Thomas	59%	60%	50%	67%	49%	64%	51%
Ruth Bader Ginsburg	90%	88%	87%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Stephen Breyer	93%	86%	90%	93%	89%	N/A	N/A
Samuel Alito	57%	64%	55%	58%	52%	60%	53%
Sonia Sotomayor	91%	88%	88%	88%	90%	95%	97%
Neil Gorsuch	64%	65%	67%	70%	56%	69%	61%
Brett Kavanaugh	N/A	70%	71%	72%	63%	80%	69%
Amy Coney Barrett	N/A	N/A	N/A	69%	57%	78%	69%
Ketanji Brown Jackson	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	89%	92%

Frequency in majority

In the 2023-2024 term, Kagan was in the majority in 71 percent of decisions. Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor were in the majority the least often of all the justices. In the 2022-2023 term, Kagan was in the majority in 91 percent of decisions. Kagan was in the majority more often than five other justices.

Since the 2011-2012 term, Kagan has been in the majority more than 80 percent of the time seven times, and in the majority more than 90 percent of the time three times. Across these terms, she has been in the majority on average 82 percent of the time.

Noteworthy cases

See also: Noteworthy cases heard by current justices on the U.S. Supreme Court

The noteworthy cases listed in this section include any case where the justice authored a 5-4 majority opinion or an 8-1 dissent. Other cases may be included in this section if they set or overturn an established legal precedent, are a major point of discussion in an election campaign, receive substantial media attention related to the justice's ruling, or based on our editorial judgment that the case is noteworthy. For more on how we decide which cases are noteworthy, click here.

Since she joined the court through the 2021 term, Kagan authored the majority opinion in a 5-4 decision 12 times and had not authored a dissent in an 8-1 decision. The table below details these cases by year.

Elena Kagan noteworthy cases
Year	5-4 majority opinion	8-1 dissenting opinion
Total	12	0
2021	2	0
2020	2	0
2019	0	0
2018	2	0
2017	1	0
2016	0	0
2015	0	0
2014	1	0
2013	2	0
2012	1	0
2011	1	0
2010	0	0

U.S. Supreme Court noteworthy opinions

• SCOTUS 2021 term (Click to expand)

  Dissent in case deciding no right to abortion under the U.S. Constitution (2022)

  See also: Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

  Kagan was part of the three-justice dissent in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022). Kagan and Associate Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor jointly authored the dissenting opinion. The majority opinion, authored by Associate Justice Samuel Alito, held that the U.S. Constitution did not provide a right to abortion. Alito was joined in the majority by Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Chief Justice John Roberts joined with the majority to uphold Mississippi's abortion law but not to overturn Roe (1973) and Casey (1992). Alito wrote:

  “	We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right to abortion does not fall within this category.	”
  —Justice Alito

  The dissenting justices wrote:

  “	Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. ... The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all. ... Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe and Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the decisions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a constitutional right for an individual to make her own choices about “intimate relationships, the family,” and contraception. Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have themselves formed the legal foundation for subsequent decisions protecting these profoundly personal choices. As discussed earlier, the Court relied on Casey to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex intimate relationships. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 23. The Court later invoked the same set of precedents to accord constitutional recognition to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 665–666; supra, at 23. In sum, Roe and Casey are inextricably interwoven with decades of precedent about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra, at 21–24. While the majority might wish it otherwise, Roe and Casey are the very opposite of “‘obsolete constitutional thinking.’” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Casey 505 U. S., at 857). Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have undermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience unplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in pregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous physical, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncomplicated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, unavoidably involving significant physiological change and excruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and childbirth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even death. Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra, at 22. ... With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.	”
  —Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan

  
  

  Judicial remedies for convicted inmates to challenge a state's method of execution (2022)

  See also: Nance v. Ward

  Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Nance v. Ward (2022), holding that 42 U.S.C. §1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights "remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute." Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissent, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch.

  In the Court's majority opinion, Kagan wrote:

  “	In several recent decisions, this Court has set out rules for challenging a State’s proposed method of execution under the Eighth Amendment. To prevail on such a claim, a prisoner must identify a readily available alternative method of execution that would significantly reduce the risk of severe pain. In doing so, the prisoner is not confined to proposing a method authorized by the executing State’s law; he may instead ask for a method used in other States. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 19). This case concerns the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim. We have held that such a claim can go forward under 42 U. S. C. §1983, rather than in habeas, when the alternative method proposed is already authorized under state law. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, 644–647 (2004). Here, the prisoner has identified an alternative method that is not so authorized. The question presented is whether §1983 is still a proper vehicle. We hold that it is.	”
  —Justice Elena Kagan

• SCOTUS 2020 term (Click to expand)

  
  

  The patent law doctrine of assignor estoppel (2021)

  See also: Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc.

  Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc. (2021), upholding assignor estoppel and clarifying that the doctrine applies only when the patent assignor-seller’s invalidity claim contradicts explicit or implicit representations they made when assigning the patent. Kagan was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.

  Kagan wrote:

  “	In Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924), this Court approved the “well settled” patent-law doctrine of “assignor estoppel.” That doctrine, rooted in an idea of fair dealing, limits an inventor’s ability to assign a patent to another for value and later contend in litigation that the patent is invalid. The question presented here is whether to discard this century-old form of estoppel. Continuing to see value in the doctrine, we decline to do so. But in upholding assignor estoppel, we clarify that it reaches only so far as the equitable principle long understood to lie at its core. The doctrine applies when, but only when, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations he made in assigning the patent. ... This Court recognized assignor estoppel a century ago, and we reaffirm that judgment today. But as the Court recognized from the beginning, the doctrine is not limitless. Its boundaries reflect its equitable basis: to prevent an assignor from warranting one thing and later alleging another. Assignor estoppel applies when an invalidity defense in an infringement suit conflicts with an explicit or implicit representation made in assigning patent rights. But absent that kind of inconsistency, an invalidity defense raises no concern of fair dealing—so assignor estoppel has no place. For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.	”
  —Justice Elena Kagan

  
  

  A reckless offense cannot qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (2021)

  See also: Borden v. United States

  Kagan authored a 5-4 majority opinion in Borden v. United States (2021), holding that a reckless offense cannot qualify as a violent felony if it only requires a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. Kagan was joined in the majority by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

  Kagan wrote:

  “	The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a gun who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The question here is whether a criminal offense can count as a violent felony if it requires only a mens rea of recklessness—a less culpable mental state than purpose or knowledge. We hold that a reckless offense cannot so qualify. ... Offenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA. They do not require, as ACCA does, the active employment of force against another person. And they are not the stuff of armed career criminals. The judgment below is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.	”
  —Justice Elena Kagan

• SCOTUS 2018 term (Click to expand)

  SORNA's delegation is constitutional (2018)

  See also: Gundy v. United States

  In Gundy v. United States (2018), Kagan authored a 5-3 majority opinion in this case that affirmed the U.S. Attorney General's delegated power from Congress to specify the applicability of SORNA’s registration requirements to sex offenders convicted before SORNA was enacted. Kagan wrote:

  “	Indeed, if SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.	”
  —Justice Elena Kagan

  
  

  Panetti Eighth Amendment precedent prohibits execution of certain prisoners (2018)

  See also: Madison v. Alabama

  Kagan authored the 5-3 majority opinion of the Court in Madison v. Alabama (2018), ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing prisoners with psychosis or dementia such that they are unable to understand the reason for their execution. Kagan was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Kagan wrote:

  “

  The sole question on which Madison’s competency depends is whether he can reach a 'rational understanding' of why the State wants to execute him. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958. In answering that question—on which we again express no view, see supra, at 6—the state court may not rely on any arguments or evidence tainted with the legal errors we have addressed. And because that is so, the court should consider whether it needs to supplement the existing record. Some evidence in that record, including portions of the experts’ reports and testimony, expressly reflects an incorrect view of the relevance of delusions or memory; still other evidence might have implicitly rested on those same misjudgments. The state court, we have little doubt, can evaluate such matters better than we. It must do so as the first step in assessing Madison’s competency—and ensuring that if he is to be executed, he understands why.

  ”

  
  

• SCOTUS 2014 term (Click to expand)

  Supreme Court upholds Brulotte rule on royalties for expired patents (2014)

  In 1997, Stephen Kimble sued Marvel Enterprises Inc., later Marvel Entertainment LLC, for patent violation after Marvel produced a Spider-Man toy that was similar to a patented design held by Kimble. In 2001, Kimble and Marvel settled out of court with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties without an expiration. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed. Five years later, in 2006, Marvel had a licensing agreement with Hasbro giving Hasbro the right to produce the toy. Kimble sued Marvel, claiming the original patent would be infringed if royalties weren't paid. A federal district court, acting on the determination of a federal magistrate judge, awarded summary judgment to Marvel in holding that the 2001 settlement agreement between Kimble and Marvel was subject to the U.S. Supreme Court's Brulotte rule. The rule was developed in the court's opinion in Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964). In Brulotte, the Court ruled, "when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit." The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, and Kimble appealed to SCOTUS in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment.

  On June 22, 2015, the Court held that patent holders could not charge royalties for their invention after the patent term has expired, and that they would not overrule Brulotte, adhering to stare decisis. Writing for the six-justice majority, Justice Kagan wrote:

  “	Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers, but only for a limited time. ... As against this superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a superspecial justification to warrant reversing Brulotte. But the kinds of reasons we have most often held sufficient in the past do not help Kimble here. If anything, they reinforce our unwillingness to do what he asks. ... What we can decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly. Cf. S. Lee and S. Ditko, Amazing Fantasy No. 15: “Spider-Man,” p. 13 (1962) (“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility”). Finding many reasons for staying the stare decisis course and no “special justification” for departing from it, we decline Kimble’s invitation to overrule Brulotte.	”
  —Justice Elena Kagan

  
  

• SCOTUS 2012 term (Click to expand)

  Dissent holds that Court's arbitration ruling shielded companies from antitrust liability (2013)

  Justice Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion in the case of American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013). Italian Colors Restaurant and a group of merchants brought a class-action lawsuit against credit card company American Express, alleging that American Express' Card Acceptance Agreement violated U.S. antitrust law by using monopoly power to leverage merchants into accepting credit cards at higher rates than competitors' credit card fees. American Express' acceptance agreement forbid class-action lawsuits and compelled arbitration. The Court agreed, holding that the arbitration agreement preventing class or collective arbitration was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) "even if the proposed class of plaintiffs proves that it would be economically infeasible for individuals to pursue arbitration on their own." Justice Antonin Scalia authored the opinion for the 5-3 majority.

  In her dissent, Kagan wrote:

  “	So if the arbitration clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from anti-trust liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse. And here is the nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad. That answer is a betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws. ... In short, the Court does not consider—and does not decide—Italian Colors's (and similarly situated litigants') actual argument about why the effective-vindication rule precludes this agreement's enforcement. As a result, Amex's contract will succeed in depriving Italian Colors of any effective opportunity to challenge monopolistic conduct allegedly in violation of the Sherman Act. The FAA, the majority says, so requires. Do not be fooled. Only the Court so requires; the FAA was never meant to produce this outcome. The FAA conceived of arbitration as a “method of resolving disputes”—a way of using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U. S., at 481 (emphasis added). In the hands of today's majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability. The Court thus undermines the FAA no less than it does the Sherman Act and other federal statutes providing rights of action. I respectfully dissent.	”
  —Justice Kagan

• SCOTUS 2011 term (Click to expand)

  Juveniles convicted of homicide cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole (2012)

  On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in two consolidated cases, Miller v. Alabama (2012) and Jackson v. Hobbs (2012). Both cases concerned lower court rulings in which a juvenile defendant was convicted for capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Kagan held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbade mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide. In noting that children are different from adults under the Constitution for sentencing purposes, the Court held that life without parole was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles, but not for adult offenders:

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• United States Supreme Court cases and courts

External links

• Search Google News for this topic
• U.S. Supreme Court
• U.S. Supreme Court Biography
• Justice Kagan's biography from the Federal Judicial Center
• Profile by Oyez
• Profile from the Supreme Court Historical Society
• Writings by Justice Kagan from the Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute

Footnotes

Political offices
Preceded by John Paul Stevens	Supreme Court of the United States 2010-Present	Succeeded by -

Federal judges nominated by Barack Obama
Nominated	Federal judges nominated by Barack Obama