Argersinger v. Hamlin

Argersinger v. Hamlin
Reference: 407 U.S. 25
Term: 1971
Important Dates
Argued: December 6, 1971; February 28, 1972 Decided: June 12, 1972
Outcome
Supreme Court of Florida reversed
Majority
Harry Blackmun • William Brennan • William O. Douglas • Thurgood Marshall • Potter Stewart • Byron White
Concurring
William Brennan • Chief Justice Warren Burger • Lewis Powell • William Rehnquist
Dissenting
None

Argersinger v. Hamlin was decided on June 12, 1972, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The case is famous for expanding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to all individuals who "may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony." The holding in this case enhanced the court's 1963 ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, which held that all felony criminal defendants were to be afforded counsel at trial. After Argersinger, any criminal defendant who might be sentenced to prison was to be granted an attorney at trial.

Questions presented: Does the court's ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana, which incorporated to state courts the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury in felony cases, also apply in misdemeanor cases? Does the court's ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, which incorporated to state courts the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases, also apply in misdemeanor cases??

Case background

The petitioner in this case was Jon Argersinger. Argersinger was charged in the state of Florida with carrying a concealed weapon. In Florida at that time, the maximum punishment for conviction on the charge was a $1,000 fine, a term of imprisonment for up to six months, or both. Argersinger, who was too poor to afford an attorney (i.e., an indigent defendant), was given a bench trial before a judge but was not granted court-appointed counsel to aid in his defense. Argersinger was convicted at his bench trial and the judge sentenced him to 90 days in jail.

Argersinger sought relief for his uncounseled conviction before the Supreme Court of Florida. In reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in both Duncan v. Louisiana and Gideon v. Wainwright, the Florida Supreme Court upheld Argersinger's conviction, holding that the right to trial by jury and to court-appointed counsel for indigents applied only "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months' imprisonment." Argersinger petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Oral argument

Oral argument was first held on December 6, 1971. The case was re-argued on February 28, 1972.

Decision

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida was reversed.

Opinion

All nine justices agreed with the court's decision to reverse the Supreme Court of Florida. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the court for a six-justice majority.

Is the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury binding on state courts in misdemeanor cases?

In his opinion for the court, and noting the important protections of due process that apply in misdemeanor cases, Justice Douglas distinguished the Sixth Amendment's requirements for jury trials and for counsel in misdemeanor cases. Justice Douglas believed that because the right to trial by jury was "brigaded with a system of trial to a judge alone," that the right to trial by jury was not absolute. Referencing the court's opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, Douglas reflected on the "deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement," but Douglas also noted that "there is historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal cases.'" Consistent with the court's opinion in Duncan, the court held that the fact that Argersinger was sentenced to a period of confinement of less than six months in jail upon his conviction of a misdemeanor during a bench trial did not violate his rights of due process. Accordingly, the court declined to incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury to include criminal cases punishable by a term of less than six months imprisonment.

Is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel binding on state courts in misdemeanor cases?

Justice Douglas continued to reiterate the distinction between the Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury and to counsel in his opinion. In his words, while acknowledging the "historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal cases,' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to the assistance of counsel."

Douglas cited the historical antecedents of both English common law and the American colonial government's response in building his argument for a distinction between the two Sixth Amendment protections under consideration in Argersinger. Douglas quoted, in part, from the court's opinion in Powell v. Alabama when he noted,

“

'Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel ... [It] appears that in at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious crimes ...' The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be provided ... We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.

”

Though Justice Douglas conceded that Supreme Court precedents such as Powell v. Alabama and Gideon v. Wainwright had limited the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to felony cases, Douglas was of the view that "The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more ... We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial."

Decision

Justice Douglas held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." He concluded his opinion by addressing certain concerns related to the practical administration of law, concerns that were noted in each of the concurring opinions. In Justice Douglas' view, the presiding judge would be best able to determine when counsel was appropriate,

“

Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts. The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy.

”

As a result of the court's opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida was reversed.

Concurrences

Three concurring opinions were filed in this case. Justice William Brennan, the only concurring justice to sign on to the opinion of the court in this case, wrote a concurrence attending the court's opinion to "add only an observation upon its discussion of legal resources." In Justice Brennan's view, "Law students...may provide an important source of legal representation for the indigent ... I think it plain that law students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today's decision."

Chief Justice Warren Burger, in acknowledging agreement with both the court's opinion and with the concurrence authored by Justice Powell, noted that while "any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter ... the trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail term ... This need to predict will place a new load on courts already overburdened and already compelled to deal with far more cases in one day than is reasonable and proper." While acknowledging these concerns, the Chief Justice acknowledged that "experienced" judges and "the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it."

The longest, and most developed, of the concurrences was authored by Justice Lewis Powell, who was joined in his opinion by Justice William Rehnquist. Prior to his elevation to the U.S. Supreme Court, Powell served as president of the American Bar Association, a position to which he alluded near the conclusion of his concurrence, "Before becoming a member of this Court, I participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the availability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case, therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to me - as it has to the other members of the Court."

In Powell's view, the court's opinion as constructed raised concerns over the burdens placed on the criminal justice system. In his words,

“

although the new rule is extended today only to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of the constitutional right to free counsel. But even today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact upon the day-to-day functioning of the criminal justice system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitutional rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especially since it is supported neither by history nor precedent.

”

Justice Powell's opinion noted several potential concerns resulting from the opinion such as the impact on judicial discretion, separation of powers concerns, potential equal protection and discrimination problems, the impact on state budgets and state resources, and the potential inability of the bar to provide a sufficient number of counsel. Upon development of these concerns, Justice Powell stated,

“

Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight both to the likelihood of short-term 'chaos' and to the possibility of long-term adverse effects on the system. The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the guarantee of due process required the assistance of counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed or that the only workable method of insuring justice is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as to its effect upon the administration of justice. But in addition to the resulting problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any sentence other than deprivation of liberty however brief, the according of special constitutional status to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate from the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless the Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. Due process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result.

”

In offering a potential remedy, Justice Powell argued that he "would hold that the right to counsel in petty-offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis." Though he considered it "impossible" and "unwise" to create a sufficiently detailed and precise set of guidelines for when judges can and should appoint counsel, he felt that three factors would certainly need to be considered:

“

First, the court should consider the complexity of the offense charged ... Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained ... Third, the court should consider the individual factors peculiar to each case ... In this process, the courts of first instance which decide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel is needed.

”

See also

• Supreme Court of the United States
• History of the Supreme Court

External links

• Supreme Court of the United States