Ayestas v. Davis

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Ayestas v. Davis | |
Term: 2017 | |
Important Dates | |
Argument: October 30, 2017 Decided: March 21, 2018 | |
Outcome | |
Judgment of the Fifth Circuit vacated | |
Vote | |
9 - 0 | |
Majority | |
Samuel Alito • Chief Justice John G. Roberts • Anthony Kennedy • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Neil Gorsuch | |
Concurring | |
Sonia Sotomayor • Ruth Bader Ginsburg |
Ayestas v. Davis is a case argued during the October 2017 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 30, 2017. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.
Cameron Langford, writing in April of 2017 for Courthouse News, stated that "the case could resolve a circuit split on when death-row inmates should be given experts to help them develop claims that their trial attorneys were incompetent."[1]
In brief: In July of 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas received a capital sentence for a murder conviction. Over a period of over ten years, Ayestas sought appellate relief of his sentence in Texas state courts. During that period, Ayestas' appellate attorneys did not raise a claim that Ayestas' trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective in failing to introduce certain evidence that could have mitigated Ayestas' capital sentence, including evidence that Ayestas had suffered multiple head injuries related to automobile and motorcycle accidents, that he began drinking alcohol in his teenage years, and that he had developed a weekly cocaine habit prior to the murder. Ayestas exhausted his state appeals in 2008 without receiving a reduction in his sentence. In 2009, during his federal appeals, Ayestas' counsel tried to introduce the mitigating evidence for an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, but a federal court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because it wasn't raised during Ayestas' state appeals. A subsequent and unrelated U.S. Supreme Court decision later permitted a procedurally defaulted claim to be introduced in federal courts under certain circumstances. In an effort to prepare his appeal to introduce the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal court based on this evidence, Ayestas filed for assistance under a federal law, 18 U.S.C. §3599(f), to investigate his claim. The assistance Ayestas sought could be awarded based on a judicial determination that the assistance was "reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant." Both a federal district court and a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the assistance, holding that the existing evidence did not support the ineffective assistance claim and that Ayestas had not demonstrated a substantial need for the assistance in order to pursue the claim. Ayestas argued that requiring him to demonstrate a substantial need in order to obtain the assistance presented what he called a "logical circularity," because he could not show a substantial need for the assistance to develop his claim without first obtaining the assistance in order to develop his claim. Argument in the case was held on October 30, 2017.
You can review the lower court's opinion here.[3]
Background
In July of 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, who was also known as Dennis Zelaya Corea, received a capital sentence for the murder of Santiana Paneque, which took place in her home in Houston, Texas. That sentence was upheld on appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in August of 1998. In December of 1998, Ayestas filed for habeas relief in the state court system, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective because counsel failed to secure the presence of Ayestas' family members from Honduras at his sentencing. The appearance and statements of family at a criminal sentencing can be used to mitigate a criminal sentence. The state of Texas produced evidence at Ayestas' sentencing that Ayestas had instructed his trial counsel not to contact his family and that counsel indicated Ayestas' mother "seemed 'unconcerned' about her son's trial." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the capital sentence in 2008.[3]
In 2009, new appellate counsel was appointed for Ayestas, and his new counsel filed for habeas relief in federal district court. There, Ayestas raised an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim (hereafter, IATC) because counsel "failed to make a reasonable investigation of all potentially mitigating evidence," including evidence that Ayestas had suffered multiple head injuries related to automobile and motorcycle accidents, that he began drinking alcohol in his teenage years, and that he had developed a weekly cocaine habit prior to the murder. The district court ruled that Ayestas had procedurally defaulted on this IATC claim because he did not raise the claim during his state habeas proceedings. Subsequent to this holding, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled in an unrelated case, Martinez v. Ryan, that the ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel in failing to raise an IATC claim of trial counsel could give cause for a federal court to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim.[4] The Fifth Circuit remanded Ayestas' case to the district court to review Ayestas' procedurally defaulted IATC claims.[3]
On remand, Ayestas filed a motion for assistance in investigating his IATC claim against his trial counsel for failing to make a reasonable investigation of all potentially mitigating evidence. Ayestas filed his motion under a federal law, 18 U.S.C. §3599(f), which governs the assistance of counsel for indigent defendants. §3599(f) read,[5]
“ |
Upon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defendant’s attorneys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses therefor under subsection (g). No ex parte proceeding, communication, or request may be considered pursuant to this section unless a proper showing is made concerning the need for confidentiality. Any such proceeding, communication, or request shall be transcribed and made a part of the record available for appellate review.[6] |
” |
Ayestas filed his §3599(f) motion for a mitigation specialist to develop his IATC claim. In November of 2014, the district court denied Ayestas habeas relief, holding that neither Ayestas' trial counsel nor his state habeas counsel were ineffective, and that the broader IATC claim against his trial attorney was still procedurally defaulted. As such, because Ayestas' IATC claim was still defaulted, the district court held that the mitigation specialist was not "reasonably necessary" under §3599(f), The court also denied Ayestas a certificate of appealability (hereafter, COA), which is required in the Fifth Circuit in order to pursue certain habeas appeals.[7]
Ayestas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. On appeal, Ayestas argued the denial of assistance to prove his revised IATC claim against his trial counsel was wrong. Specifically, Ayestas claimed that "the district court should not have examined the merits of his IATC claims until it provided him with a mitigation specialist and allowed the results of that investigation to be presented. Ayestas argues that under Martinez and Trevino, in order to prove that his prior lawyers were ineffective, he must be allowed to develop and discover what his prior lawyers should have developed or discovered. ... By prematurely deciding that [Ayestas’s] IATC claims were facially meritless, without affording resources for factual development under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) ... the district court summarily dismissed [Ayestas’s] petition based solely on its review of the allegations contained in the original petition filed in 2009."
Ayestas claimed that the original petition he filed in 2009 was tainted by the work of ineffective counsel and, therefore, he should have had resources to investigate his IATC claim without relying solely on evidence that was itself tainted by ineffective counsel.[3]
A three-judge panel of the circuit court composed of Judges W. Eugene Davis, Jerry E. Smith, and Leslie Southwick heard the appeal. The panel issued a per curiam opinion on March 22, 2016, in which the court upheld the district court's order denying Ayestas a COA. In the panel's per curiam opinion, the court relied on two 2015 circuit precedents, Allen v. Stephens and Wade v. Stephens, to require that Ayestas demonstrate a substantial need for assistance to develop a claim that had not been procedurally defaulted. The opinion further stated,[3]
“ |
Ayestas argues the district court, and by extension these two precedents, required an impossibility: proving deficient performance in order to be given resources to discover the evidence of deficient performance. He mischaracterizes the requirement. There must be a viable constitutional claim, not a meritless one, and not simply a search for evidence that is supplemental to evidence already presented. ... The basic point is that a prisoner cannot get funding to search for whatever can be found to support an as-yet unidentified basis for holding that his earlier counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Instead, there must be a substantiated argument, not speculation, about what the prior counsel did or omitted doing. ... We interpret the district court’s ruling as being that any evidence of ineffectiveness, even if found, would not support relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to authorize a mitigation specialist for Ayestas before it determined the viability of Ayestas’s claim.[6] |
” |
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Ayestas argued that the courts mandated something of what Ayestas called a "logical circularity" in requiring him to show a substantial need in order to obtain assistance to develop his IATC claim. In order to receive funds or services under §3599(f), the law requires courts to determine if the funds sought are "reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant." In order to demonstrate if the funds were reasonably necessary, however, both the district court and the Fifth Circuit required Ayestas to show both a substantial need and a viable constitutional claim, which Ayestas argued he could not do without the §3599(f) assistance he sought.
Petitioner's challenge
Carlos Manuel Ayestas, the petitioner, challenged the holding of the Fifth Circuit requiring a defendant to demonstrate a substantial need in order to obtain mitigation assistance under §3599(f).
Certiorari granted
On November 7, 2016, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, the petitioner, initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Ayestas' certiorari request on April 3, 2017, limiting argument in the case to question 2 of the petition. Argument in the case was held on October 30, 2017.[8]
Question presented
Question presented: "Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit erred in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) withholds 'reasonably necessary' resources to investigate and develop an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that state habeas counsel forfeited, where the claimant's existing evidence does not meet the ultimate burden of proof at the time the Section 3599(f) motion is made."[8] |
Audio
- Audio of oral argument:[9]
Transcript
- Transcript of oral argument:[10]
Outcome
Decision
A unanimous Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling, holding that the Fifth Circuit had applied the incorrect legal standard.[2]
Opinion of the court
Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the court. Alito compared the phrase "reasonably necessary" in the statute with the Fifth Circuit's "substantial need" standard and concluded that the Fifth Circuit's standard imposed a higher burden:
“ | In the strictest sense of the term, something is 'necessary' only if it is essential. But in ordinary speech, the term is often used more loosely to refer to something that is merely important or strongly desired. The term 'necessary' in the Necessary and Proper Clause does not mean 'absolutely necessary,' and a 'necessary' business expense under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §162(a), may be an expense that is merely helpful and appropriate...Section 3599 appears to use the term 'necessary' to mean something less than essential. The provision applies to services that are 'reasonably necessary,' but it makes little sense to refer to something as being 'reasonably essential.' What the statutory phrase calls for, we conclude, is a determination by the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, as to whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services as sufficiently important...The Fifth Circuit’s test—substantial need'—is arguably more demanding. We may assume that the term 'need' is comparable to 'necessary'—that is, that something is 'needed' if it is 'necessary.' But the term 'substantial suggests a heavier burden than the statutory term 'reasonably.'[2][11][6] | ” |
Alito wrote that "determining whether funding is 'reasonably necessary' is a decision as to which district courts enjoy broad discretion." In making that determination, Alito continued, district courts should consider "the likelihood that the contemplated services will help the applicant win relief." Alito concluded, "a funding applicant must not be expected to prove that he will be able to win relief if given the services he seeks. But the 'reasonably necessary' test requires an assessment of the likely utility of the services requested, and §3599(f) cannot be read to guarantee that an applicant will have enough money to turn over every stone."[2]
The court vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its ruling.[2]
Concurrence by Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the court's judgment and opinion but wrote separately, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Sotomayor agreed with the court's conclusion that the correct legal standard to apply was whether the funding was "reasonably necessary." In her concurrence, she wrote that she believed Ayestas had met that standard:
“ | Ayestas has made a strong showing that he is entitled to §3599(f ) funding. As the Court notes, the statute affords district courts some discretion in these funding determinations, even where a petitioner shows the services are 'reasonably necessary.’ Exercise of that discretion may be appropriate if there is a showing of gamesmanship or where the State has provided funding for the same investigation services, as Ayestas conceded at argument. Nonetheless, the troubling failures of counsel at both the trial and state postconviction stages of Ayestas’ case are exactly the
types of facts that should prompt courts to afford investigatory services to ensure that trial errors that go to a 'bedrock principle in our justice system' do not go unaddressed.[2][6] |
” |
Text of opinion
See also
Footnotes
- ↑ Courthousenews.com, "SCOTUS picks up circuit split over habeas help," April 3, 2017
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 United States Supreme Court, "Ayestas v. Davis Opinion," March 21, 2018
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Carlos Manuel Ayestas a/k/a Dennis Zelaya Corea v. William Stephens, March 22, 2016
- ↑ In 2013, the Supreme Court extended this holding to Texas in the case of Trevino v. Thaler.
- ↑ Cornell University's Legal Information Institute, "18 U.S.C. § 3599 - Counsel for financially unable defendants," accessed September 24, 2017
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ The Fifth Circuit's rule reads, in part, "In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises from process issued by a state court, or in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, the applicant cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)."
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Supreme Court of the United States, Ayestas v. Davis, April 3, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Ayestas v. Davis, argued October 30, 2017
- ↑ Supreme Court of the United States, Ayestas v. Davis, argued October 30, 2017
- ↑ Internal citations and quotations omitted.