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Bravo-Fernandez v. United States

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Supreme Court of the United States
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States
Reference: 15-537
Issue: Double jeopardy
Term: 2016
Important Dates
Argued: October 4, 2016
Decided: November 29, 2016
Outcome
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Vote
8-0 to affirm
Majority
Chief Justice John G. RobertsAnthony KennedyClarence ThomasRuth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorElena Kagan
Concurring
Thomas
Dissenting
None


Bravo-Fernandez v. United States is a case that was argued during the October 2016 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. Argument in the case was held on October 4, 2016. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. On November 29, 2016, the court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado sought double jeopardy protection against retrial on bribery convictions.
  • The issue: When a conviction has been vacated as unconstitutional, does the Fifth Amendment preclude retrial on those charges if a criminal defendant has been constitutionally acquitted on other, separate charges in the same trial?
  • The outcome: The court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

  • In brief: In this case, petitioners Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado sought to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protection against being put on trial for the same charges after a final disposition is reached, a practice known as double jeopardy. The petitioners argued that they could be retried on bribery charges because a jury acquitted them on related offenses in an earlier trial and, in acquitting both men, the jury "necessarily found that the government failed to prove issues that the government would have to relitigate in ... new prosecutions."[1] Also, both men alleged that a district court order indicating that the men had been acquitted of the bribery charges—an order which the district court subsequently vacated—constituted a final judgment on the bribery charges. Thus, to retry them on the bribery charges would violate double jeopardy. Both the district court and the First Circuit rejected these arguments. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard argument on the retrial question only and not on the question of whether the vacated order constituted a final judgment. Argument was held on October 4, 2016. The court issued its opinion in the case on November 29, 2016, with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous court.

    You can review the First Circuit's opinion here.[1]

    Click on the tabs below to learn more about this Supreme Court case.

    Case

    Background

    In May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado traveled from Puerto Rico to Las Vegas, Nevada, to see a boxing match. At the time, Bravo-Fernandez was president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico and Martinez-Maldonado was a member of the Puerto Rico Senate. In June 2010, a grand jury indicted both defendants, finding probable cause "for the government's allegations concerning the connection between Bravo's payment for the trip and Martinez's support for legislation beneficial to Bravo's company." The indictment included violations of the federal program bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 666), violations of the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952 (a)(3)(A)), and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371). In a 2011 trial before Judge Francisco A. Besosa of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, a jury acquitted both defendants of the conspiracy and Travel Act violations, but convicted both defendants of federal program bribery under § 666.[1]

    On October 23, 2013, The First Circuit vacated the § 666 convictions as unconstitutional, finding that the jury was given improper instructions. The First Circuit remanded the case to the district court for possible re-prosecution of the § 666 bribery charges under the initial indictment. Two days later, Judge Besosa issued an order indicating that both defendants had been acquitted of the § 666 violations. The government filed an emergency motion to clarify the order, arguing that the defendants had not, in fact, been acquitted and that the First Circuit's decision did not mandate such an action. Judge Besosa vacated his own order, specifying that the defendants' initial convictions had only been vacated and not that the defendants had been acquitted of the bribery charges.

    Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado subsequently filed to reinstate Judge Besosa's order, arguing that the judge's order constituted a final judgment on the § 666 charges. As such, the petitioners could not be prosecuted again for the § 666 charges because to do so would violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. This motion was denied by the district court.

    Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado then sought an order to block retrial on the charges, "arguing that the part of the jury’s first-trial verdict finding them not guilty had necessarily rejected a bribery theory. The trial judge rejected the challenge, concluding that the jury may have acted irrationally in issuing verdicts that actually conflicted with each other. That, the judge found, removed the effect of the favorable part of the jury verdict, and the charges that had led to the earlier guilty part of the verdict could be tried again."[2]

    Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado appealed to the First Circuit, arguing that the district court's denial of the two motions violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy. In an opinion authored by Judge David Barron, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the two motions on June 15, 2015.[1][2]

    Petitioners' challenge

    The petitioners in the case advanced the argument that their acquittals on both the Travel Act and conspiracy charges from the previous trial preclude a retrial on the bribery charges. This argument relied on what is known as the rule of collateral estoppel, which "is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy."[1]

    According to the seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary, collateral estoppel is "an affirmative defense which prohibits a party from relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first one."[3]

    In 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson that "the collateral estoppel aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a prosecution that depends on a fact necessarily decided in the defendant's favor by an earlier acquittal." In granting certiorari in the Bravo-Fernandez case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "it is undisputed that the acquittals depended on the jury’s finding that the petitioners did not violate § 666." Under Ashe, any new prosecution in a criminal case involving multiple counts is prohibited if that prosecution relies upon a fact decided in favor of the defendants during the first trial.[2]

    The issue for the Supreme Court, however, was that there is a split among the federal circuit courts on the interpretation of collateral estoppel limits of double jeopardy. Further, the First Circuit believed, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashe, that the petitioners' acquittals on conspiracy and Travel Act violations do not prohibit a retrial on the § 666 bribery convictions, even though the bribery convictions were vacated on appeal and all three charges were adjudicated in the same trial. The First Circuit believed this, in part, because the inconsistent verdicts actually favored the prosecution, not the defendants, so Ashe would not prevent retrial on the bribery charges once the unfavorable portions of the jury verdicts (i.e, the bribery convictions) were vacated on appeal.

    Certiorari granted

    On October 23, 2015, petitioners Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado initiated proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petitioners' certiorari request on March 28, 2016, limiting the scope of judicial inquiry to question 1 of the petition. Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on October 4, 2016.

    Arguments


    Question presented

    Question presented:

    "Whether, under Ashe and Yeager, a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause."[4]


    Audio

    • Audio of oral argument:[5]



    Transcript

    • Transcript of oral argument:[6]

    Outcome

    Decision

    In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion.[7]

    Opinion

    In her opinion for the court, Justice Ginsburg distinguished between the application of issue preclusion under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment in this case versus other applications of issue preclusion. Ginsburg noted that while issue preclusion applied in cases where juries returned inconsistent verdicts—e.g., a case where juries convict on one charge and acquit on another when both charges "turn on the very same issue of ultimate fact" —as well as in instances where "the same jury in the same proceeding fails to reach a verdict on a different count turning on the same critical issue," here the court found that issue preclusion was inapplicable because "the guilty verdicts were vacated on appeal because of error in the judge’s instructions unrelated to the verdicts’ inconsistency."[7]

    The court accepted the First Circuit's reasoning, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashe v. Swenson, that the petitioners' acquittals on conspiracy and Travel Act violations did not prohibit a retrial on the petitioners' §666 bribery convictions, even though the bribery convictions were vacated on appeal and all three charges were adjudicated in the same trial. The First Circuit held the inconsistent verdicts actually favored the prosecution, not the defendants, so retrial on the §666 bribery charges would not be prevented once the unfavorable portions of the jury verdicts (i.e, the bribery convictions) were vacated on appeal. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the jury returned irreconciable verdicts, it is impossible to know how a jury would have ruled on the §666 bribery charges. In the court's words,[7]

    Here, the jury convicted Bravo and Martínez of violating §666 but acquitted them of conspiring, and traveling with the intent, to violate §666. The convictions and acquittals are irreconcilable because other elements of the Travel Act and conspiracy counts were not disputed. It is unknowable "which of the inconsistent verdicts—the acquittal[s] or the conviction[s]—'the jury really meant'" ... In view of the Government’s inability to obtain review of the acquittals ... the inconsistent jury findings weigh heavily against according those acquittals issue-preclusive effect ... That petitioners’ bribery convictions were later vacated for trial error does not alter our analysis. The critical inquiry is whether the jury actually decided that Bravo and Martínez did not violate §666 ... Indeed, the jurors in this case might not have acquitted on the Travel Act and conspiracy counts absent their belief that the §666 bribery convictions would stand ... Bravo and Martínez, therefore, cannot establish the factual predicate necessary to preclude the Government from retrying them on the standalone §666 charges—namely, that the jury in the first proceeding actually decided that they did not violate the federal bribery statute. [8]

    In affirming the decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Ginsburg noted, "because we do not know what the jury would have concluded had there been no instructional error ... a new trial on the counts of conviction is in order. Bravo and Martínez have succeeded on appeal to that extent, but they are entitled to no more. The split verdict does not impede the Government from renewing the prosecution."[7]

    Concurring opinions

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in the case noting that he would reconsider the court's prior holdings in Ashe v. Swenson and Yeager v. United States as they are applied to issue preclusion cases involving double jeopardy. Here, however, Justice Thomas joined the court's opinion "because the Court today properly declines to extend those cases, and indeed reaches the correct result under the Clause’s original meaning."[7]

    Dissenting opinions

    There were no dissenting opinions filed.

    The opinion

    Filings

    The court granted the petitioners' certiorari request on March 28, 2016.

    Merits filings

    Parties' filings

    • Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, the petitioners, filed their merits brief on June 10, 2016.
    • The United States, the respondent, filed its reply brief on August 12, 2016.

    Amicus curiae filings

    The following groups filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the petitioners, Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado.

    • Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
    • Brief of the National Association for Public Defense
    • Brief of various criminal law professors


    Certiorari filings

    Parties' filings

    • Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, the petitioners, filed their certiorari petition on October 23, 2015.
    • The United States of America, the respondent, filed a brief in opposition to certiorari on February 10, 2016, after three successive orders extending time to file a response were granted by the court.
    • Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, the petitioners, filed a reply brief on February 23, 2016, to respondent's brief in opposition.

    See also

    Footnotes