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County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund

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Supreme Court of the United States
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
Term: 2019
Important Dates
Argument: November 6, 2019
Decided: April 23, 2020
Outcome
Vacated and remanded
Vote
6-3
Majority
Stephen BreyerChief Justice John G. RobertsRuth Bader GinsburgSonia SotomayorElena KaganBrett Kavanaugh
Concurring
Brett Kavanaugh
Dissenting
Clarence ThomasNeil GorsuchSamuel Alito


County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund is a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on November 6, 2019, during the court's October 2019-2020 term. The case came on a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.[1]

The court vacated and remanded the 9th Circuit's decision in a 6-3 ruling. The court held "a permit is required when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge." In the majority opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that the 9th Circuit's holding was too broad, while the petitioner's argument was too narrow.[2] Click here for more information.

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Maui County, Hawaii, owns and operates four wells acting as the county's primary means of liquid waste disposal into groundwater and the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits the discharge of pollutants from point sources unless a party obtains an exemption from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The Hawaii Wildlife Fund sued Maui County for violating the CWA by discharging waste without a permit. The District of Hawaii agreed. On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
  • The issue: Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.[3]
  • The outcome: The court vacated and remanded the 9th Circuit's decision in a 6-3 ruling. The court held "a permit is required when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge." In the majority opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that the 9th Circuit's holding was too broad, while the petitioner's argument was too narrow.[2]

  • You can review the lower court's opinion here.

    Timeline

    The following timeline details key events in this case:

    • April 23, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 9th Circuit's decision and remanded the case.
    • November 6, 2019: Oral argument
    • February 19, 2019: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • August 27, 2018: The petitioner, the County of Maui, Hawaii, filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • February 1, 2018: The 9th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District of Hawaii.

    Background

    Maui County, Hawaii, owns and operates four wells at the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (LWRF). As of 2018, the wells were the county's main means of liquid waste disposal into groundwater and the Pacific Ocean.[4]

    The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits the discharge of pollutants, defined as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any ... well ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Parties who obtain a permit from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System are exempt from the point source pollutant prohibition.Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; invalid names, e.g. too many

    The Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club, Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association sued Maui County for violating the CWA by discharging liquid waste without a permit from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.[5]

    In 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted three summary judgment rulings, holding Maui County violated the CWA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, "finding the County discharged pollutants from its wells into the Pacific Ocean, in violation of the CWA, and further finding the County had fair notice of what was prohibited."[4]

    Maui County petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court. The court granted the petition on February 19, 2019.[3]

    Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the court:

    Questions presented:
    • Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.[3]

    Outcome

    In a 6-3 opinion, the court vacated the 9th Circuit's decision and remanded the case. The court held "a permit is required when there is a discharge from a point source directly into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge." In the majority opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that the 9th Circuit's holding was too broad, while the petitioner's argument was too narrow.[2]

    Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Samuel Alito also filed a dissenting opinion.

    Opinion

    In his opinion, Justice Breyer wrote:

    The structure of the statute indicates that, as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint source pollution, Congress intended to leave substantial responsibility and autonomy to the States. ... Those who look to legislative history to help interpret a statute will find that this Act’s history strongly supports our conclusion that the permitting provision does not extend so far. ... Congress left general groundwater regulatory authority to the States; its failure to include groundwater in the general EPA permitting provision was deliberate. ...

    [Maui and the Solicitor Generals'] interpretation is too narrow, for it would risk serious interference with EPA’s ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges.

    The statute’s words reflect Congress’ basic aim to provide federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable waters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory authority over land and groundwater. We hold that the statute requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.[6]

    —Justice Breyer[2]

    Concurring opinion

    Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, writing separately to emphasize three points: (1) the majority's interpretation of the CWA adhered to an interpretation set forth in a plurality opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United States (2006); (2) the CWA did not establish a test to indicate how a pollutant may be considered to have come from a point source; and (3) Justice Thomas' inaccurately argued in his dissent that the court did not commit to the most important factors in determining whether pollutants entering navigable waters come from a point source.[2]

    In his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote:

    Under Justice Scalia’s interpretation in Rapanos, the fact that the pollutants from Maui’s wastewater facility reach the ocean via an indirect route does not itself exempt Maui’s facility from the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirement for point sources. The Court today adheres to Justice Scalia’s analysis in Rapanos on that issue. ...


    The statute does not establish a bright-line test regarding when a pollutant may be considered to have come “from” a point source. The source of the vagueness is Congress’ statutory text, not the Court’s opinion. The Court’s opinion seeks to translate the vague statutory text into more concrete guidance. ...

    The Court identifies relevant factors to consider and emphasizes that “[t]ime and distance are obviously important.” And the Court expressly adds that “[t]ime and distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”[6]

    —Justice Kavanaugh[2]

    Dissenting opinion

    Justice Thomas

    Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Justice Thomas argued a permit was required "only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters."[2]

    In his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:

    Based on the statutory text and structure, I would hold that a permit is required only when a point source discharges pollutants directly into navigable waters. The Court adopts this interpretation in part, concluding that a permit is required for “a direct discharge.” But the Court then departs from the statutory text by requiring a permit for “the functional equivalent of a direct discharge,” which it defines through an open-ended inquiry into congressional intent and practical considerations. ...


    The inclusion of the term “addition” in the CWA indicates that the statute excludes anything other than a direct discharge. When a point source releases pollutants to groundwater, one would naturally say that the groundwater has been augmented with pollutants from the point source. If the pollutants eventually reach navigable waters, one would not naturally say that the navigable waters have been augmented with pollutants from the point source. The augmentation instead occurs with pollutants from the groundwater. ...

    Construing the EPA’s power to regulate point sources to allow the agency to regulate nonpoint sources and groundwater is in serious tension with Congress’ design.[6]

    —Justice Thomas[2]

    Justice Alito

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion.

    In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote

    The Court makes up a rule that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and inconsistent application. ... It holds that a permit is required “when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.” This is not a plausible interpretation of the statutory text and, to make matters worse, the Court’s test has no clear meaning. ... Entities like water treatment authorities that need to know whether they must get a permit are left to guess how this nebulous standard will be applied. ...


    I would interpret the words of the statute, and in my view, the better of the two possible interpretations is that a permit is required when a pollutant is discharged directly from a point source to navigable waters. This interpretation is consistent with the statutory language and better fits the overall scheme of the Clean Water Act. And properly understood, it does not have the sort of extreme consequences that the Court finds unacceptable.[6]

    —Justice Alito[2]

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    Oral argument

    Audio



    Transcript

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes